Takaki Komiyama - A cell-type-specific cortical circuit for maintenance of value representations
Takaki Komiyama will discuss how cortical circuits maintain information about the value of behavioral options across trials and transform past experience into future choices. The talk draws on longitudinal imaging and circuit manipulation in mice to examine distinct neuronal populations and local and long-range interactions in history-dependent decision-making.
A cell-type-specific cortical circuit for maintenance of value representations
Takaki Komiyama presents longitudinal imaging and circuit-manipulation studies of history-dependent decision-making. The work identifies retrosplenial-cortex populations and local and long-range interactions that maintain option values across trials, update them after outcomes and translate past experience into future choices.
Neuroscience of Emotions & Tools for Improving Emotion Regulation | Dr. Ralph Adolphs
Ralph Adolphs explains how the brain creates emotions including fear, joy, and awe, and discusses evidence-based approaches to emotion regulation. The episode connects neural mechanisms with attention, decision-making, and bodily state.
Neural mechanisms of optimal performance
When we attend a demanding task, our performance is poor at low arousal (when drowsy) or high arousal (when anxious), but we achieve optimal performance at intermediate arousal. This celebrated Yerkes-Dodson inverted-U law relating performance and arousal is colloquially referred to as being "in the zone." In this talk, I will elucidate the behavioral and neural mechanisms linking arousal and performance under the Yerkes-Dodson law in a mouse model. During decision-making tasks, mice express an array of discrete strategies, whereby the optimal strategy occurs at intermediate arousal, measured by pupil, consistent with the inverted-U law. Population recordings from the auditory cortex (A1) further revealed that sound encoding is optimal at intermediate arousal. To explain the computational principle underlying this inverted-U law, we modeled the A1 circuit as a spiking network with excitatory/inhibitory clusters, based on the observed functional clusters in A1. Arousal induced a transition from a multi-attractor (low arousal) to a single attractor phase (high arousal), and performance is optimized at the transition point. The model also predicts stimulus- and arousal-induced modulations of neural variability, which we confirmed in the data. Our theory suggests that a single unifying dynamical principle, phase transitions in metastable dynamics, underlies both the inverted-U law of optimal performance and state-dependent modulations of neural variability.
On Idiosyncratic Biases in Decision-Making
Why do individuals, both humans and animals, exhibit personal biases in two-alternative decision-making tasks, even when no clear reason exists to favor one alternative over another? In this talk, I will explore two competing hypotheses to explain these idiosyncratic biases. The first suggests that such tendencies arise from unique personal experiences, where past associations between actions and feedback influence future choices. The second hypothesis proposes that the bias reflects irreducible microscopic heterogeneities in the dynamics of decision-making networks. I will present experimental data and theoretical findings that support the latter hypothesis, shedding new light on the neural mechanisms behind seemingly irrational preferences. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2025-03-05. Recording duration: 00:50:36.
Decision and Behavior
This webinar addressed computational perspectives on how animals and humans make decisions, spanning normative, descriptive, and mechanistic models. Sam Gershman (Harvard) presented a capacity-limited reinforcement learning framework in which policies are compressed under an information bottleneck constraint. This approach predicts pervasive perseveration, stimulus‐independent “default” actions, and trade-offs between complexity and reward. Such policy compression reconciles observed action stochasticity and response time patterns with an optimal balance between learning capacity and performance. Jonathan Pillow (Princeton) discussed flexible descriptive models for tracking time-varying policies in animals. He introduced dynamic Generalized Linear Models (Sidetrack) and hidden Markov models (GLM-HMMs) that capture day-to-day and trial-to-trial fluctuations in choice behavior, including abrupt switches between “engaged” and “disengaged” states. These models provide new insights into how animals’ strategies evolve under learning. Finally, Kenji Doya (OIST) highlighted the importance of unifying reinforcement learning with Bayesian inference, exploring how cortical-basal ganglia networks might implement model-based and model-free strategies. He also described Japan’s Brain/MINDS 2.0 and Digital Brain initiatives, aiming to integrate multimodal data and computational principles into cohesive “digital brains.”
Feedback-induced dispositional changes in risk preferences
Contrary to the original normative decision-making standpoint, empirical studies have repeatedly reported that risk preferences are affected by the disclosure of choice outcomes (feedback). Although no consensus has yet emerged regarding the properties and mechanisms of this effect, a widespread and intuitive hypothesis is that repeated feedback affects risk preferences by means of a learning effect, which alters the representation of subjective probabilities. Here, we ran a series of seven experiments (N= 538), tailored to decipher the effects of feedback on risk preferences. Our results indicate that the presence of feedback consistently increases risk-taking, even when the risky option is economically less advantageous. Crucially, risk-taking increases just after the instructions, before participants experience any feedback. These results challenge the learning account, and advocate for a dispositional effect, induced by the mere anticipation of feedback information. Epistemic curiosity and regret avoidance may drive this effect in partial and complete feedback conditions, respectively.
Face matching and decision making: The influence of framing, task presentation and criterion placement
Many situations rely on the accurate identification of people with whom we are unfamiliar. For example, security at airports or in police investigations require the identification of individuals from photo-ID. Yet, the identification of unfamiliar faces is error prone, even for practitioners who routinely perform this task. Indeed, even training protocols often yield no discernible improvement. The challenge of unfamiliar face identification is often thought of as a perceptual problem; however, this assumption ignores the potential role of decision-making and its contributing factors (e.g., criterion placement). In this talk, I am going to present a series of experiments that investigate the role of decision-making in face identification.
Prosocial Learning and Motivation across the Lifespan
2024 BACN Early-Career Prize Lecture Many of our decisions affect other people. Our choices can decelerate climate change, stop the spread of infectious diseases, and directly help or harm others. Prosocial behaviours – decisions that help others – could contribute to reducing the impact of these challenges, yet their computational and neural mechanisms remain poorly understood. I will present recent work that examines prosocial motivation, how willing we are to incur costs to help others, prosocial learning, how we learn from the outcomes of our choices when they affect other people, and prosocial preferences, our self-reports of helping others. Throughout the talk, I will outline the possible computational and neural bases of these behaviours, and how they may differ from young adulthood to old age.
