Cognition seminars

Traditional brain-style (connectionist) approaches basically hit a wall when it comes to relational cognition. As an alternative to the well-known approaches of structured connectionism and deep learning, I present an engine for relational pattern recognition based on minimalist reinterpretations of first principles of connectionism. Results of computational experiments will be discussed on problems testing relational learning and universal generalization.

Electric Gymnotiform fish live in muddy, shallow waters near the shore – hiding in the dense filamentous roots of floating plants such as Eichornia crassipes (“camalote”). They explore their surroundings by using a series of electric pulses that serve as self emitted carrier of electrosensory signals. This propagates at the speed of light through this spongiform habitat and is barely sensed by the lateral line of predators and prey. The emitted field polarizes the surroundings according to the difference in impedance with water which in turn modifies the profile of transcutaneous currents considered as an electrosensory image. Using this system, pulse Gymnotiformes create an electrosensory bubble where an object’s location, impedance, size and other characteristics are discriminated and probably recognized. Although consciousness is still not well-proven, cognitive functions as volition, attention, and path integration have been shown. Here I will summarize different aspects of the electromotor electrosensory loop of pulse Gymnotiforms. First, I will address how objects are polarized with a stereotyped but temporospatially complex electric field, consisting of brief pulses emitted at regular intervals. This relies on complex electric organs quasi periodically activated through an electromotor coordination system by a pacemaker in the medulla. Second, I will deal with the imaging mechanisms of pulse gymnotiform fish and the presence of two regions in the electrosensory field, a rostral region where the field time course is coherent and field vector direction is constant all along the electric organ discharge and a lateral region where the field time course is site specific and field vector direction describes a stereotyped 3D trajectory. Third, I will describe the electrosensory mosaic and their characteristics. Receptor and primary afferents correspond one to one showing subtypes optimally responding to the time course of the self generated pulse with a characteristic train of spikes. While polarized objects at the rostral region project their electric images on the perioral region where electrosensory receptor density, subtypes and central projection are maximal, the image of objects on the side recruit a single type of scattered receptors. Therefore, the rostral mosaic has been likened to an electrosensory fovea and its receptive field referred to as foveal field. The rest of the mosaic and field are referred to as peripheral. Finally, I will describe ongoing work on early processing structures. I will try to generate an integrated view, including anatomical and functional data obtained in vitro, acute experiments, and unitary recordings in freely moving fish. We have recently shown have shown that these fish tract allo-generated fields and the virtual fields generated by nearby objects in the presence of self-generated fields to explore the nearby environment. These data together with the presence of a multimodal receptor mosaic at the cutaneous surface particularly surrounding the mouth and an important role of proprioception in early sensory processing suggests the hypothesis that the active electrosensory system is part of a multimodal haptic sense.

Every day when we fall asleep we lose consciousness, we are not there. And then, every morning, when we wake up, we regain it. What mechanisms give rise to consciousness, and how can we explain consciousness in the realm of the physical world of atoms and matter? For centuries, philosophers and scientists have aimed to crack this mystery. Much progress has been made in the past decades to understand how consciousness is instantiated in the brain, yet critical questions remain: can we develop a consciousness meter? Are computers conscious? What about other animals and babies? We have embarked in a large-scale, multicenter project to test, in the context of an open science, adversarial collaboration, two of the most prominent theories: Integrated information theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory. We are collecting over 500 datasets including invasive and non-invasive recordings of the human brain, i.e.. fMRI, MEG and ECoG. We hope this project will enable theory-driven discoveries and further explorations that will help us better understand how consciousness fits inside the human brain.

It is generally acknowledged that analogy is a core mechanism of human cognition, but paradoxically, analogies based on structural similarities would rarely be implemented spontaneously (e.g. without an explicit invitation to compare two representations). The scarcity of deep spontaneous analogies is at odds with the demonstration that familiar concepts from our daily-life are spontaneously used to encode the structure of our experiences. Based on this idea, we will present experimental works highlighting the predominant role of structural similarities in analogical retrieval. The educational stakes lurking behind the tendency to encode the problem’s structures through familiar concepts will also be addressed.

