Cognitive Psychology seminars

Adolescent development is not only shaped by the mere passing of time and accumulating experience, but it also depends on pubertal timing and the cascade of maturational processes orchestrated by gonadal hormones. Although individual variability in puberty onset confounds adolescent studies, it has not been efficiently controlled for. Here we introduce ultrasonic bone age assessment to estimate biological maturity and disentangle the independent effects of chronological and biological age on adolescent cognitive abilities, emotional development, and brain maturation. Comparing cognitive performance of participants with different skeletal maturity we uncover the impact of biological age on both IQ and specific abilities. With respect to emotional development, we find narrow windows of highest vulnerability determined by biological age. In terms of neural development, we focus on the relevance of neural states unrelated to sensory stimulation, such as cortical activity during sleep and resting states, and we uncover a novel anterior-to-posterior pattern of human brain maturation. Based on our findings, bone age is a promising biomarker of adolescent maturity.

Research into pitch perception and time perception has typically treated the two as independent processes. However, previous studies of music and speech perception have suggested that pitch and timing information may be processed in an integrated manner, such that the pitch of an auditory stimulus can influence a person’s perception, expectation, and memory of its duration and tempo. Typically, higher-pitched sounds are perceived as faster and longer in duration than lower-pitched sounds with identical timing. We conducted a series of experiments to better understand the limits of this pitch-time integrality. Across several experiments, we tested whether the higher-equals-faster illusion generalizes across the broader frequency range of human hearing by asking participants to compare the tempo of a repeating tone played in one of six octaves to a metronomic standard. When participants heard tones from all six octaves, we consistently found an inverted U-shaped effect of the tone’s pitch height, such that perceived tempo peaked between A4 (440 Hz) and A5 (880 Hz) and decreased at lower and higher octaves. However, we found that the decrease in perceived tempo at extremely high octaves could be abolished by exposing participants to high-pitched tones only, suggesting that pitch-induced timing biases are context sensitive. We additionally tested how the timing of an auditory stimulus influences the perception of its pitch, using a pitch discrimination task in which probe tones occurred early, late, or on the beat within a rhythmic context. Probe timing strongly biased participants to rate later tones as lower in pitch than earlier tones. Together, these results suggest that pitch and time exert a bidirectional influence on one another, providing evidence for integrated processing of pitch and timing information in auditory perception. Identifying the mechanisms behind this pitch-time interaction will be critical for integrating current models of pitch and tempo processing.

A high-resolution central fovea is a prominent design feature of human vision. But how important is the fovea for information processing and gaze guidance in everyday visual-cognitive tasks? Following on from classic findings for sentence reading, I will present key results from a series of eye-tracking experiments in which observers had to search for a target object within static or dynamic images of real-world scenes. Gaze-contingent scotomas were used to selectively deny information processing in the fovea, parafovea, or periphery. Overall, the results suggest that foveal vision is less important and peripheral vision is more important for scene perception and search than previously thought. The importance of foveal vision was found to depend on the specific requirements of the task. Moreover, the data support a central-peripheral dichotomy in which peripheral vision selects and central vision recognizes.

Humans and other animals can estimate rapidly the number of items in a scene, flashes or tones in a sequence and motor actions. Adaptation techniques provide clear evidence in humans for the existence of specialized numerosity mechanisms that make up the numbersense. This sense of number is truly general, encoding the numerosity of both spatial arrays and sequential sets, in vision and audition, and interacting strongly with action. The adaptation (cross-sensory and cross-format) acts on sensory mechanisms rather than decisional processes, pointing to a truly general sense.

Relational thinking involves comparing abstract relationships between mental representations that vary in complexity; however, this complexity is rarely made explicit during everyday comparisons. This study explored how people naturally navigate relational complexity and interference using a novel relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task with both minimal and relationally directed instruction to observe changes in performance across three levels of relational complexity: perceptual, analogy, and system mappings. Individual working memory and relational abilities were examined to understand RMTS performance and susceptibility to interfering relational structures. Trials were presented without practice across four blocks and participants received feedback after each attempt to guide learning. Experiment 1 instructed participants to select the target that best matched the sample, while Experiment 2 additionally directed participants’ attention to same and different relations. Participants in Experiment 2 demonstrated improved performance when solving analogical mappings, suggesting that directing attention to relational characteristics affected behavior. Higher performing participants—those above chance performance on the final block of system mappings—solved more analogical RMTS problems and had greater visuospatial working memory, abstraction, verbal analogy, and scene analogy scores compared to lower performers. Lower performers were less dynamic in their performance across blocks and demonstrated negative relationships between analogy and system mapping accuracy, suggesting increased interference between these relational structures. Participant performance on RMTS problems did not change monotonically with relational complexity, suggesting that increases in relational complexity places nonlinear demands on working memory. We argue that competing relational information causes additional interference, especially in individuals with lower executive function abilities.

