Cognition seminars

Knowing where we are, where we have been, and where we are going is critical to many behaviors, including navigation and memory. One potential neuronal mechanism underlying this ability is phase precession, in which spatially tuned neurons represent sequences of positions by activating at progressively earlier phases of local network theta oscillations. Based on studies in rodents, researchers have hypothesized that phase precession may be a general neural pattern for representing sequential events for learning and memory. By recording human single-neuron activity during spatial navigation, we show that spatially tuned neurons in the human hippocampus and entorhinal cortex exhibit phase precession. Furthermore, beyond the neural representation of locations, we show evidence for phase precession related to specific goal states. Our find- ings thus extend theta phase precession to humans and suggest that this phenomenon has a broad func- tional role for the neural representation of both spatial and non-spatial information.

In this talk I’ll discuss our recent work on how visual and auditory cues to space are integrated as we move. There are at least 3 reasons why this turns out to be a difficult problem for the brain to solve (and us to understand!). First, vision and hearing start off in different coordinates (eye-centred vs head-centred), so they need a common reference frame in which to communicate. By preventing eye and head movements, this problem has been neatly sidestepped in the literature, yet self-movement is the norm. Second, self-movement creates visual and auditory image motion. Correct interpretation therefore requires some form of compensation. Third, vision and hearing encode motion in very different ways: vision contains dedicated motion detectors sensitive to speed, whereas hearing does not. We propose that some (all?) of these problems could be solved by considering the perception of audiovisual space as the integration of separate body-centred visual and auditory cues, the latter formed by integrating image motion with motor system signals and vestibular information. To test this claim, we use a classic cue integration framework, modified to account for cues that are biased and partially correlated. We find good evidence for the model based on simple judgements of audiovisual motion within a circular array of speakers and LEDs that surround the participant while they execute self-controlled head movement.

Self-control is a central aspect of free will. Because self-control is often described in terms of resisting temptations, research on the cognitive neuroscience of free will often focuses on mechanisms of top-down regulation. We argue that this obscures a crucial temporal dimension of free will: now-then regulation. We distinguish now-then regulation from top-down regulation, and situate now-then regulation within a broader account of temporally extended agency. In highlighting this temporal dimension of control, we aim to provide a more nuanced account of how motivation informs action over time, different kinds of regulatory processes underlying the planning and execution of action, and the temporal components of reasons-responsiveness.

In this talk, I’ll introduce the formal concept of a (pre)sheaf as data attached to a topological space. Sheaves capture the notion of patching local sources of information to form a global whole, e.g., the binding of visual features such as colour and shape. The formal theory appears to be closely related to the foundational properties asserted by the Information Integration Theory (IIT) for phenomenology. A comparison is intended to engender discussion on ways that phenomenology may benefit from a sheaf theory, or (more generally) a category theory approach.

Neuroscientific methods successfully account for a system’s functional properties, but leave out the subjective properties of the accompanying experience. According to IIT, phenomenology can be studied scientifically by unfolding the cause-effect structure specified by a system. To illustrate how, in this talk I compare two systems (a grid and a map) to show that they can be functionally equivalent in performing fixation, but only one can specify a cause-effect structure that accounts for the extendedness of phenomenal space.

It is an open question whether preferences for visual art can be lawfully predicted from the basic constituent elements of a visual image. Here, we developed and tested a computational framework to investigate how aesthetic values are formed. We show that it is possible to explain human preferences for a visual art piece based on a mixture of low- and high-level features of the image. Subjective value ratings could be predicted not only within but also across individuals, using a regression model with a common set of interpretable features. We also show that the features predicting aesthetic preference can emerge hierarchically within a deep convolutional neural network trained only for object recognition. Our findings suggest that human preferences for art can be explained at least in part as a systematic integration over the underlying visual features of an image.

Multisensory perception is often studied through the effects of inter-sensory conflict, such as in the McGurk effect, the Ventriloquist illusion, and the Rubber Hand Illusion. Moreover, Bayesian approaches to cue fusion and causal inference overwhelmingly draw on cross-modal conflict to measure and to model multisensory perception. Given the prevalence of conflict, it is remarkable that accounts of multisensory perception have so far neglected the theory of conflict monitoring and cognitive control, established about twenty years ago. I hope to make a case for the role of conflict monitoring and resolution during multisensory perception. To this end, I will present EEG and fMRI data showing that cross-modal conflict in speech, resulting in either integration or segregation, triggers neural mechanisms of conflict detection and resolution. I will also present data supporting a role of these mechanisms during perceptual conflict in general, using Binocular Rivalry, surrealistic imagery, and cinema. Based on this preliminary evidence, I will argue that it is worth considering the potential role of conflict in multisensory perception and its incorporation in a causal inference framework. Finally, I will raise some potential problems associated with this proposal.

In decision-making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: (1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, (2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and (3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as eleven alternative models each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants’ data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants’ choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.

