Cognitive Psychology seminars

People largely differ with respect to how well they can learn, memorize, and perceive faces. In this talk, I address two potential sources of variation. One factor might be people’s ability to adapt their perception to the kind of faces they are currently exposed to. For instance, some studies report that those who show larger adaptation effects are also better at performing face learning and memory tasks. Another factor might be people’s sensitivity to perceive fine differences between similar-looking faces. In fact, one study shows that the brain of good performers in a face memory task shows larger neural differences between similar-looking faces. Capitalizing on this body of evidence, I present a behavioural study where I explore the relationship between people’s perceptual adaptability and sensitivity and their individual face processing performance.

An understanding of the self helps explain not only human thoughts, feelings, attitudes but also many aspects of everyday behaviour. This talk focuses on a viewpoint - self as processes. This viewpoint emphasizes the dynamics of the self that best connects with the development of the self over time and its realist orientation. We are combining psychological experiments and data mining to comprehend the stability and adaptability of the self across various populations. In this talk, I draw on evidence from experimental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and machine learning approaches to demonstrate why and how self-association affects cognition and how it is modulated by various social experiences and situational factors

Working memory is about the past but for the future. Adopting such a future-focused perspective shifts the narrative of working memory as a limited-capacity storage system to working memory as an anticipatory buffer that helps us prepare for potential and sequential upcoming behaviour. In my talk, I will present a series of our recent studies that have started to reveal emerging principles of a working memory that looks forward – highlighting, amongst others, how selective attention plays a vital role in prioritising internal contents for behaviour, and the bi-directional links between visual working memory and action. These studies show how studying the dynamics of working memory, selective attention, and action together paves way for an integrated understanding of how mind serves behaviour.

Neurofeedback provides a feedback display which is linked with on-going brain activity and thus allows self-regulation of neural activity in specific brain regions associated with certain cognitive functions and is considered a promising tool for clinical interventions. Recent reviews of neurofeedback have stressed the importance of applying the “double-blind” experimental design where critically the patient is unaware of the neurofeedback treatment condition. An important question then becomes; is double-blind even possible? Or are subjects aware of the purposes of the neurofeedback experiment? – this question is related to the issue of how we assess awareness or the absence of awareness to certain information in human subjects. Fortunately, methods have been developed which employ neurofeedback implicitly, where the subject is claimed to have no awareness of experimental purposes when performing the neurofeedback. Implicit neurofeedback is intriguing and controversial because it runs counter to the first neurofeedback study, which showed a link between awareness of being in a certain brain state and control of the neurofeedback-derived brain activity. Claiming that humans are unaware of a specific type of mental content is a notoriously difficult endeavor. For instance, what was long held as wholly unconscious phenomena, such as dreams or subliminal perception, have been overturned by more sensitive measures which show that degrees of awareness can be detected. In this talk, I will discuss whether we will critically examine the claim that we can know for certain that a neurofeedback experiment was performed in an unconscious manner. I will present evidence that in certain neurofeedback experiments such as manipulations of attention, participants display residual degrees of awareness of experimental contingencies to alter their cognition.

Despite her still poor visual acuity and minimal visual experience, a 2-3 month old baby will reliably respond to facial expressions, smiling back at her caretaker or older sibling. But what if that same baby had been deprived of her early visual experience? Will she be able to appropriately respond to seemingly mundane interactions, such as a peer’s facial expression, if she begins seeing at the age of 10? My work is part of Project Prakash, a dual humanitarian/scientific mission to identify and treat curably blind children in India and then study how their brain learns to make sense of the visual world when their visual journey begins late in life. In my talk, I will give a brief overview of Project Prakash, and present findings from one of my primary lines of research: plasticity of face perception with late sight onset. Specifically, I will discuss a mixed methods effort to probe and explain the differential windows of plasticity that we find across different aspects of distributed face recognition, from distinguishing a face from a nonface early in the developmental trajectory, to recognizing facial expressions, identifying individuals, and even identifying one’s own caretaker. I will draw connections between our empirical findings and our recent theoretical work hypothesizing that children with late sight onset may suffer persistent face identification difficulties because of the unusual acuity progression they experience relative to typically developing infants. Finally, time permitting, I will point to potential implications of our findings in supporting newly-sighted children as they transition back into society and school, given that their needs and possibilities significantly change upon the introduction of vision into their lives.