Rethinking behavior in the light of evolution
In theoretical neuroscience, the brain is usually described as an information processing system that encodes and manipulates representations of knowledge to produce plans of action. This view leads to a decomposition of brain functions into putative processes such as object recognition, working memory, decision-making, action planning, etc., inspiring the search for the neural correlates of these processes. However, neurophysiological data do not support many of the predictions of these classic subdivisions. Instead, there is divergence and broad distribution of functions that should be unified, mixed representations combining functions that should be distinct, and a general incompatibility with the conceptual subdivisions posited by theories of information processing. In this talk, I will explore the possibility of resynthesizing a different set of functional subdivisions, guided by the growing body of data on the evolutionary process that produced the human brain. I will summarize, in chronological order, a proposed sequence of innovations that appeared in nervous systems along the lineage that leads from the earliest multicellular animals to humans. Along the way, functional subdivisions and elaborations will be introduced in parallel with the neural specializations that made them possible, gradually building up an alternative conceptual taxonomy of brain functions. These functions emphasize mechanisms for real-time interaction with the world, rather than for building explicit knowledge of the world, and the relevant representations emphasize pragmatic outcomes rather than decoding accuracy, mixing variables in the way seen in real neural data. I suggest that this alternative taxonomy may better delineate the real functional pieces into which the brain is organized, and can offer a more natural mapping between behavior and neural mechanisms. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2024-03-13. Recording duration: 00:52:50.
Visual mechanisms for flexible behavior
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the way the brain enables us to act on the sensory world is its flexibility. We can make a general inference about many sensory features (rating the ripeness of mangoes or avocados) and map a single stimulus onto many choices (slicing or blending mangoes). These can be thought of as flexibly mapping many (features) to one (inference) and one (feature) to many (choices) sensory inputs to actions. Both theoretical and experimental investigations of this sort of flexible sensorimotor mapping tend to treat sensory areas as relatively static. Models typically instantiate flexibility through changing interactions (or weights) between units that encode sensory features and those that plan actions. Experimental investigations often focus on association areas involved in decision-making that show pronounced modulations by cognitive processes. I will present evidence that the flexible formatting of visual information in visual cortex can support both generalized inference and choice mapping. Our results suggest that visual cortex mediates many forms of cognitive flexibility that have traditionally been ascribed to other areas or mechanisms. Further, we find that a primary difference between visual and putative decision areas is not what information they encode, but how that information is formatted in the responses of neural populations, which is related to difference in the impact of causally manipulating different areas on behavior. This scenario allows for flexibility in the mapping between stimuli and behavior while maintaining stability in the information encoded in each area and in the mappings between groups of neurons.
Tracking subjects' strategies in behavioural choice experiments at trial resolution
Psychology and neuroscience are increasingly looking to fine-grained analyses of decision-making behaviour, seeking to characterise not just the variation between subjects but also a subject's variability across time. When analysing the behaviour of each subject in a choice task, we ideally want to know not only when the subject has learnt the correct choice rule but also what the subject tried while learning. I introduce a simple but effective Bayesian approach to inferring the probability of different choice strategies at trial resolution. This can be used both for inferring when subjects learn, by tracking the probability of the strategy matching the target rule, and for inferring subjects use of exploratory strategies during learning. Applied to data from rodent and human decision tasks, we find learning occurs earlier and more often than estimated using classical approaches. Around both learning and changes in the rewarded rules the exploratory strategies of win-stay and lose-shift, often considered complementary, are consistently used independently. Indeed, we find the use of lose-shift is strong evidence that animals have latently learnt the salient features of a new rewarded rule. Our approach can be extended to any discrete choice strategy, and its low computational cost is ideally suited for real-time analysis and closed-loop control.
Movements and engagement during decision-making
When experts are immersed in a task, a natural assumption is that their brains prioritize task-related activity. Accordingly, most efforts to understand neural activity during well-learned tasks focus on cognitive computations and task-related movements. Surprisingly, we observed that during decision-making, the cortex-wide activity of multiple cell types is dominated by movements, especially “uninstructed movements”, that are spontaneously expressed. These observations argue that animals execute expert decisions while performing richly varied, uninstructed movements that profoundly shape neural activity. To understand the relationship between these movements and decision-making, we examined the movements more closely. We tested whether the magnitude or the timing of the movements was correlated with decision-making performance. To do this, we partitioned movements into two groups: task-aligned movements that were well predicted by task events (such as the onset of the sensory stimulus or choice) and task independent movement (TIM) that occurred independently of task events. TIM had a reliable, inverse correlation with performance in head-restrained mice and freely moving rats. This hinted that the timing of spontaneous movements could indicate periods of disengagement. To confirm this, we compared TIM to the latent behavioral states recovered by a hidden Markov model with Bernoulli generalized linear model observations (GLM-HMM) and found these, again, to be inversely correlated. Finally, we examined the impact of these behavioral states on neural activity. Surprisingly, we found that the same movement impacts neural activity more strongly when animals are disengaged. An intriguing possibility is that these larger movement signals disrupt cognitive computations, leading to poor decision-making performance. Taken together, these observations argue that movements and cognitionare closely intertwined, even during expert decision-making.
Identifying mechanisms of cognitive computations from spikes
Higher cortical areas carry a wide range of sensory, cognitive, and motor signals supporting complex goal-directed behavior. These signals mix in heterogeneous responses of single neurons, making it difficult to untangle underlying mechanisms. I will present two approaches for revealing interpretable circuit mechanisms from heterogeneous neural responses during cognitive tasks. First, I will show a flexible nonparametric framework for simultaneously inferring population dynamics on single trials and tuning functions of individual neurons to the latent population state. When applied to recordings from the premotor cortex during decision-making, our approach revealed that populations of neurons encoded the same dynamic variable predicting choices, and heterogeneous firing rates resulted from the diverse tuning of single neurons to this decision variable. The inferred dynamics indicated an attractor mechanism for decision computation. Second, I will show an approach for inferring an interpretable network model of a cognitive task—the latent circuit—from neural response data. We developed a theory to causally validate latent circuit mechanisms via patterned perturbations of activity and connectivity in the high-dimensional network. This work opens new possibilities for deriving testable mechanistic hypotheses from complex neural response data.
