Dyslexia, Rhythm, Language and the Developing Brain
Recent insights from auditory neuroscience provide a new perspective on how the brain encodes speech. Using these recent insights, I will provide an overview of key factors underpinning individual differences in children’s development of language and phonology, providing a context for exploring atypical reading development (dyslexia). Children with dyslexia are relatively insensitive to acoustic cues related to speech rhythm patterns. This lack of rhythmic sensitivity is related to the atypical neural encoding of rhythm patterns in speech by the brain. I will describe our recent data from infants as well as children, demonstrating developmental continuity in the key neural variables.
Verb metaphors are processed as analogies
Metaphor is a pervasive phenomenon in language and cognition. To date, the vast majority of psycholinguistic research on metaphor has focused on noun-noun metaphors of the form An X is a Y (e.g., My job is a jail). Yet there is evidence that verb metaphor (e.g., I sailed through my exams) is more common. Despite this, comparatively little work has examined how verb metaphors are processed. In this talk, I will propose a novel account for verb metaphor comprehension: verb metaphors are understood in the same way that analogies are—as comparisons processed via structure-mapping. I will discuss the predictions that arise from applying the analogical framework to verb metaphor and present a series of experiments showing that verb metaphoric extension is consistent with those predictions.
Do large language models solve verbal analogies like children do?
Analogical reasoning –learning about new things by relating it to previous knowledge– lies at the heart of human intelligence and creativity and forms the core of educational practice. Children start creating and using analogies early on, making incredible progress moving from associative processes to successful analogical reasoning. For example, if we ask a four-year-old “Horse belongs to stable like chicken belongs to …?” they may use association and reply “egg”, whereas older children will likely give the intended relational response “chicken coop” (or other term to refer to a chicken’s home). Interestingly, despite state-of-the-art AI-language models having superhuman encyclopedic knowledge and superior memory and computational power, our pilot studies show that these large language models often make mistakes providing associative rather than relational responses to verbal analogies. For example, when we asked four- to eight-year-olds to solve the analogy “body is to feet as tree is to …?” they responded “roots” without hesitation, but large language models tend to provide more associative responses such as “leaves”. In this study we examine the similarities and differences between children's and six large language models' (Dutch/multilingual models: RobBERT, BERT-je, M-BERT, GPT-2, M-GPT, Word2Vec and Fasttext) responses to verbal analogies extracted from an online adaptive learning environment, where >14,000 7-12 year-olds from the Netherlands solved 20 or more items from a database of 900 Dutch language verbal analogies.
AI-assisted language learning: Assessing learners who memorize and reason by analogy
Vocabulary learning applications like Duolingo have millions of users around the world, but yet are based on very simple heuristics to choose teaching material to provide to their users. In this presentation, we will discuss the possibility to develop more advanced artificial teachers, which would be based on modeling of the learner’s inner characteristics. In the case of teaching vocabulary, understanding how the learner memorizes is enough. When it comes to picking grammar exercises, it becomes essential to assess how the learner reasons, in particular by analogy. This second application will illustrate how analogical and case-based reasoning can be employed in an alternative way in education: not as the teaching algorithm, but as a part of the learner’s model.
Studying genetic overlap between ASD risk and related traits: From polygenic pleiotropy to disorder-specific profiles
The neural basis of flexible semantic cognition (BACN Mid-career Prize Lecture 2022)
Semantic cognition brings meaning to our world – it allows us to make sense of what we see and hear, and to produce adaptive thoughts and behaviour. Since we have a wealth of information about any given concept, our store of knowledge is not sufficient for successful semantic cognition; we also need mechanisms that can steer the information that we retrieve so it suits the context or our current goals. This talk traces the neural networks that underpin this flexibility in semantic cognition. It draws on evidence from multiple methods (neuropsychology, neuroimaging, neural stimulation) to show that two interacting heteromodal networks underpin different aspects of flexibility. Regions including anterior temporal cortex and left angular gyrus respond more strongly when semantic retrieval follows highly-related concepts or multiple convergent cues; the multivariate responses in these regions correspond to context-dependent aspects of meaning. A second network centred on left inferior frontal gyrus and left posterior middle temporal gyrus is associated with controlled semantic retrieval, responding more strongly when weak associations are required or there is more competition between concepts. This semantic control network is linked to creativity and also captures context-dependent aspects of meaning; however, this network specifically shows more similar multivariate responses across trials when association strength is weak, reflecting a common controlled retrieval state when more unusual associations are the focus. Evidence from neuropsychology, fMRI and TMS suggests that this semantic control network is distinct from multiple-demand cortex which supports executive control across domains, although challenging semantic tasks recruit both networks. The semantic control network is juxtaposed between regions of default mode network that might be sufficient for the retrieval of strong semantic relationships and multiple-demand regions in the left hemisphere, suggesting that the large-scale organisation of flexible semantic cognition can be understood in terms of cortical gradients that capture systematic functional transitions that are repeated in temporal, parietal and frontal cortex.
