Cognition seminars

During navigation, animals estimate their position using path integration and landmarks, engaging many brain areas. Whether these areas follow specialized or universal cue integration principles remains incompletely understood. We combine electrophysiology with virtual reality to quantify cue integration across thousands of neurons in three navigation-relevant areas: primary visual cortex (V1), retrosplenial cortex (RSC), and medial entorhinal cortex (MEC). Compared with V1 and RSC, path integration influences position estimates more in MEC, and conflicts between path integration and landmarks trigger remapping more readily. Whereas MEC codes position prospectively, V1 codes position retrospectively, and RSC is intermediate between the two. Lowered visual contrast increases the influence of path integration on position estimates only in MEC. These properties are most pronounced in a population of MEC neurons, overlapping with grid cells, tuned to distance run in darkness. These results demonstrate the specialized role that path integration plays in MEC compared with other navigation-relevant cortical areas.

Environmental boundaries anchor cognitive maps that support memory. However, trapezoidal boundary geometry distorts the regular firing patterns of entorhinal grid cells proposedly providing a metric for cognitive maps. Here, we test the impact of trapezoidal boundary geometry on human spatial memory using immersive virtual reality. Consistent with reduced regularity of grid patterns in rodents and a grid-cell model based on the eigenvectors of the successor representation, human positional memory was degraded in a trapezoid compared to a square environment; an effect particularly pronounced in the trapezoid’s narrow part. Congruent with spatial frequency changes of eigenvector grid patterns, distance estimates between remembered positions were persistently biased; revealing distorted memory maps that explained behavior better than the objective maps. Our findings demonstrate that environmental geometry affects human spatial memory similarly to rodent grid cell activity — thus strengthening the putative link between grid cells and behavior along with their cognitive functions beyond navigation.

I will present my recent work on mathematical modeling of human memory. I will argue that memory recall of random lists of items is governed by the universal algorithm resulting in the analytical relation between the number of items in memory and the number of items that can be successfully recalled. The retention of items in memory on the other hand is not universal and differs for different types of items being remembered, in particular retention curves for words and sketches is different even when sketches are made to only carry information about an object being drawn. I will discuss the putative reasons for these observations and introduce the phenomenological model predicting retention curves.

The idea that perception in humans relies on some form of probabilistic computations has become very popular over the last decades. It has been extremely difficult however to characterize the extent and the nature of the probabilistic representations and operations that are manipulated by neural populations in the human cortex. Several theoretical works suggest that probabilistic representations are present from low-level sensory areas to high-level areas. According to this view, the neural dynamics implements some forms of probabilistic message passing (i.e. neural sampling, probabilistic population coding, etc.) which solves the problem of perceptual inference. Here I will present recent experimental evidence that human and non-human primate perception implements some form of message passing. I will first review findings showing probabilistic integration of sensory evidence across space and time in primate visual cortex. Second, I will show that the confidence reports in a hierarchical task reveal that uncertainty is represented both at lower and higher levels, in a way that is consistent with probabilistic message passing both from lower to higher and from higher to lower representations. Finally, I will present behavioral and neural evidence that human perception takes into account pairwise correlations in sequences of sensory samples in agreement with the message passing hypothesis, and against standard accounts such as accumulation of sensory evidence or predictive coding.

This talk will focus on our lab's extensive research on understanding and enhancing creative analogical reasoning. I will cover the development of the analogy finding matrix task, evidence for conscious augmentation of creative state during this task, and the real-world implications this ability has for college STEM education. I will also discuss recent research aimed at enhancing performance on this creative analogical reasoning task using both transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS).

The theory of predictive processing posits that the brain computes expectations to process information predictively. Empirical evidence in support of this theory, however, is scarce and largely limited to sensory areas. Here, we report a precise and adaptive mechanism in the frontal cortex of non-human primates consistent with predictive processing of temporal events. We found that the speed of neural dynamics is precisely adjusted according to the average time of an expected stimulus. This speed adjustment, in turn, enables neurons to encode stimuli in terms of deviations from expectation. This lawful relationship was evident across multiple experiments and held true during learning: when temporal statistics underwent covert changes, neural responses underwent predictable changes that reflected the new mean. Together, these results highlight a precise mathematical relationship between temporal statistics in the environment and neural activity in the frontal cortex that may serve as a mechanism for predictive temporal processing.

Cognitive models of timing often include a pacemaker analogue whose ticks are accumulated to form an internal representation of time, and a threshold that determines when a target duration has elapsed. However, clear EEG manifestations of these abstract components have not yet been identified. We measured the EEG of subjects while they performed a temporal bisection task in which they were requested to categorize visual stimuli as short or long in duration. We report an ERP component whose amplitude depends monotonically on the stimulus duration. The relation of the ERP amplitude and stimulus duration can be captured by a simple model, adapted from a known drift-diffusion model for time perception. It includes a noisy accumulator that starts with the stimulus onset and a threshold. If the threshold is reached during stimulus presentation, the stimulus is categorized as "long", otherwise the stimulus is categorized as "short". At the stimulus offset, a response proportional to the distance to the threshold is emitted. This simple model has two parameters that fit both the behavior and ERP amplitudes recorded in the task. Two subsequent experiments replicate and extend this finding to another modality (touch) as well as to different time ranges (subsecond and suprasecond), establishing the described ERP component as a useful handle on the cognitive processes involved in temporal decisions.