Spontaneous and sensory-evoked cortical activity is highly state-dependent, promoting the functional flexibility of cortical circuits underlying perception and cognition. Using neural recordings in combination with behavioral state monitoring, we find that arousal and motor activity have complementary roles in regulating local cortical operations, providing dynamic control of sensory encoding. These changes in encoding are linked to altered performance on perceptual tasks. Neuromodulators, such as acetylcholine, may regulate this state-dependent flexibility of cortical network function. We therefore recently developed an approach for dual mesoscopic imaging of acetylcholine release and neural activity across the entire cortical mantle in behaving mice. We find spatiotemporally heterogeneous patterns of cholinergic signaling across the cortex. Transitions between distinct behavioral states reorganize the structure of large-scale cortico-cortical networks and differentially regulate the relationship between cholinergic signals and neural activity. Together, our findings suggest dynamic state-dependent regulation of cortical network operations at the levels of both local and large-scale circuits.

To organize various experiences in a coherent mental representation, we need to properly estimate the duration and temporal order of different events. Yet, our perception of time is noisy and vulnerable to various illusions. Studying these illusions can elucidate the mechanism by which the brain perceives time. In this talk, I will review a few studies on how the brain perceives duration of events and the temporal order between self-generated motion and sensory feedback. Combined with computational models at different levels, these experiments illustrated that the brain incorporates the prior knowledge of the statistical distribution of the duration of stimuli and the decay of memory when estimating duration of an individual event, and adjusts its perception of temporal order to changes in the statistics of the environment.

Computational and cognitive neuroscience techniques have made great strides towards describing the neural computations underlying perceptual inference and decision-making under uncertainty. These tools tell us how and why perceptual illusions occur, which brain areas may represent noisy information in a probabilistic manner, and so on. However, an understanding of the subjective, qualitative aspects of perception remains elusive: qualia, or the personal, intrinsic properties of phenomenal awareness, have remained out of reach of these computational analytic insights. Here, I propose that metacognitive computations, and the subjective feelings that go along with them, give us a solid starting point for understanding subjective experience in general. Specifically, perceptual metacognition possesses ontological and practical properties that provide a powerful and unique opportunity for studying the studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience using established tools of computational and cognitive neuroscience. By capitalizing on decades of developments in formal computational model comparisons as applied to the specific properties of perceptual metacognition, we are now in a privileged position to reveal new and exciting insights about how the brain constructs our subjective conscious experiences.

Analogy-making is considered to be one of the cognitive processes which are hard to be accounted for in connectionist terms. A number of models have been proposed, but they are either tailed for specific analogical tasks or require complicated mechanisms which don’t fit into the mainstream connectionist modelling paradigm. In this talk I will present a new connectionist account of analogy-making based on the vector approach to representing symbols (VARS). This approach allows representing relational structures of varying complexity by numeric vectors with fixed dimensionality. I will also present a simple and computationally efficient mechanism of aligning VARS representations, which integrates both semantic similarity and structural constraints. The results of a series of simulations will demonstrate that VARS can account for basic analogical phenomena.

Interoception, the sense of internal bodily signals, is essential for physiological homeostasis, cognition, and emotions. Human neuroimaging studies suggest insular cortex plays a central role in interoception, yet the cellular and circuit mechanisms of its involvement remain unclear. We developed a microprism-based cellular imaging approach to monitor insular cortex activity in behaving mice across different physiological need states. We combine this imaging approach with manipulations of peripheral physiology, circuit-mapping, cell type-specific and circuit-specific manipulation approaches to investigate the underlying circuit mechanisms. I will present our recent data investigating insular cortex activity during two physiological need states – hunger and thirst. These wereinduced naturally by caloric/fluid deficiency, or artificially by activation of specific hypothalamic “hunger neurons” and “thirst neurons”. We found that insular cortex ongoing activity faithfully represents current physiological state, independently of behavior or arousal levels. In contrast, transient responses to learned food- or water-predicting cues reflect a population-level “simulation” of future predicted satiety. Together with additional circuit-mapping and manipulation experiments, our findings suggest that insular cortex integrates visceral-sensory inputs regarding current physiological state with hypothalamus-gated amygdala inputs signaling availability of food/water. This way, insular cortex computes a prediction of future physiological state that can be used to guide behavioral choice.