Children’s inference of verb meanings: Inductive, analogical and abductive inference
Children need inference in order to learn the meanings of words. They must infer the referent from the situation in which a target word is said. Furthermore, to be able to use the word in other situations, they also need to infer what other referents the word can be generalized to. As verbs refer to relations between arguments, verb learning requires relational analogical inference, something which is challenging to young children. To overcome this difficulty, young children recruit a diverse range of cues in their inference of verb meanings, including, but not limited to, syntactic cues and social and pragmatic cues as well as statistical cues. They also utilize perceptual similarity (object similarity) in progressive alignment to extract relational verb meanings and further to gain insights about relational verb meanings. However, just having a list of these cues is not useful: the cues must be selected, combined, and coordinated to produce the optimal interpretation in a particular context. This process involves abductive reasoning, similar to what scientists do to form hypotheses from a range of facts or evidence. In this talk, I discuss how children use a chain of inferences to learn meanings of verbs. I consider not only the process of analogical mapping and progressive alignment, but also how children use abductive inference to find the source of analogy and gain insights into the general principles underlying verb learning. I also present recent findings from my laboratory that show that prelinguistic human infants use a rudimentary form of abductive reasoning, which enables the first step of word learning.
It’s not over our heads: Why human language needs a body
n the ‘orthodox’ view, cognition has been seen as manipulation of symbolic, mental representations, separate from the body. This dualist Cartesian approach characterised much of twentieth-century thought and is still taken for granted by many people today. Language, too, has for a long time been treated across scientific domains as a system operating largely independently from perception, action, and the body (articulatory-perceptual organs notwithstanding). This could lead one into believing that to emulate linguistic behaviour, it would suffice to develop ‘software’ operating on abstract representations that would work on any computational machine. Yet the brain is not the sole problem-solving resource we have at our disposal. The disembodied picture is inaccurate for numerous reasons, which will be presented addressing the issue of the indissoluble link between cognition, language, body, and environment in understanding and learning. The talk will conclude with implications and suggestions for pedagogy, relevant for disciplines as diverse as instruction in language, mathematics, and sports.
Understanding Natural Language: Insights From Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Artificial Intelligence
How bilingualism modulates the neural mechanisms of selective attention
Learning and using multiple languages places considerable demands on our cognitive system, and has been shown to modulate the mechanisms of selective attention in both children and adults. Yet the nature of these adaptive changes is still not entirely clear. One possibility is that bilingualism boosts the capacity for selective attention; another is that it leads to a different distribution of this finite resource, aimed at supporting optimal performance under the increased processing demands. I will present a series of studies investigating the nature of modifications of selective attention in bilingualism. Using behavioural and neuroimaging techniques, our data confirm that bilingualism modifies the neural mechanisms of selective attention even in the absence of behavioural differences between monolinguals and bilinguals. They further suggest that, instead of enhanced attentional capacity, these neuroadaptive modifications appear to reflect its redistribution, arguably aimed at economising the available resources to support optimal behavioural performance.
Language, Cognition, Biology
Perceptual and neural basis of sound-symbolic crossmodal correspondences
Multisensory speech perception
Categories, language, and visual working memory: how verbal labels change capacity limitations
The limited capacity of visual working memory constrains the quantity and quality of the information we can store in mind for ongoing processing. Research from our lab has demonstrated that verbal labeling/categorization of visual inputs increases its retention and fidelity in visual working memory. In this talk, I will outline the hypotheses that explain the interaction between visual and verbal inputs in working memory, leading to the boosts we observed. I will further show how manipulations of the categorical distinctiveness of the labels, the timing of their occurrence, to which item labels are applied, as well as their validity modulate the benefits one can draw from combining visual and verbal inputs to alleviate capacity limitations. Finally, I will discuss the implications of these results to our understanding of working memory and its interaction with prior knowledge.
Theory-driven probabilistic modeling of language use: a case study on quantifiers, logic and typicality
Theoretical linguistics postulates abstract structures that successfully explain key aspects of language. However, the precise relation between abstract theoretical ideas and empirical data from language use is not always apparent. Here, we propose to empirically test abstract semantic theories through the lens of probabilistic pragmatic modelling. We consider the historically important case of quantity words (e.g., `some', `all'). Data from a large-scale production study seem to suggest that quantity words are understood via prototypes. But based on statistical and empirical model comparison, we show that a probabilistic pragmatic model that embeds a strict truth-conditional notion of meaning explains the data just as well as a model that encodes prototypes into the meaning of quantity words.
Surprising generalizations in the neural implementation of Hebrew and English word reading
Space for Thinking - Spatial Reference Frames and Abstract Concepts
People from cultures around the world tend to borrow from the domain of space to represent abstract concepts. For example, in the domain on time, we use spatial metaphors (e.g., describing the future as being in front and the past behind), accompany our speech with spatial gestures (e.g., gesturing to the left to refer to a past event), and use external tools that project time onto a spatial reference frame (e.g., calendars). Importantly, these associations are also present in the way we think and reason about time, suggesting that space and time are also linked in the mind. In this talk, I will explore the developmental origins and functional implications of these types of cross-dimensional associations. To start, I will discuss the roles that language and culture play in shaping how children in the US and India represent time. Next, I will use word learning and memory as test cases for exploring why cross-dimensional associations may be cognitively advantageous. Finally, I will talk about future directions and the practical implications for this line of work, with a focus on how encouraging spatial representations of abstract concepts could improve learning outcomes.
Infant Relational Learning - Interactions with Visual and Linguistic Factors
Humans are incredible learners, a talent supported by our ability to detect and transfer relational similarities between items and events. Spotting these common relations despite perceptual differences is challenging, yet there’s evidence that this ability begins early, with infants as young as 3 months discriminating same and different (Anderson et al., 2018; Ferry et al., 2015). How? To understand the underlying mechanisms, I examine how learning outcomes in the first year correspond with changes in input and in infant age. I discuss the commonalities in this process with that seen in older children and adults, as well as differences due to interactions with other maturing processes like language and visual attention.