Can we learn without conscious awareness? Numerous evidences in the research of implicit learning have indicated that people can learn the statistical structure of the stimuli but seemingly without any awareness of its underlying rules. However, it remains unclear what types of knowledge can be learned in implicit learning, what is the relationship between conscious and unconscious knowledge, and what are the neural substrates for the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge. In this talk, I will discuss with you about these ongoing questions.

Visual perceptual learning (VPL) is defined as improved performance on a visual task due to visual experience. It was once argued that attention to a visual feature is necessary for VPL of the feature to occur. Contrary to this view, a phenomenon called task-irrelevant VPL demonstrated that VPL can occur due to exposure to a feature which is sub-threshold and task-irrelevant, and therefore, unattended. A series of findings based on task-irrelevant VPL has indicated the following two mechanisms. First, attention to a feature facilitates VPL of the feature while inhibiting VPL of unattended and supra-threshold features. Second, reward paired with a feature enables VPL of the feature irrespective of whether the feature is attended or not. However, we recently found an additional twist; VPL of a task-irrelevant and supra-threshold feature embedded in a natural scene is not subject to the inhibition of attention. This new finding suggests a need to revise the current view or add a new mechanism as to how VPL occurs.

Cognitive control allows us to think and behave flexibly based on our context and goals. Most theories of cognitive control propose a control representation that enables the same input to produce different outputs contingent on contextual factors. In this talk, I will focus on an important property of the control representation's neural code: its representational dimensionality. Dimensionality of a neural representation balances a basic separability/generalizability trade-off in neural computation. This tradeoff has important implications for cognitive control. In this talk, I will present initial evidence from fMRI and EEG showing that task representations in the human brain leverage both ends of this tradeoff during flexible behavior.

Executing memory-guided behavior requires storage of information about experience and later recall of that information to inform choices. Awake hippocampal replay, when hippocampal neural ensembles briefly reactivate a representation related to prior experience, has been proposed to critically contribute to these memory-related processes. However, it remains unclear whether awake replay contributes to memory function by promoting the storage of past experiences, facilitating planning based on evaluation of those experiences, or both. We designed a dynamic spatial task that promotes replay before a memory-based choice and assessed how the content of replay related to past and future behavior. We found that replay content was decoupled from subsequent choice and instead was enriched for representations of previously rewarded locations and places that had not been visited recently, indicating a role in memory storage rather than in directly guiding subsequent behavior.

Mammals instinctively explore and form mental maps of their spatial environments. Models of cognitive mapping in neuroscience mostly depict map-learning as a process of random or biased diffusion. In practice, however, animals explore spaces using structured, purposeful, sensory-guided actions. We have used threat-evoked escape behavior in mice to probe the relationship between ethological exploratory behavior and abstract spatial cognition. First, we show that in arenas with obstacles and a shelter, mice spontaneously learn efficient multi-step escape routes by memorizing allocentric subgoal locations. Using closed-loop neural manipulations to interrupt running movements during exploration, we next found that blocking runs targeting an obstacle edge abolished subgoal learning. We conclude that mice use an action-driven learning process to identify subgoals, and these subgoals are then integrated into an allocentric map-like representation. We suggest a conceptual framework for spatial learning that is compatible with the successor representation from reinforcement learning and sensorimotor enactivism from cognitive science.

When making decision under risk, people often exhibit behaviours that classical economic theories cannot explain. Newer models that attempt to account for these ‘irrational’ behaviours often lack neuroscience bases and require the introduction of subjective and problem-specific constructs. Here, we present a decision-making model inspired by the prediction error signals and introspective neuronal replay reported in the brain. In the model, decisions are chosen based on ‘anticipated surprise’, defined by a nonlinear average of the differences between individual outcomes and a reference point. The reference point is determined by the expected value of the possible outcomes, which can dynamically change during the mental simulation of decision-making problems involving sequential stages. Our model elucidates the contribution of each stage to the appeal of available options in a decision-making problem. This allows us to explain several economic paradoxes and gambling behaviours. Our work could help bridge the gap between decision-making theories in economics and neurosciences.

In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.

Multisensory responses are ubiquitous in so-called unisensory cortex. However, despite their prevalence, we have very little understanding of what – if anything - they contribute to perception. In this talk I will focus on audio-visual integration in auditory cortex. Anatomical tracing studies highlight visual cortex as one source of visual input to auditory cortex. Using cortical cooling we test the hypothesis that these inputs support audiovisual integration in ferret auditory cortex. Behavioural studies in humans support the idea that visual stimuli can help listeners to parse an auditory scene. This effect is paralleled in single units in auditory cortex, where responses to a sound mixture can be determined by the timing of a visual stimulus such that sounds that are temporally coherent with a visual stimulus are preferentially represented. Our recent data therefore support the idea that one role for the early integration of auditory and visual signals in auditory cortex is to support auditory scene analysis, and that visual cortex plays a key role in this process.