I argue that the evolution of our life history, with its distinctively long, protected human childhood allows an early period of broad hypothesis search and exploration, before the demands of goal-directed exploitation set in. This cognitive profile is also found in other animals and is associated with early behaviours such as neophilia and play. I relate this developmental pattern to computational ideas about explore-exploit trade-offs, search and sampling, and to neuroscience findings. I also present several lines of new empirical evidence suggesting that young human learners are highly exploratory, both in terms of their search for external information and their search through hypothesis spaces. In fact, they are sometimes more exploratory than older learners and adults.

We will start our talk with a short video of our research, illustrating methods (some old and new) and findings that have provided our current understanding of how visual capabilities develop in infancy and early childhood. However, our research poses some outstanding questions. We will briefly discuss three issues, which are linked by a common focus on the development of visual attentional processing: (1) How do recurrent cortical loops contribute to development? Cortical selectivity (e.g., to orientation, motion, and binocular disparity) develops in the early months of life. However, these systems are not purely feedforward but depend on parallel pathways, with recurrent feedback loops playing a critical role. The development of diverse networks, particularly for motion processing, may explain changes in dynamic responses and resolve developmental data obtained with different methodologies. One possible role for these loops is in top-down attentional control of visual processing. (2) Why do hyperopic infants become strabismic (cross-eyes)? Binocular interaction is a particularly sensitive area of development. Standard clinical accounts suppose that long-sighted (hyperopic) refractive errors require accommodative effort, putting stress on the accommodation-convergence link that leads to its breakdown and strabismus. Our large-scale population screening studies of 9-month infants question this: hyperopic infants are at higher risk of strabismus and impaired vision (amblyopia and impaired attention) but these hyperopic infants often under- rather than over-accommodate. This poor accommodation may reflect poor early attention processing, possibly a ‘soft sign’ of subtle cerebral dysfunction. (3) What do many neurodevelopmental disorders have in common? Despite similar cognitive demands, global motion perception is much more impaired than global static form across diverse neurodevelopmental disorders including Down and Williams Syndromes, Fragile-X, Autism, children with premature birth and infants with perinatal brain injury. These deficits in motion processing are associated with deficits in other dorsal stream functions such as visuo-motor co-ordination and attentional control, a cluster we have called ‘dorsal stream vulnerability’. However, our neuroimaging measures related to motion coherence in typically developing children suggest that the critical areas for individual differences in global motion sensitivity are not early motion-processing areas such as V5/MT, but downstream parietal and frontal areas for decision processes on motion signals. Although these brain networks may also underlie attentional and visuo-motor deficits , we still do not know when and how these deficits differ across different disorders and between individual children. Answering these questions provide necessary steps, not only increasing our scientific understanding of human visual brain development, but also in designing appropriate interventions to help each child achieve their full potential.

What psychological mechanisms do primates use to engage in self-control, and what is the ultimate function of these skills? I will argue that a suite of decision-making capacities, including choices about the timing of benefits, evolved in the context of foraging behaviors and vary with ecological complexity across species. Then, I will examine how these foraging capacities can be generalized to solve novel problems posing temporal costs that are important for humans, such as cooking food, and can therefore underpin evolutionary transitions in behavior. Finally, I will present work testing the hypothesis that a limited future time horizon constrains the expression of other complex abilities in nonhumans, explaining the emergence of human-unique forms of social cognition and behavior.

Research on analogical processing and reasoning has provided strong evidence that the use of adequate educational analogies has strong and positive effects on the learning of mathematics. In this talk I will show some experimental results suggesting that analogies based on spatial representations might be particularly effective to improve mathematics learning. Since fostering mathematics learning also involves addressing psychosocial factors such as the development of mathematical anxiety, providing social incentives to learn, and fostering engagement and motivation, I will argue that one area to explore with great potential to improve math learning is applying analogical research in the development of learning games aimed to improve math learning. Finally, I will show some early prototypes of an educational project devoted to developing games designed to foster the learning of early mathematics in kindergarten children.