Humans constantly make perceptual decisions on human faces and voices. These regularly come with the challenge of receiving only uncertain sensory evidence, resulting from noisy input and noisy neural processes. Efficiently adapting one’s internal decision system including prior expectations and subsequent metacognitive assessments to these challenges is crucial in everyday life. However, the exact decision mechanisms and whether these represent modifiable states remain unknown in the general population and clinical patients with psychosis. Using data from a laboratory-based sample of healthy controls and patients with psychosis as well as a complementary, large online sample of healthy controls, I will demonstrate how a combination of perceptual face and voice recognition decision fidelity, metacognitive ratings, and Bayesian computational modelling may be used as indicators to differentiate between non-clinical and clinical states in the future.

The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one's own behavior and, through them, external events. Why is this subjective feeling important for humans? Is it just a by-product of our actions? Previous studies have shown that the sense of agency can affect the intensity of sensory input because we predict the input from our motor intention. However, my research has found that the sense of agency plays more roles than just predictions. It enhances perceptual processes of sensory input and potentially helps to harvest more information about the link between the external world and the self. Furthermore, our recent research found both indirect and direct evidence that the sense of agency is important for people's exploratory behaviors, and this may be linked to proximal exploitations of one's control in the environment. In this talk, I will also introduce the paradigms we use to study the sense of agency as a result of perceptual processes, and our findings of individual differences in this sense and the implications.

Explicit similarity judgments tend to emphasize relational information more than do difference judgments. In this talk, I propose and test the hypothesis that this asymmetry arises because human reasoners represent the relation different as the negation of the relation same (i.e., as not-same). This proposal implies that processing difference is more cognitively demanding than processing similarity. Both for verbal comparisons between word pairs, and for visual comparisons between sets of geometric shapes, participants completed a triad task in which they selected which of two options was either more similar to or more different from a standard. On unambiguous trials, one option was unambiguously more similar to the standard, either by virtue of featural similarity or by virtue of relational similarity. On ambiguous trials, one option was more featurally similar (but less relationally similar) to the standard, whereas the other was more relationally similar (but less featurally similar). Given the higher cognitive complexity of assessing relational similarity, we predicted that detecting relational difference would be particularly demanding. We found that participants (1) had more difficulty accurately detecting relational difference than they did relational similarity on unambiguous trials, and (2) tended to emphasize relational information more when judging similarity than when judging difference on ambiguous trials. The latter finding was captured by a computational model of comparison that weights relational information more heavily for similarity than for difference judgments. These results provide convergent evidence for a representational asymmetry between the relations same and different.

Vector-space models are used frequently to compare similarity and dimensionality among entity concepts. What happens when we apply these models to relational concepts? What is the evidence that such models do apply to relational concepts? If we use such a model, then one implication is that maximizing surface feature variation should improve relational concept learning. For example, in STEM instruction, the effectiveness of teaching by analogy is often limited by students’ focus on superficial features of the source and target exemplars. However, in contrast to the prediction of the vector-space computational model, the strategy of progressive alignment (moving from perceptually similar to different targets) has been suggested to address this issue (Gentner & Hoyos, 2017), and human behavioral evidence has shown benefits from progressive alignment. Here I will present some preliminary data that supports the computational approach. Participants were explicitly instructed to match stimuli based on relations while perceptual similarity of stimuli varied parametrically. We found that lower perceptual similarity reduced accurate relational matching. This finding demonstrates that perceptual similarity may interfere with relational judgements, but also hints at why progressive alignment maybe effective. These are preliminary, exploratory data and I to hope receive feedback on the framework and to start a discussion in a group on the utility of vector-space models for relational concepts in general.

Following the seminal structure mapping theory by Dedre Gentner, the process of mapping the corresponding structures of relations defining two analogs has been understood as a key component of analogy making. However, not without a merit, in recent years some semantic, pragmatic, and perceptual aspects of analogy mapping attracted primary attention of analogy researchers. For almost a decade, our team have been re-focusing on relational structure mapping, investigating its potential mechanisms across various analogy tasks, both abstract (semantically-lean) and more concrete (semantically-rich), using diverse methods (behavioral, correlational, eye-tracking, EEG). I will present the overview of our main findings. They suggest that structure mapping (1) consists of an incremental construction of the ultimate mental representation, (2) which strongly depends on working memory resources and reasoning ability, (3) even if as little as a single trivial relation needs to be represented mentally. The effective mapping (4) is related to the slowest brain rhythm – the delta band (around 2-3 Hz) – suggesting its highly integrative nature. Finally, we have developed a new task – Graph Mapping – which involves pure mapping of two explicit relational structures. This task allows for precise investigation and manipulation of the mapping process in experiments, as well as is one of the best proxies of individual differences in reasoning ability. Structure mapping is as crucial to analogy as Gentner advocated, and perhaps it is crucial to cognition in general.