Decoding mental conflict between reward and curiosity in decision-making
Humans and animals are not always rational. They not only rationally exploit rewards but also explore an environment owing to their curiosity. However, the mechanism of such curiosity-driven irrational behavior is largely unknown. Here, we developed a decision-making model for a two-choice task based on the free energy principle, which is a theory integrating recognition and action selection. The model describes irrational behaviors depending on the curiosity level. We also proposed a machine learning method to decode temporal curiosity from behavioral data. By applying it to rat behavioral data, we found that the rat had negative curiosity, reflecting conservative selection sticking to more certain options and that the level of curiosity was upregulated by the expected future information obtained from an uncertain environment. Our decoding approach can be a fundamental tool for identifying the neural basis for reward–curiosity conflicts. Furthermore, it could be effective in diagnosing mental disorders.
The Geometry of Decision-Making
Running, swimming, or flying through the world, animals are constantly making decisions while on the move—decisions that allow them to choose where to eat, where to hide, and with whom to associate. Despite this most studies have considered only on the outcome of, and time taken to make, decisions. Motion is, however, crucial in terms of how space is represented by organisms during spatial decision-making. Employing a range of new technologies, including automated tracking, computational reconstruction of sensory information, and immersive ‘holographic’ virtual reality (VR) for animals, experiments with fruit flies, locusts and zebrafish (representing aerial, terrestrial and aquatic locomotion, respectively), I will demonstrate that this time-varying representation results in the emergence of new and fundamental geometric principles that considerably impact decision-making. Specifically, we find that the brain spontaneously reduces multi-choice decisions into a series of abrupt (‘critical’) binary decisions in space-time, a process that repeats until only one option—the one ultimately selected by the individual—remains. Due to the critical nature of these transitions (and the corresponding increase in ‘susceptibility’) even noisy brains are extremely sensitive to very small differences between remaining options (e.g., a very small difference in neuronal activity being in “favor” of one option) near these locations in space-time. This mechanism facilitates highly effective decision-making, and is shown to be robust both to the number of options available, and to context, such as whether options are static (e.g. refuges) or mobile (e.g. other animals). In addition, we find evidence that the same geometric principles of decision-making occur across scales of biological organisation, from neural dynamics to animal collectives, suggesting they are fundamental features of spatiotemporal computation.
Human foraging: Insights into decision-making
Understanding and Mitigating Bias in Human & Machine Face Recognition
With the increasing use of automated face recognition (AFR) technologies, it is important to consider whether these systems not only perform accurately, but also equitability or without “bias”. Despite rising public, media, and scientific attention to this issue, the sources of bias in AFR are not fully understood. This talk will explore how human cognitive biases may impact our assessments of performance differentials in AFR systems and our subsequent use of those systems to make decisions. We’ll also show how, if we adjust our definition of what a “biased” AFR algorithm looks like, we may be able to create algorithms that optimize the performance of a human+algorithm team, not simply the algorithm itself.
From spikes to factors: understanding large-scale neural computations
It is widely accepted that human cognition is the product of spiking neurons. Yet even for basic cognitive functions, such as the ability to make decisions or prepare and execute a voluntary movement, the gap between spikes and computation is vast. Only for very simple circuits and reflexes can one explain computations neuron-by-neuron and spike-by-spike. This approach becomes infeasible when neurons are numerous the flow of information is recurrent. To understand computation, one thus requires appropriate abstractions. An increasingly common abstraction is the neural ‘factor’. Factors are central to many explanations in systems neuroscience. Factors provide a framework for describing computational mechanism, and offer a bridge between data and concrete models. Yet there remains some discomfort with this abstraction, and with any attempt to provide mechanistic explanations above that of spikes, neurons, cell-types, and other comfortingly concrete entities. I will explain why, for many networks of spiking neurons, factors are not only a well-defined abstraction, but are critical to understanding computation mechanistically. Indeed, factors are as real as other abstractions we now accept: pressure, temperature, conductance, and even the action potential itself. I use recent empirical results to illustrate how factor-based hypotheses have become essential to the forming and testing of scientific hypotheses. I will also show how embracing factor-level descriptions affords remarkable power when decoding neural activity for neural engineering purposes.
Extracting computational mechanisms from neural data using low-rank RNNs
An influential theory in systems neuroscience suggests that brain function can be understood through low-dimensional dynamics [Vyas et al 2020]. However, a challenge in this framework is that a single computational task may involve a range of dynamic processes. To understand which processes are at play in the brain, it is important to use data on neural activity to constrain models. In this study, we present a method for extracting low-dimensional dynamics from data using low-rank recurrent neural networks (lrRNNs), a highly expressive and understandable type of model [Mastrogiuseppe & Ostojic 2018, Dubreuil, Valente et al. 2022]. We first test our approach using synthetic data created from full-rank RNNs that have been trained on various brain tasks. We find that lrRNNs fitted to neural activity allow us to identify the collective computational processes and make new predictions for inactivations in the original RNNs. We then apply our method to data recorded from the prefrontal cortex of primates during a context-dependent decision-making task. Our approach enables us to assign computational roles to the different latent variables and provides a mechanistic model of the recorded dynamics, which can be used to perform in silico experiments like inactivations and provide testable predictions.
