What it’s like is all there is: The value of Consciousness
Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.
Sex, drugs, and bad choices: using rodent models to understand decision making
Nearly every aspect of life involves decisions between options that differ in both their expected rewards and the potential costs (such as delay to reward delivery or risk of harm) that accompany those rewards. The ability to choose adaptively when faced with such decisions is critical for well-being and overall quality of life. In neuropsychiatric conditions such as substance use disorders, however, decision making is often compromised, which can prolong and exacerbate their severity and co-morbidities. In this seminar, Dr. Setlow will discuss research in rodent models investigating behavioral and biological mechanisms of cost-benefit decision making. In particular, he will focus on factors (including sex) that contribute to differences in cost-benefit decision making across the population, how variability in decision making is related to substance use, and how substance use can produce long-lasting changes in decision preference.