Research into pitch perception and time perception has typically treated the two as independent processes. However, previous studies of music and speech perception have suggested that pitch and timing information may be processed in an integrated manner, such that the pitch of an auditory stimulus can influence a person’s perception, expectation, and memory of its duration and tempo. Typically, higher-pitched sounds are perceived as faster and longer in duration than lower-pitched sounds with identical timing. We conducted a series of experiments to better understand the limits of this pitch-time integrality. Across several experiments, we tested whether the higher-equals-faster illusion generalizes across the broader frequency range of human hearing by asking participants to compare the tempo of a repeating tone played in one of six octaves to a metronomic standard. When participants heard tones from all six octaves, we consistently found an inverted U-shaped effect of the tone’s pitch height, such that perceived tempo peaked between A4 (440 Hz) and A5 (880 Hz) and decreased at lower and higher octaves. However, we found that the decrease in perceived tempo at extremely high octaves could be abolished by exposing participants to high-pitched tones only, suggesting that pitch-induced timing biases are context sensitive. We additionally tested how the timing of an auditory stimulus influences the perception of its pitch, using a pitch discrimination task in which probe tones occurred early, late, or on the beat within a rhythmic context. Probe timing strongly biased participants to rate later tones as lower in pitch than earlier tones. Together, these results suggest that pitch and time exert a bidirectional influence on one another, providing evidence for integrated processing of pitch and timing information in auditory perception. Identifying the mechanisms behind this pitch-time interaction will be critical for integrating current models of pitch and tempo processing.

In this talk I will present our recent behavioural and neuroscience research on how the brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so. I will propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. We show that belief change occurs when the potential outcomes of holding it alters, for example when moving from a safe environment to a threatening environment. Our findings yield predictions about how belief formation alters as a function of mental health. We test these predictions using a linguistic analysis of participants’ web searches ‘in the wild’ to quantify the affective properties of information they consume and relate those to reported psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I will present a study in which we used our framework to alter the incentive structure of social media platforms to reduce the spread of misinformation and improve belief accuracy.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Magnitude estimation and stimulus discrimination tasks are affected by perceptual biases that cause the stimulus parameter to be perceived as shifted toward the mean of its distribution. These biases have been extensively studied in psychophysics and, more recently and to a lesser extent, with neural activity recordings. New computational techniques allow us to train spiking recurrent neural networks on the tasks used in the experiments. This provides us with another valuable tool with which to investigate the network mechanisms responsible for the biases and how behavior could be modeled. As an example, in this talk I will consider networks trained to discriminate the durations of temporal intervals. The trained networks presented the contraction bias, even though they were trained with a stimulus sequence without temporal correlations. The neural activity during the delay period carried information about the stimuli of the current trial and previous trials, this being one of the mechanisms that originated the contraction bias. The population activity described trajectories in a low-dimensional space and their relative locations depended on the prior distribution. The results can be modeled as an ideal observer that during the delay period sees a combination of the current and the previous stimuli. Finally, I will describe how the neural trajectories in state space encode an estimate of the interval duration. The approach could be applied to other cognitive tasks.

Perception and action are biased by our recent experiences. Even when a sequence of stimuli are randomly presented, responses are sometimes attracted toward the past. The mechanism of such bias, recently termed serial dependence, is still under investigation. Currently, there is mixed evidence indicating that such bias could be either from a sensory and perceptual origin or occurring only at decisional stages. In this talk, I will present recent findings from our group showing that biases are decreased when disrupting the memory trace in a premotor region in a simple visuomotor task. In addition, we have shown that this bias is stable over periods of up to 8 s. At the end, I will show ongoing analysis of a recent experiment and argue that serial dependence may rely on distributed memory representations of stimuli and task relevant features.

Language production is a form of behavior and as such involves executive control and the prefrontal function. The cognitive architecture of prefrontal executive function thus certainly plays an important role in shaping language production. In this talk, I will review the main features of the prefrontal executive function we have uncovered during the last two decades and I will discuss how these features may help understanding language production.