Prefrontal top-down projections control context-dependent strategy selection
The rules governing behavior often vary with behavioral contexts. As a result, an action rewarded in one context may be discouraged in another. Animals and humans are capable of switching between behavioral strategies under different contexts and acting adaptively according to the variable rules, a flexibility that is thought to be mediated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC). However, how the PFC orchestrates the context-dependent switch of strategies remains unclear. Here we show that pathway-specific projection neurons in the medial PFC (mPFC) differentially contribute to context-instructed strategy selection. In mice trained in a decision-making task in which a previously established rule and a newly learned rule are associated with distinct contexts, the activity of mPFC neurons projecting to the dorsomedial striatum (mPFC-DMS) encodes the contexts and further represents decision strategies conforming to the old and new rules. Moreover, mPFC-DMS neuron activity is required for the context-instructed strategy selection. In contrast, the activity of mPFC neurons projecting to the ventral midline thalamus (mPFC-VMT) does not discriminate between the contexts, and represents the old rule even if mice have adopted the new one. Furthermore, these neurons act to prevent the strategy switch under the new rule. Our results suggest that mPFC-DMS neurons promote flexible strategy selection guided by contexts, whereas mPFC-VMT neurons favor fixed strategy selection by preserving old rules.
Mapping learning and decision-making algorithms onto brain circuitry
In the first half of my talk, I will discuss our recent work on the midbrain dopamine system. The hypothesis that midbrain dopamine neurons broadcast an error signal for the prediction of reward is among the great successes of computational neuroscience. However, our recent results contradict a core aspect of this theory: that the neurons uniformly convey a scalar, global signal. I will review this work, as well as our new efforts to update models of the neural basis of reinforcement learning with our data. In the second half of my talk, I will discuss our recent findings of state-dependent decision-making mechanisms in the striatum.
A predictive-processing account of psychosis
There has been increasing interest in the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying psychotic disorders in recent years. One promising approach is based on the theoretical framework of predictive processing, which proposes that inferences regarding the state of the world are made by combining prior beliefs with sensory signals. Delusions and hallucinations are the core symptoms of psychosis and often co-occur. Yet, different predictive-processing alterations have been proposed for these two symptom dimensions, according to which the relative weighting of prior beliefs in perceptual inference is decreased or increased, respectively. I will present recent behavioural, neuroimaging, and computational work that investigated perceptual decision-making under uncertainty and ambiguity to elucidate the changes in predictive processing that may give rise to psychotic experiences. Based on the empirical findings presented, I will provide a more nuanced predictive-processing account that suggests a common mechanism for delusions and hallucinations at low levels of the predictive-processing hierarchy, but still has the potential to reconcile apparently contradictory findings in the literature. This account may help to understand the heterogeneity of psychotic phenomenology and explain changes in symptomatology over time.
Hunger state-dependent modulation of decision-making in larval Drosophila
It is critical for all animals to make appropriate, but also flexible, foraging decisions, especially when facing starvation. Sensing olfactory information is essential to evaluate food quality before ingestion. Previously, we found that <i>Drosophila</i> larvae switch their response to certain odors from aversion to attraction when food deprived. The neural mechanism underlying this switch in behavior involves serotonergic modulation and reconfiguration of odor processing in the early olfactory sensory system. We now investigate if a change in hunger state also influences other behavioral decisions. Since it had been shown that fly larvae can perform cannibalism, we investigate the effect of food deprivation on feeding on dead conspecifics. We find that fed fly larvae rarely use dead conspecifics as a food source. However, food deprivation largely enhances this behavior. We will now also investigate the underlying neural mechanisms that mediate this enhancement and compare it to the already described mechanism for a switch in olfactory choice behavior. Generally, this flexibility in foraging behavior enables the larva to explore a broader range of stimuli and to expand their feeding choices to overcome starvation.
Disentangling neural correlates of consciousness and task relevance using EEG and fMRI
How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.
A neural mechanism for terminating decisions
The brain makes decisions by accumulating evidence until there is enough to stop and choose. Neural mechanisms of evidence accumulation are well established in association cortex, but the site and mechanism of termination is unknown. Here, we elucidate a mechanism for termination by neurons in the primate superior colliculus. We recorded simultaneously from neurons in lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) and the superior colliculus (SC) while monkeys made perceptual decisions, reported by eye-movements. Single-trial analyses revealed distinct dynamics: LIP tracked the accumulation of evidence on each decision, and SC generated one burst at the end of the decision, occasionally preceded by smaller bursts. We hypothesized that the bursts manifest a threshold mechanism applied to LIP activity to terminate the decision. Focal inactivation of SC produced behavioral effects diagnostic of an impaired threshold sensor, requiring a stronger LIP signal to terminate a decision. The results reveal the transformation from deliberation to commitment.
Decision Making and the Brain
In this talk, we will examine human behavior from the perspective of the choices we make every day. We will study the role of the brain in enabling these decisions and discuss some simple computational models of decision making and the neural basis. Towards the end, we will have a short, interactive session to engage in some easy decisions that will help us discover our own biases.
Sex Differences in Learning from Exploration
Sex-based modulation of cognitive processes could set the stage for individual differences in vulnerability to neuropsychiatric disorders. While value-based decision making processes in particular have been proposed to be influenced by sex differences, the overall correct performance in decision making tasks often show variable or minimal differences across sexes. Computational tools allow us to uncover latent variables that define different decision making approaches, even in animals with similar correct performance. Here, we quantify sex differences in mice in the latent variables underlying behavior in a classic value-based decision making task: a restless two-armed bandit. While male and female mice had similar accuracy, they achieved this performance via different patterns of exploration. Male mice tended to make more exploratory choices overall, largely because they appeared to get ‘stuck’ in exploration once they had started. Female mice tended to explore less but learned more quickly during exploration. Together, these results suggest that sex exerts stronger influences on decision making during periods of learning and exploration than during stable choices. Exploration during decision making is altered in people diagnosed with addictions, depression, and neurodevelopmental disabilities, pinpointing the neural mechanisms of exploration as a highly translational avenue for conferring sex-modulated vulnerability to neuropsychiatric diagnoses.
