Contentopic mapping and object dimensionality - a novel understanding on the organization of object knowledge
Our ability to recognize an object amongst many others is one of the most important features of the human mind. However, object recognition requires tremendous computational effort, as we need to solve a complex and recursive environment with ease and proficiency. This challenging feat is dependent on the implementation of an effective organization of knowledge in the brain. Here I put forth a novel understanding of how object knowledge is organized in the brain, by proposing that the organization of object knowledge follows key object-related dimensions, analogously to how sensory information is organized in the brain. Moreover, I will also put forth that this knowledge is topographically laid out in the cortical surface according to these object-related dimensions that code for different types of representational content – I call this contentopic mapping. I will show a combination of fMRI and behavioral data to support these hypotheses and present a principled way to explore the multidimensionality of object processing.
Comparing supervised learning dynamics: Deep neural networks match human data efficiency but show a generalisation lag
Recent research has seen many behavioral comparisons between humans and deep neural networks (DNNs) in the domain of image classification. Often, comparison studies focus on the end-result of the learning process by measuring and comparing the similarities in the representations of object categories once they have been formed. However, the process of how these representations emerge—that is, the behavioral changes and intermediate stages observed during the acquisition—is less often directly and empirically compared. In this talk, I'm going to report a detailed investigation of the learning dynamics in human observers and various classic and state-of-the-art DNNs. We develop a constrained supervised learning environment to align learning-relevant conditions such as starting point, input modality, available input data and the feedback provided. Across the whole learning process we evaluate and compare how well learned representations can be generalized to previously unseen test data. Comparisons across the entire learning process indicate that DNNs demonstrate a level of data efficiency comparable to human learners, challenging some prevailing assumptions in the field. However, our results also reveal representational differences: while DNNs' learning is characterized by a pronounced generalisation lag, humans appear to immediately acquire generalizable representations without a preliminary phase of learning training set-specific information that is only later transferred to novel data.
Unifying the mechanisms of hippocampal episodic memory and prefrontal working memory
Remembering events in the past is crucial to intelligent behaviour. Flexible memory retrieval, beyond simple recall, requires a model of how events relate to one another. Two key brain systems are implicated in this process: the hippocampal episodic memory (EM) system and the prefrontal working memory (WM) system. While an understanding of the hippocampal system, from computation to algorithm and representation, is emerging, less is understood about how the prefrontal WM system can give rise to flexible computations beyond simple memory retrieval, and even less is understood about how the two systems relate to each other. Here we develop a mathematical theory relating the algorithms and representations of EM and WM by showing a duality between storing memories in synapses versus neural activity. In doing so, we develop a formal theory of the algorithm and representation of prefrontal WM as structured, and controllable, neural subspaces (termed activity slots). By building models using this formalism, we elucidate the differences, similarities, and trade-offs between the hippocampal and prefrontal algorithms. Lastly, we show that several prefrontal representations in tasks ranging from list learning to cue dependent recall are unified as controllable activity slots. Our results unify frontal and temporal representations of memory, and offer a new basis for understanding the prefrontal representation of WM
What do neurons want?
Multisensory interactions in temporal frequency processing
NMC4 Short Talk: Neural Representation: Bridging Neuroscience and Philosophy
We understand the brain in representational terms. E.g., we understand spatial navigation by appealing to the spatial properties that hippocampal cells represent, and the operations hippocampal circuits perform on those representations (Moser et al., 2008). Philosophers have been concerned with the nature of representation, and recently neuroscientists entered the debate, focusing specifically on neural representations. (Baker & Lansdell, n.d.; Egan, 2019; Piccinini & Shagrir, 2014; Poldrack, 2020; Shagrir, 2001). We want to know what representations are, how to discover them in the brain, and why they matter so much for our understanding of the brain. Those questions are framed in a traditional philosophical way: we start with explanations that use representational notions, and to more deeply understand those explanations we ask, what are representations — what is the definition of representation? What is it for some bit of neural activity to be a representation? I argue that there is an alternative, and much more fruitful, approach. Rather than asking what representations are, we should ask what the use of representational *notions* allows us to do in neuroscience — what thinking in representational terms helps scientists do or explain. I argue that this framing offers more fruitful ground for interdisciplinary collaboration by distinguishing the philosophical concerns that have a place in neuroscience from those that don’t (namely the definitional or metaphysical questions about representation). And I argue for a particular view of representational notions: they allow us to impose the structure of one domain onto another as a model of its causal structue. So, e.g., thinking about the hippocampus as representing spatial properties is a way of taking structures in those spatial properties, and projecting those structures (and algorithms that would implement them) them onto the brain as models of its causal structure.
A function approximation perspective on neural representations
Activity patterns of neural populations in natural and artificial neural networks constitute representations of data. The nature of these representations and how they are learned are key questions in neuroscience and deep learning. In his talk, I will describe my group's efforts in building a theory of representations as feature maps leading to sample efficient function approximation. Kernel methods are at the heart of these developments. I will present applications to deep learning and neuronal data.