In this talk I will present our recent behavioural and neuroscience research on how the brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so. I will propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. We show that belief change occurs when the potential outcomes of holding it alters, for example when moving from a safe environment to a threatening environment. Our findings yield predictions about how belief formation alters as a function of mental health. We test these predictions using a linguistic analysis of participants’ web searches ‘in the wild’ to quantify the affective properties of information they consume and relate those to reported psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I will present a study in which we used our framework to alter the incentive structure of social media platforms to reduce the spread of misinformation and improve belief accuracy.

In this lecture, I would like to share with the broad audience the empirical results gathered and the theoretical advancements made in the framework of the Lendület project entitled ’The cognitive basis of human sociality’. The main objective of this project was to understand the mechanisms that enable the unique sociality of humans, from the angle of cognitive science. In my talk, I will focus on recent empirical evidence in the study of three fundamental social cognitive functions (social categorization, theory of mind and social learning; mainly from the empirical lenses of developmental psychology) in order to outline a theory that emphasizes the need to consider their interconnectedness. The proposal is that the ability to represent the social world along categories and the capacity to read others’ minds are used in an integrated way to efficiently assess the epistemic states of fellow humans by creating a shared representational space. The emergence of this shared representational space is both the result of and a prerequisite to efficient learning about the physical and social environment.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Vocabulary learning applications like Duolingo have millions of users around the world, but yet are based on very simple heuristics to choose teaching material to provide to their users. In this presentation, we will discuss the possibility to develop more advanced artificial teachers, which would be based on modeling of the learner’s inner characteristics. In the case of teaching vocabulary, understanding how the learner memorizes is enough. When it comes to picking grammar exercises, it becomes essential to assess how the learner reasons, in particular by analogy. This second application will illustrate how analogical and case-based reasoning can be employed in an alternative way in education: not as the teaching algorithm, but as a part of the learner’s model.

Theory of mind, which consists of reasoning about the knowledge, belief, desire, and similar mental states of others, is a key component of social reasoning and social interaction. While it has been studied by cognitive scientists for decades, none of the prevailing theories of the processes that underlie theory of mind reasoning and development explain the breadth of experimental findings. I propose that this is because theory of mind is, like much of human reasoning, inherently analogical. In this talk, I will discuss several theory of mind findings from the psychology literature, the challenges they pose for our understanding of theory of mind, and bring in evidence from the Analogical Theory of Mind (AToM) cognitive model that demonstrates how these findings fit into an analogical understanding of theory of mind reasoning.

Space is the universal donor for relations" (Gentner, 2014). This quote is the foundation of my talk. I will explore how and why visual representations and analogies are related, and why. I will also explore how considering the relation between analogy and spatial reasoning can shed light on why and how spatial thinking is correlated with learning in STEM fields. For example, I will consider children’s numbers sense and learning of the number line from the perspective of analogical reasoning.

Previous experiments have shown that a comparison of two written narratives highlights their shared relational structure, which in turn facilitates the retrieval of analogous narratives from the past (e.g., Gentner, Loewenstein, Thompson, & Forbus, 2009). However, analogical retrieval occurs across domains that appear more conceptually distant than merely different narratives, and the deepest analogies use matches in higher-order relational structure. The present study investigated whether comparison can facilitate analogical retrieval of higher-order relations across written narratives and abstract symbolic problems. Participants read stories which became retrieval targets after a delay, cued by either analogous stories or letter-strings. In Experiment 1 we replicated Gentner et al. who used narrative retrieval cues, and also found preliminary evidence for retrieval between narrative and symbolic domains. In Experiment 2 we found clear evidence that a comparison of analogous letter-string problems facilitated the retrieval of source stories with analogous higher-order relations. Experiment 3 replicated the retrieval results of Experiment 2 but with a longer delay between encoding and recall, and a greater number of distractor source stories. These experiments offer support for the schema induction account of analogical retrieval (Gentner et al., 2009) and show that the schemas abstracted from comparison of narratives can be transferred to non-semantic symbolic domains.

How and why are analogies spontaneously generated? Despite the prominence of analogy in learning and reasoning, there is little research on whether and how analogy is spontaneously generated in everyday settings. Here we fill this gap by gathering parents' answers to children's real questions, and examining analogy use in parental explanations. Study 1 found that parents used analogy spontaneously in their explanations, despite no prompt nor mention of analogy in the instruction. Study 2 found that these analogical explanations were rated highly by parents, schoolteachers, and university students alike. In Study 3, six-year-olds also rated good analogical explanations highly, but unlike their parents, did not rate them higher than causal, non-analogical explanations. We discuss what makes an analogy a good explanation, and how theories from both explanation and analogy research explain one’s motivation for spontaneously generating analogies.

A core question in human development is how we bring meaning to conventional symbols. This question is deeply connected to understanding how children learn mathematics—a symbol system with unique vocabularies, syntaxes, and written forms. In this talk, I will present findings from a program of research focused on children’s acquisition of place value symbols (i.e., multidigit number meanings). The base-10 symbol system presents a variety of obstacles to children, particularly in English. Children who cannot overcome these obstacles face years of struggle as they progress through the mathematics curriculum of the upper elementary and middle school grades. Through a combination of longitudinal, cross-sectional, and pretest-training-posttest approaches, I aim to illuminate relational learning mechanisms by which children sometimes succeed in mastering the place value system, as well as instructional techniques we might use to help those who do not.