Can I be bothered? Neural and computational mechanisms underlying the dynamics of effort processing (BACN Early-career Prize Lecture 2021)
From a workout at the gym to helping a colleague with their work, everyday we make decisions about whether we are willing to exert effort to obtain some sort of benefit. Increases in how effortful actions and cognitive processes are perceived to be has been linked to clinically severe impairments to motivation, such as apathy and fatigue, across many neurological and psychiatric conditions. However, the vast majority of neuroscience research has focused on understanding the benefits for acting, the rewards, and not on the effort required. As a result, the computational and neural mechanisms underlying how effort is processed are poorly understood. How do we compute how effortful we perceive a task to be? How does this feed into our motivation and decisions of whether to act? How are such computations implemented in the brain? and how do they change in different environments? I will present a series of studies examining these questions using novel behavioural tasks, computational modelling, fMRI, pharmacological manipulations, and testing in a range of different populations. These studies highlight how the brain represents the costs of exerting effort, and the dynamic processes underlying how our sensitivity to effort changes as a function of our goals, traits, and socio-cognitive processes. This work provides new computational frameworks for understanding and examining impaired motivation across psychiatric and neurological conditions, as well as why all of us, sometimes, can’t be bothered.
Foraging for the future: Food caching in squirrels and birds
Forming latent codes for decision-making and spatial navigation: a generative modeling perspective
Alternative Applications of Foraging Theory
Cognitive experience alters cortical involvement in navigation decisions
The neural correlates of decision-making have been investigated extensively, and recent work aims to identify under what conditions cortex is actually necessary for making accurate decisions. We discovered that mice with distinct cognitive experiences, beyond sensory and motor learning, use different cortical areas and neural activity patterns to solve the same task, revealing past learning as a critical determinant of whether cortex is necessary for decision tasks. We used optogenetics and calcium imaging to study the necessity and neural activity of multiple cortical areas in mice with different training histories. Posterior parietal cortex and retrosplenial cortex were mostly dispensable for accurate performance of a simple navigation-based visual discrimination task. In contrast, these areas were essential for the same simple task when mice were previously trained on complex tasks with delay periods or association switches. Multi-area calcium imaging showed that, in mice with complex-task experience, single-neuron activity had higher selectivity and neuron-neuron correlations were weaker, leading to codes with higher task information. Therefore, past experience is a key factor in determining whether cortical areas have a causal role in decision tasks.
Distributed and stable memory representations may lead to serial dependence
Perception and action are biased by our recent experiences. Even when a sequence of stimuli are randomly presented, responses are sometimes attracted toward the past. The mechanism of such bias, recently termed serial dependence, is still under investigation. Currently, there is mixed evidence indicating that such bias could be either from a sensory and perceptual origin or occurring only at decisional stages. In this talk, I will present recent findings from our group showing that biases are decreased when disrupting the memory trace in a premotor region in a simple visuomotor task. In addition, we have shown that this bias is stable over periods of up to 8 s. At the end, I will show ongoing analysis of a recent experiment and argue that serial dependence may rely on distributed memory representations of stimuli and task relevant features.
Inter-individual variability in reward seeking and decision making: role of social life and consequence for vulnerability to nicotine
Inter-individual variability refers to differences in the expression of behaviors between members of a population. For instance, some individuals take greater risks, are more attracted to immediate gains or are more susceptible to drugs of abuse than others. To probe the neural bases of inter-individual variability we study reward seeking and decision-making in mice, and dissect the specific role of dopamine in the modulation of these behaviors. Using a spatial version of the multi-armed bandit task, in which mice are faced with consecutive binary choices, we could link modifications of midbrain dopamine cell dynamics with modulation of exploratory behaviors, a major component of individual characteristics in mice. By analyzing mouse behaviors in semi-naturalistic environments, we then explored the role of social relationships in the shaping of dopamine activity and associated beahviors. I will present recent data from the laboratory suggesting that changes in the activity of dopaminergic networks link social influences with variations in the expression of non-social behaviors: by acting on the dopamine system, the social context may indeed affect the capacity of individuals to make decisions, as well as their vulnerability to drugs of abuse, in particular nicotine.
The ubiquity of opportunity cost: Foraging and beyond
A key insight from the foraging literature is the importance of assessing the overall environmental quality — via global reward rate or similar measures, which capture the opportunity cost of time and can guide behavioral allocation toward relatively richer options. Meanwhile, the majority of research in decision neuroscience and computational psychiatry has focused instead on how choices are guided by much more local, event-locked evaluations: of individual situations, actions, or outcomes. I review a combination of research and theoretical speculation from my lab and others that emphasizes the role of foraging's average rewards and opportunity costs in a much larger range of decision problems, including risk, time discounting, vigor, cognitive control, and deliberation. The broad range of behaviors affected by this type of evaluation gives a new theoretical perspective on the effects of stress and autonomic mobilization, and on mood and the broad range of symptoms associated with mood disorders.
Orbitofrontal cortex and the integrative approach to functional neuroanatomy
The project of functional neuroanatomy typically considers single brain areas as the core functional unit of the brain. Functional neuroanatomists typically use specialized tasks that are designed to isolate hypothesized functions from other cognitive processes. Our lab takes a broader view; specifically, we consider brain regions as parts of larger circuits and we take cognitive processes as part of more complex behavioral repertoires. In my talk, I will discuss the ramifications of this perspective for thinking about the role of the orbitofrontal cortex. I will discuss results of recent experiments from my lab that tackle the question of OFC function within the context of larger brain networks and in freely moving foraging tasks. I will argue that this perspective challenges conventional accounts of the role of OFC and invites new ones. I will conclude by speculating on implications for the practice of functional neuroanatomy.
Neural circuits for novel choices and for choice speed and accuracy changes in macaques
While most experimental tasks aim at isolating simple cognitive processes to study their neural bases, naturalistic behaviour is often complex and multidimensional. I will present two studies revealing previously uncharacterised neural circuits for decision-making in macaques. This was possible thanks to innovative experimental tasks eliciting sophisticated behaviour, bridging the human and non-human primate research traditions. Firstly, I will describe a specialised medial frontal circuit for novel choice in macaques. Traditionally, monkeys receive extensive training before neural data can be acquired, while a hallmark of human cognition is the ability to act in novel situations. I will show how this medial frontal circuit can combine the values of multiple attributes for each available novel item on-the-fly to enable efficient novel choices. This integration process is associated with a hexagonal symmetry pattern in the BOLD response, consistent with a grid-like representation of the space of all available options. We prove the causal role played by this circuit by showing that focussed transcranial ultrasound neuromodulation impairs optimal choice based on attribute integration and forces the subjects to default to a simpler heuristic decision strategy. Secondly, I will present an ongoing project addressing the neural mechanisms driving behaviour shifts during an evidence accumulation task that requires subjects to trade speed for accuracy. While perceptual decision-making in general has been thoroughly studied, both cognitively and neurally, the reasons why speed and/or accuracy are adjusted, and the associated neural mechanisms, have received little attention. We describe two orthogonal dimensions in which behaviour can vary (traditional speed-accuracy trade-off and efficiency) and we uncover independent neural circuits concerned with changes in strategy and fluctuations in the engagement level. The former involves the frontopolar cortex, while the latter is associated with the insula and a network of subcortical structures including the habenula.