Analogical reasoning is a complex ‘high-level’ cognitive process characterised by making inferences based on analogical comparisons. As with other high-level processes, development takes place over a protracted time period and believed to result from changes in multiple ‘lower-level’ systems. In the case of analogical reasoning, changes in systems responsible for conceptual knowledge, task knowledge, inhibition, and working memory have all been causally implicated in development. Whilst there is evidence that each of these systems contributes to development, what the relative contribution of each across development is, and how they interact with each, remain largely unanswered questions. In this presentation, I will describe how cross-sectional trajectory analysis can be used as a complementary method to shed light on these questions.

The corpus callosum is the largest fibre tract in the brain of placental mammals and connects the two cerebral hemispheres. Corpus callosum dysgenesis is a developmental brain disorder that is commonly genetic and occurs in approximately 1:4000 live births. It is easily diagnosed by MRI or prenatal ultrasound and is found in isolation or together with other brain anomalies, or with other organ system defects in a large number of different congenital syndromes. Callosal dysgenesis is a structural brain wiring disorder that can impact brain function and cognition in heterogeneous ways. We aim to understand how early developmental mechanisms lead to circuit alterations that ultimately impact behaviour and cognition. Translated to Spanish by MD and Medical interpreter Trinidad Ott. El cuerpo calloso es el tracto de fibras más grande del cerebro de los mamíferos placentarios y conecta los dos hemisferios cerebrales. La disgenesia del cuerpo calloso es un trastorno del desarrollo del cerebro que comunmente es genético y ocurre en aproximadamente 1: 4000 nacidos vivos. Se diagnostica fácilmente mediante resonancia magnética o ecografía prenatal y se encuentra aislado o junto con otras anomalías cerebrales, o con otros defectos del sistema de órganos en un gran número de síndromes congénitos diferentes. La disgenesia callosa es un trastorno estructural del cableado cerebral que puede afectar la función cerebral y la cognición de formas heterogéneas. Nuestro objetivo es comprender cómo los primeros mecanismos del desarrollo conducen a alteraciones en los circuitos que, en última instancia, afectan el comportamiento y la cognición. Traducción al español por la Doctora e Intérprete Médica Trinidad Ott.

The curse of dimensionality plagues models of reinforcement learning and decision-making. The process of abstraction solves this by constructing abstract variables describing features shared by different specific instances, reducing dimensionality and enabling generalization in novel situations. Here we characterized neural representations in monkeys performing a task where a hidden variable described the temporal statistics of stimulus-response-outcome mappings. Abstraction was defined operationally using the generalization performance of neural decoders across task conditions not used for training. This type of generalization requires a particular geometric format of neural representations. Neural ensembles in dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and hippocampus, and in simulated neural networks, simultaneously represented multiple hidden and explicit variables in a format reflecting abstraction. Task events engaging cognitive operations modulated this format. These findings elucidate how the brain and artificial systems represent abstract variables, variables critical for generalization that in turn confers cognitive flexibility.

The neurotransmitter dopamine is essential for normal reward learning and motivational arousal processes. Indeed these core functions are implicated in the major neurological and psychiatric dopamine disorders such as schizophrenia, substance abuse disorders/addiction and Parkinson's disease. Over the years, we have made significant strides in understanding the dopamine system across multiple levels of description, and I will focus on our recent advances in the computational description, and brain circuit mechanisms that facilitate the dual role of dopamine in learning and performance. I will specifically describe our recent work with imaging the activity of dopamine axons and measurements of dopamine release in mice performing various behavioural tasks. We discovered wave-like spatiotemporal activity of dopamine in the striatal region, and I will argue that this pattern of activation supports a critical computational operation; spatiotemporal credit assignment to regional striatal subexperts. Our findings provide a mechanistic description for vectorizing reward prediction error signals relayed by dopamine.