Natural behavior reveals the way that gaze serves the needs of the current task, and the complex cognitive control mechanisms that are involved. It has become increasingly clear that even the simplest actions involve complex decision processes that depend on an interaction of visual information, knowledge of the current environment, and the intrinsic costs and benefits of actions choices. I will explore these ideas in the context of walking in natural terrain, where we are able to recover the 3D structure of the visual environment. We show that subjects choose flexible paths that depend on the flatness of the terrain over the next few steps. Subjects trade off flatness with straightness of their paths towards the goal, indicating a nuanced trade-off between stability and energetic costs on both the time scale of the next step and longer-range constraints.

Macroscopic brain organisation emerges early in life, even prenatally, and continues to develop through adolescence and into early adulthood. The emergence and continual refinement of large-scale brain networks, connecting neuronal populations across anatomical distance, allows for increasing functional integration and specialisation. This process is thought crucial for the emergence of complex cognitive processes. But how and why is this process so diverse? We used structural neuroimaging collected from a large diverse cohort, to explore how different features of macroscopic brain organisation are associated with diverse cognitive trajectories. We used diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI) to construct whole-brain white-matter connectomes. A simulated attack on each child's connectome revealed that some brain networks were strongly organized around highly connected 'hubs'. The more children's brains were critically dependent on hubs, the better their cognitive skills. Conversely, having poorly integrated hubs was a very strong risk factor for cognitive and learning difficulties across the sample. We subsequently developed a computational framework, using generative network modelling (GNM), to model the emergence of this kind of connectome organisation. Relatively subtle changes within the wiring rules of this computational framework give rise to differential developmental trajectories, because of small biases in the preferential wiring properties of different nodes within the network. Finally, we were able to use this GNM to implicate the molecular and cellular processes that govern these different growth patterns.

It is generally agreed upon that qualities of conscious experience instantiate structural properties, usually called relations. They furnish a representation of qualities (or qualia, in fact) in terms of a mathematical space Q (rather than a set), which is crucial to both modelling and measuring of conscious experience." "What is usually disregarded is that “only such structural properties generalize across individuals” (Austen Clark), but that qualities themselves as differentiated by stimulus specifications, behavior or reports do not. We show that this implies that only the part of Q which is invariant with respect to the automorphism group has a well-defined referent, while individual elements do not. This poses a prima facie limitation of any theory or experiment that aims to address individual qualities. We show how mathematical theories of consciousness can overcome this limitation via symmetry groups and group actions, making accessible to science what is properly called private language.

Category theory is a branch of mathematics which have been used to organize various regions of mathematics and related sciences from a radical “relation-first” point of view. Why consciousness researchers should care about category theory? " "There are (at least) 3 reasons:" "1 Everything is relational" "2 Everything is relation" "3 Relation is everything" "In this talk we explain the reasons above more concretely and introduce the ideas to utilize basic concepts in category theory for consciousness studies.

Working memory is the sketchpad of consciousness, the fundamental mechanism the brain uses to gain volitional control over its thoughts and actions. For the past 50 years, working memory has been thought to rely on cortical neurons that fire continuous impulses that keep thoughts “online”. However, new work from our lab has revealed more complex dynamics. The impulses fire sparsely and interact with brain rhythms of different frequencies. Higher frequency gamma (>35 Hz) rhythms help carry the contents of working memory while lower frequency alpha/beta (~8-30 Hz) rhythms act as control signals that gate access to and clear out working memory. In other words, a rhythmic dance between brain rhythms may underlie your ability to control your own thoughts.

Many everyday decisions are based on both external cues and internal hunches. How does the brain put these together? We addressed this question in mice trained to make decisions based on sensory stimuli and on past events. While mice made these decisions, we causally probed the roles of cortical areas and recorded from thousands of neurons throughout the brain, with an emphasis on frontal cortex. The results are not what we thought based on textbook notions of how the brain works. This talk is based on work led by Nick Steinmetz, Peter Zatka-Haas, Armin Lak, and Pip Coen, in the laboratory I share with Kenneth Harris

The tight relationship between attention and conscious perception has been extensively researched in the past decades. However, whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particularly when it came to abstract and high-level processing. I will talk about a recent study where we utilized the Stroop paradigm to show that task load gates unconscious semantic processing. In a series of psychophysical experiments, the unconscious word semantics influenced conscious task performance only under the low task load condition, but not the high task load condition. Intriguingly, with enough practice in the high task load condition, the unconscious effect reemerged. These findings suggest a competition of attentional resources between unconscious and conscious processes, challenging the automaticity account of unconscious processing.

In this talk, I shall not argue for any single thesis or theory in the realm of the (un)consciousness and (in)attention. Instead I will discuss specific examples where philosophers and psychologists can have genuine collaborations in this area. Since issues concerning phenomenological overflow is already too familiar for this audience, I will briefly discuss it only, and focus on other issues that have not been overworked. The exact contents are to be determined, but I will perhaps focus on recent controversies over “sustained representation of perspectival shape” (Morales, Bax, and Firestone, 2020, 2021).