Frontal circuit specialisations for information search and decision making
During primate evolution, prefrontal cortex (PFC) expanded substantially relative to other cortical areas. The expansion of PFC circuits likely supported the increased cognitive abilities of humans and anthropoids to sample information about their environment, evaluate that information, plan, and decide between different courses of action. What quantities do these circuits compute as information is being sampled towards and a decision is being made? And how can they be related to anatomical specialisations within and across PFC? To address this, we recorded PFC activity during value-based decision making using single unit recording in non-human primates and magnetoencephalography in humans. At a macrocircuit level, we found that value correlates differ substantially across PFC subregions. They are heavily shaped by each subregion’s anatomical connections and by the decision-maker’s current locus of attention. At a microcircuit level, we found that the temporal evolution of value correlates can be predicted using cortical recurrent network models that temporally integrate incoming decision evidence. These models reflect the fact that PFC circuits are highly recurrent in nature and have synaptic properties that support persistent activity across temporally extended cognitive tasks. Our findings build upon recent work describing economic decision making as a process of attention-weighted evidence integration across time.
Astrocytes encode complex behaviorally relevant information
While it is generally accepted that neurons control complex behavior and brain computation, the role of non-neuronal cells in this context remains unclear. Astrocytes, glial cells of the central nervous system, exhibit complex forms of chemical excitation, most prominently calcium transients, evoked by local and projection neuron activity. In this talk, I will provide mechanistic links between astrocytes’ spatiotemporally complex activity patterns, neuronal molecular signaling, and behavior. Using a visual detection task, in vivo calcium imaging, robust statistical analyses, and machine learning approaches, my work shows that cortical astrocytes encode the animal's decision, reward, performance level, and sensory properties. Behavioral context and motor activity-related parameters strongly impact astrocyte responses. Error analysis confirms that astrocytes carry behaviorally relevant information, supporting astrocytes' complementary role to neuronal coding beyond their established homeostatic and metabolic roles.
Neural correlates of temporal processing in humans
Estimating intervals is essential for adaptive behavior and decision-making. Although several theoretical models have been proposed to explain how the brain keeps track of time, there is still no evidence toward a single one. It is often hard to compare different models due to their overlap in behavioral predictions. For this reason, several studies have looked for neural signatures of temporal processing using methods such as electrophysiological recordings (EEG). However, for this strategy to work, it is essential to have consistent EEG markers of temporal processing. In this talk, I'll present results from several studies investigating how temporal information is encoded in the EEG signal. Specifically, across different experiments, we have investigated whether different neural signatures of temporal processing (such as the CNV, the LPC, and early ERPs): 1. Depend on the task to be executed (whether or not it is a temporal task or different types of temporal tasks); 2. Are encoding the physical duration of an interval or how much longer/shorter an interval is relative to a reference. Lastly, I will discuss how these results are consistent with recent proposals that approximate temporal processing with decisional models.
Sex, drugs, and bad choices: using rodent models to understand decision making
Nearly every aspect of life involves decisions between options that differ in both their expected rewards and the potential costs (such as delay to reward delivery or risk of harm) that accompany those rewards. The ability to choose adaptively when faced with such decisions is critical for well-being and overall quality of life. In neuropsychiatric conditions such as substance use disorders, however, decision making is often compromised, which can prolong and exacerbate their severity and co-morbidities. In this seminar, Dr. Setlow will discuss research in rodent models investigating behavioral and biological mechanisms of cost-benefit decision making. In particular, he will focus on factors (including sex) that contribute to differences in cost-benefit decision making across the population, how variability in decision making is related to substance use, and how substance use can produce long-lasting changes in decision preference.
Functional ultrasound imaging during behavior
The dream of a systems neuroscientist is to be able to unravel neural mechanisms that give rise to behavior. It is increasingly appreciated that behavior involves the concerted distributed activity of multiple brain regions so the focus on single or few brain areas might hinder our understanding. There have been quite a few technological advancements in this domain. Functional ultrasound imaging (fUSi) is an emerging technique that allows us to measure neural activity from medial frontal regions down to subcortical structures up to a depth of 20 mm. It is a method for imaging transient changes in cerebral blood volume (CBV), which are proportional to neural activity changes. It has excellent spatial resolution (~100 μm X 100 μm X 400 μm); its temporal resolution can go down to 100 milliseconds. In this talk, I will present its use in two model systems: marmoset monkeys and rats. In marmoset monkeys, we used it to delineate a social – vocal network involved in vocal communication while in rats, we used it to gain insights into brain wide networks involved in evidence accumulation based decision making. fUSi has the potential to provide an unprecedented access to brain wide dynamics in freely moving animals performing complex behavioral tasks.
A Network for Computing Value Equilibrium in the Human Medial Prefrontal Corte
Humans and other animals make decisions in order to satisfy their goals. However, it remains unknown how neural circuits compute which of multiple possible goals should be pursued (e.g., when balancing hunger and thirst) and how to combine these signals with estimates of available reward alternatives. Here, humans undergoing fMRI accumulated two distinct assets over a sequence of trials. Financial outcomes depended on the minimum cumulate of either asset, creating a need to maintain “value equilibrium” by redressing any imbalance among the assets. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signals in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) tracked the level of imbalance among goals, whereas the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) signaled the level of redress incurred by a choice rather than the overall amount received. These results suggest that a network of medial frontal brain regions compute a value signal that maintains value equilibrium among internal goals.
