Cognitive maps as expectations learned across episodes – a model of the two dentate gyrus blades
How can the hippocampal system transition from episodic one-shot learning to a multi-shot learning regime and what is the utility of the resultant neural representations? This talk will explore the role of the dentate gyrus (DG) anatomy in this context. The canonical DG model suggests it performs pattern separation. More recent experimental results challenge this standard model, suggesting DG function is more complex and also supports the precise binding of objects and events to space and the integration of information across episodes. Very recent studies attribute pattern separation and pattern integration to anatomically distinct parts of the DG (the suprapyramidal blade vs the infrapyramidal blade). We propose a computational model that investigates this distinction. In the model the two processing streams (potentially localized in separate blades) contribute to the storage of distinct episodic memories, and the integration of information across episodes, respectively. The latter forms generalized expectations across episodes, eventually forming a cognitive map. We train the model with two data sets, MNIST and plausible entorhinal cortex inputs. The comparison between the two streams allows for the calculation of a prediction error, which can drive the storage of poorly predicted memories and the forgetting of well-predicted memories. We suggest that differential processing across the DG aids in the iterative construction of spatial cognitive maps to serve the generation of location-dependent expectations, while at the same time preserving episodic memory traces of idiosyncratic events.
An economic decision-making model of anticipated surprise with dynamic expectation
When making decision under risk, people often exhibit behaviours that classical economic theories cannot explain. Newer models that attempt to account for these ‘irrational’ behaviours often lack neuroscience bases and require the introduction of subjective and problem-specific constructs. Here, we present a decision-making model inspired by the prediction error signals and introspective neuronal replay reported in the brain. In the model, decisions are chosen based on ‘anticipated surprise’, defined by a nonlinear average of the differences between individual outcomes and a reference point. The reference point is determined by the expected value of the possible outcomes, which can dynamically change during the mental simulation of decision-making problems involving sequential stages. Our model elucidates the contribution of each stage to the appeal of available options in a decision-making problem. This allows us to explain several economic paradoxes and gambling behaviours. Our work could help bridge the gap between decision-making theories in economics and neurosciences.
Feature selectivity can explain mismatch signals in mouse visual cortex
Sensory experience often depends on one’s own actions, including self-motion. Theories of predictive coding postulate that actions are regulated by calculating prediction error, which is the difference between sensory experience and expectation based on self-generated actions. Signals consistent with prediction error have been reported in mouse visual cortex (V1) when visual flow coupled to running was unexpectedly stopped. Here, we show such signals can be elicited by visual stimuli uncoupled to animal’s running. We recorded V1 neurons while presenting drifting gratings that unexpectedly stopped. We found strong responses to visual perturbations, which were enhanced during running. Perturbation responses were strongest in the preferred orientation of individual neurons and perturbation responsive neurons were more likely to prefer slow visual speeds. Our results indicate that prediction error signals can be explained by the convergence of known motor and sensory signals, providing a purely sensory and motor explanation for purported mismatch signals.
Active sleep in flies: the dawn of consciousness
The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.