Prior studies of A:B::C:D verbal analogies have identified several factors that affect performance, including the semantic similarity between source and target domains (semantic distance), the semantic association between the C-term and incorrect answers (distracter salience), and the type of relations between word pairs (e.g., categorical, compositional, and causal). However, it is unclear how these stimulus properties affect performance when utilized together. Moreover, how do these item factors interact with individual differences such as crystallized intelligence and creative thinking? Several studies reveal interactions among these item and individual difference factors impacting verbal analogy performance. For example, a three-way interaction demonstrated that the effects of semantic distance and distracter salience had a greater impact on performance for compositional and causal relations than for categorical ones (Jones, Kmiecik, Irwin, & Morrison, 2022). Implications for analogy theories and future directions are discussed.

The challenges of problem solving do not exclusively lie in how to perform heuristic search, but they begin with how we understand a given task: How to cognitively represent the task domain and its components can determine how quickly someone is able to progress towards a solution, whether advanced strategies can be discovered, or even whether a solution is found at all. While this challenge of constructing and changing representations has been acknowledged early on in problem solving research, for the most part it has been sidestepped by focussing on simple, well-defined problems whose representation is almost fully determined by the task instructions. Thus, the established theory of problem solving as heuristic search in problem spaces has little to say on this. In this talk, I will present a study designed to explore this issue, by virtue of finding and refining an adequate problem representation being its main challenge. In this exploratory case study, it was investigated how pairs of participants acquaint themselves with a complex spatial transformation task in the domain of iterated mental paper folding over the course of several days. Participants have to understand the geometry of edges which occurs when repeatedly mentally folding a sheet of paper in alternating directions without the use of external aids. Faced with the difficulty of handling increasingly complex folds in light of limited cognitive capacity, participants are forced to look for ways in which to represent folds more efficiently. In a qualitative analysis of video recordings of the participants' behaviour, the development of their conceptualisation of the task domain was traced over the course of the study, focussing especially on their use of gesture and the spontaneous occurrence and use of metaphors in the construction of new representations. Based on these observations, I will conclude the talk with several theoretical speculations regarding the roles of metaphor and cognitive capacity in representational change.

Learning does not occur in isolation. From parent-child interactions to formal classroom environments, humans explore, learn, and communicate in rich, diverse social contexts. Rather than simply observing and copying their conspecifics, humans engage in a range of epistemic practices that actively recruit those around them. What makes human social learning so distinctive, powerful, and smart? In this talk, I will present a series of studies that reveal the remarkably sophisticated inferential abilities that young children show not only in how they learn from others but also in how they help others learn. Children interact with others as learners and as teachers to learn and communicate about the world, about others, and even about the self. The results collectively paint a picture of human social learning that is far more than copying and imitation: It is active, bidirectional, and cooperative. I will end by discussing ongoing work that extends this picture beyond what we typically call “social learning”, with implications for building better machines that learn from and interact with humans.

Children need inference in order to learn the meanings of words. They must infer the referent from the situation in which a target word is said. Furthermore, to be able to use the word in other situations, they also need to infer what other referents the word can be generalized to. As verbs refer to relations between arguments, verb learning requires relational analogical inference, something which is challenging to young children. To overcome this difficulty, young children recruit a diverse range of cues in their inference of verb meanings, including, but not limited to, syntactic cues and social and pragmatic cues as well as statistical cues. They also utilize perceptual similarity (object similarity) in progressive alignment to extract relational verb meanings and further to gain insights about relational verb meanings. However, just having a list of these cues is not useful: the cues must be selected, combined, and coordinated to produce the optimal interpretation in a particular context. This process involves abductive reasoning, similar to what scientists do to form hypotheses from a range of facts or evidence. In this talk, I discuss how children use a chain of inferences to learn meanings of verbs. I consider not only the process of analogical mapping and progressive alignment, but also how children use abductive inference to find the source of analogy and gain insights into the general principles underlying verb learning. I also present recent findings from my laboratory that show that prelinguistic human infants use a rudimentary form of abductive reasoning, which enables the first step of word learning.

n the ‘orthodox’ view, cognition has been seen as manipulation of symbolic, mental representations, separate from the body. This dualist Cartesian approach characterised much of twentieth-century thought and is still taken for granted by many people today. Language, too, has for a long time been treated across scientific domains as a system operating largely independently from perception, action, and the body (articulatory-perceptual organs notwithstanding). This could lead one into believing that to emulate linguistic behaviour, it would suffice to develop ‘software’ operating on abstract representations that would work on any computational machine. Yet the brain is not the sole problem-solving resource we have at our disposal. The disembodied picture is inaccurate for numerous reasons, which will be presented addressing the issue of the indissoluble link between cognition, language, body, and environment in understanding and learning. The talk will conclude with implications and suggestions for pedagogy, relevant for disciplines as diverse as instruction in language, mathematics, and sports.