How much depth do you see? It depends…
NMC4 Short Talk: Transient neuronal suppression for exploitation of new sensory evidence
Decision-making in noisy environments with constant sensory evidence involves integrating sequentially-sampled evidence, a strategy formalized by diffusion models which is supported by decades behavioral and neural findings. By contrast, it is unknown whether this strategy is also used during decision-making when the underlying sensory evidence is expected to change. Here, we trained monkeys to identify the dominant color of a dynamically refreshed checkerboard pattern that doesn't become informative until after a variable delay. Animals' behavioral responses were briefly suppressed after an abrupt change in evidence, and many neurons in the frontal eye field displayed a corresponding dip in activity at this time, similar to the dip frequently observed after stimulus onset. Generalized drift-diffusion models revealed that behavior and neural activity were consistent with a brief suppression of motor output without a change in evidence accumulation itself, in contrast to the popular belief that evidence accumulation is paused or reset. These results suggest that a brief interruption in motor preparation is an important strategy for dealing with changing evidence during perceptual decision making.
Suboptimal human inference inverts the bias-variance trade-off for decisions with asymmetric evidence
Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies and variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to the frequently suboptimal inference strategies used by humans. We examined inference problems involving rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that were suboptimal relative to the Bayesian ideal observer. These suboptimal strategies reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but high bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but displayed weaker, near-normative bias. Our results yield new insights into the principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference, and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that are sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality of the inference process.
Spatial summation for motion detection
Timing errors and decision making
Error monitoring refers to the ability to monitor one's own task performance without explicit feedback. This ability is studied typically in two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigms. Recent research showed that humans can also keep track of the magnitude and direction of errors in different magnitude domains (e.g., numerosity, duration, length). Based on the evidence that suggests a shared mechanism for magnitude representations, we aimed to investigate whether metric error monitoring ability is commonly governed across different magnitude domains. Participants reproduced/estimated temporal, numerical, and spatial magnitudes after which they rated their confidence regarding first order task performance and judged the direction of their reproduction/estimation errors. Participants were also tested in a 2AFC perceptual decision task and provided confidence ratings regarding their decisions. Results showed that variability in reproductions/estimations and metric error monitoring ability, as measured by combining confidence and error direction judgements, were positively related across temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Metacognitive sensitivity in these metric domains was also positively associated with each other but not with metacognitive sensitivity in the 2AFC perceptual decision task. In conclusion, the current findings point at a general metric error monitoring ability that is shared across different metric domains with limited generalizability to perceptual decision-making.
Change of mind in rapid free-choice picking scenarios
In a famous philosophical paradox, Buridan's ass perishes because he is equally hungry and thirsty, and cannot make up his mind whether to first drink or eat. We are faced daily with the need to pick between alternatives that are equally attractive (or not) to us. What are the processes that allow us to avoid paralysis and to rapidly select between such equal options when there are no preferences or rational reasons to rely on? One solution that was offered is that although on a higher cognitive level there is symmetry between the alternatives, on a neuronal level the symmetry does not maintain. What is the nature of this asymmetry of the neuronal level? In this talk I will present experiments addressing this important phenomenon using measures of human behavior, EEG, EMG and large scale neural network modeling, and discuss mechanisms involved in the process of intention formation and execution, in the face of alternatives to choose from. Specifically, I will show results revealing the temporal dynamics of rapid intention formation and, moreover, ‘change of intention’ in a free choice picking scenario, in which the alternatives are on a par for the participant. The results suggest that even in arbitrary choices, endogenous or exogenous biases that are present in the neural system for selecting one or another option may be implicitly overruled; thus creating an implicit and non-conscious ‘change of mind’. Finally, the question is raised: in what way do such rapid implicit ‘changes of mind’ help retain one’s self-control and free-will behavior?
The bounded rationality of probability distortion
In decision-making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: (1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, (2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and (3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as eleven alternative models each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants’ data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants’ choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.
Visual Decisions in Natural Action
Natural behavior reveals the way that gaze serves the needs of the current task, and the complex cognitive control mechanisms that are involved. It has become increasingly clear that even the simplest actions involve complex decision processes that depend on an interaction of visual information, knowledge of the current environment, and the intrinsic costs and benefits of actions choices. I will explore these ideas in the context of walking in natural terrain, where we are able to recover the 3D structure of the visual environment. We show that subjects choose flexible paths that depend on the flatness of the terrain over the next few steps. Subjects trade off flatness with straightness of their paths towards the goal, indicating a nuanced trade-off between stability and energetic costs on both the time scale of the next step and longer-range constraints.
Merging of cues and hunches by the mouse cortex
Many everyday decisions are based on both external cues and internal hunches. How does the brain put these together? We addressed this question in mice trained to make decisions based on sensory stimuli and on past events. While mice made these decisions, we causally probed the roles of cortical areas and recorded from thousands of neurons throughout the brain, with an emphasis on frontal cortex. The results are not what we thought based on textbook notions of how the brain works. This talk is based on work led by Nick Steinmetz, Peter Zatka-Haas, Armin Lak, and Pip Coen, in the laboratory I share with Kenneth Harris
Metabolic and functional connectivity relate to distinct aspects of cognition
A major challenge of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how the brain as a network gives rise to our cognition. Simultaneous [18F]-fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography functional magnetic resonance imaging (FDG-PET/fMRI) provides the opportunity to investigate brain connectivity not only via spatially distant, synchronous cerebrovascular hemodynamic responses (functional connectivity), but also glucose metabolism (metabolic connectivity). However, how these two modalities of brain connectivity differ in their relation to cognition is unknown. In this webinar, Dr Katharina Voigt will discuss recent findings demonstrating the advantage of simultaneous FDG-PET/fMRI in providing a more complete picture of the neural mechanisms underlying cognition, that calls for a combination of both modalities in future cognitive neuroscience. Dr Katharina Voigt is a Research Fellow within the Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University. Her research interests include systems neuroscience, simultaneous PET-MRI, and decision-making.
Large-scale approaches for distributed circuits underlying visual decision-making
Mammalian vision and visually-guided behavior relies on neurons distributed across diverse brain regions. In this talk I will describe our efforts to create tools that allow us to measure activity from these distributed circuits - Neuropixels probes for large-scale electrophysiology - and our findings from studies deploying these tools to study visual detection and discrimination in mice.
The Geometry of Decision-Making
Choosing among spatially distributed options is a central challenge for animals, from deciding among alternative potential food sources or refuges, to choosing with whom to associate. Here, using an integrated theoretical and experimental approach (employing immersive Virtual Reality), with both invertebrate and vertebrate models—the fruit fly, desert locust and zebrafish—we consider the recursive interplay between movement and collective vectorial integration in the brain during decision-making regarding options (potential ‘targets’) in space. We reveal that the brain repeatedly breaks multi-choice decisions into a series of abrupt (critical) binary decisions in space-time where organisms switch, spontaneously, from averaging vectorial information among, to suddenly excluding one of, the remaining options. This bifurcation process repeats until only one option—the one ultimately selected—remains. Close to each bifurcation the ‘susceptibility’ of the system exhibits a sharp increase, inevitably causing small differences among the remaining options to become amplified; a property that both comes ‘for free’ and is highly desirable for decision-making. This mechanism facilitates highly effective decision-making, and is shown to be robust both to the number of options available, and to context, such as whether options are static (e.g. refuges) or mobile (e.g. other animals). In addition, we find evidence that the same geometric principles of decision-making occur across scales of biological organisation, from neural dynamics to animal collectives, suggesting they are fundamental features of spatiotemporal computation.
Analogy and ethics: opportunities at the intersection
Analogy offers a new interpretation of a common concern in ethics: whether decision making includes or excludes a consideration of moral issues. This is often discussed as the moral awareness of decision makers and considered a motivational concern. The possible new interpretation is that moral awareness is in part a matter of expertise. Some failures of moral awareness can then be understood as stemming from novicehood. Studies of analogical transfer are consistent with the possibility that moral awareness is in part a matter of expertise, that as a result motivation is less helpful than some prior theorizing would predict, and that many adults are not as expert in the domain of ethics as one might hope. The possibility of expert knowledge of ethical principles leads to new questions and opportunities.
Neural dynamics of probabilistic information processing in humans and recurrent neural networks
In nature, sensory inputs are often highly structured, and statistical regularities of these signals can be extracted to form expectation about future sensorimotor associations, thereby optimizing behavior. One of the fundamental questions in neuroscience concerns the neural computations that underlie these probabilistic sensorimotor processing. Through a recurrent neural network (RNN) model and human psychophysics and electroencephalography (EEG), the present study investigates circuit mechanisms for processing probabilistic structures of sensory signals to guide behavior. We first constructed and trained a biophysically constrained RNN model to perform a series of probabilistic decision-making tasks similar to paradigms designed for humans. Specifically, the training environment was probabilistic such that one stimulus was more probable than the others. We show that both humans and the RNN model successfully extract information about stimulus probability and integrate this knowledge into their decisions and task strategy in a new environment. Specifically, performance of both humans and the RNN model varied with the degree to which the stimulus probability of the new environment matched the formed expectation. In both cases, this expectation effect was more prominent when the strength of sensory evidence was low, suggesting that like humans, our RNNs placed more emphasis on prior expectation (top-down signals) when the available sensory information (bottom-up signals) was limited, thereby optimizing task performance. Finally, by dissecting the trained RNN model, we demonstrate how competitive inhibition and recurrent excitation form the basis for neural circuitry optimized to perform probabilistic information processing.
Motives and modulators of human decision making
Did we eat spaghetti for lunch because we saw our colleague eat spaghetti? What drives a risk decision? How can our breakfast impact our decisions throughout the day? Research from different disciplines such as economics, psychology and neuroscience have attempted to investigate the motives and modulators of human decision making. Human decisions can be flexibly modulated by the different experiences we have in our daily lives, at the same time, bodily processes, such as metabolism can also impact economic behavior. These modulations can occur through our social networks, through the impact of our own behavior on the social environment, but also simply by the food we have eaten. Here, I will present a series of recent studies from my lab in which we shed light on the psychological, neural and metabolic motives and modulators of human decision making.
The role of the primate prefrontal cortex in inferring the state of the world and predicting change
In an ever-changing environment, uncertainty is omnipresent. To deal with this, organisms have evolved mechanisms that allow them to take advantage of environmental regularities in order to make decisions robustly and adjust their behavior efficiently, thus maximizing their chances of survival. In this talk, I will present behavioral evidence that animals perform model-based state inference to predict environmental state changes and adjust their behavior rapidly, rather than slowly updating choice values. This model-based inference process can be described using Bayesian change-point models. Furthermore, I will show that neural populations in the prefrontal cortex accurately predict behavioral switches, and that the activity of these populations is associated with Bayesian estimates. In addition, we will see that learning leads to the emergence of a high-dimensional representational subspace that can be reused when the animals re-learn a previously learned set of action-value associations. Altogether, these findings highlight the role of the PFC in representing a belief about the current state of the world.
Metacognition for past and future decision making in primates
As Socrates said that "I know that I know nothing," our mind's function to be aware of our ignorance is essential for abstract and conceptual reasoning. However, the biological mechanism to enable such a hierarchical thought, or meta-cognition, remained unknown. In the first part of the talk, I will demonstrate our studies on the neural mechanism for metacognition on memory in macaque monkeys. In reality, awareness of ignorance is essential not only for the retrospection of the past but also for the exploration of novel unfamiliar environments for the future. However, this proactive feature of metacognition has been understated in neuroscience. In the second part of the talk, I will demonstrate our studies on the neural mechanism for prospective metacognitive matching among uncertain options prior to perceptual decision making in humans and monkeys. These studies converge to suggest that higher-order processes to self-evaluate mental state either retrospectively or prospectively are implemented in the primate neural networks.