Cognitive Psychology seminars

Traditional work in the study of human reward-based learning involves designing an experimental task---often inspired by Reinforcement Learning (RL) theory---and fits a small set of computational models---often inspired by RL algorithms---to that dataset. For example, researchers often model human behavior on bandit tasks using variants of Q-learning. While this approach has been highly productive, leading to landmark discoveries such as the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis, it also has limitations. This talk focuses on the lack of generalizability of such models: Even if they closely fit behavior on the original task, models derived from the one-task-one-model paradigm usually predict behavior on other tasks quite poorly. I argue that this lack of generalizability is a fundamental problem for the cognitive sciences: we intuitively expect our models to be robust to superficial task differences, such as variations in the number of choice options, reward probabilities, or the exact kind of non-stationarity. I will propose potential solutions to this problem along two dimensions: the behavioral dataset and the computational model. Regarding computational models, I will introduce work in which we moved beyond the limitations of hand-crafted one-off models by employing flexible, data-driven methods. These methods allowed us to compare classes of models instead of individual model instances, allowing us to cover the space of possible models more exhaustively, and innovate cognitive mechanisms very efficiently. For the behavioral dataset, we move from using single learning tasks to a comprehensive task space that encompasses most existing paradigms in the literature, while closing the gaps between them in a near-continuous fashion. Our results suggest that more general models in conjunction with broader datasets can pave the road toward increasingly general models of human reward-based learning and decision making, and a persistent departure from many aspects of RL theory. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2026-05-20. Recording duration: 00:51:19.

Reward expectations – one’s prediction about the likelihood of future outcomes - play a central role in shaping the satisfaction derived from those outcomes. Most existing research treats expectations as static, assuming they remain fixed in time. However, real-life expectations are often dynamic, fluctuating as new information becomes available. For example, during a soccer game, your expectations of seeing your team winning will likely rise and fall as the game unfolds. In the main part of this talk, I will present a series of studies demonstrating that human expectations can be tracked at sub-second timescales. Using slot machines as a case study, we leverage the continuous deceleration of the reels to elicit moment-by-moment fluctuations in rewardexpectations. To capture these dynamics, we take complementary approaches: we use the high temporal resolution of electroencephalography (EEG) to track neural signatures of evolving expectations, and we develop a novel behavioral paradigm (“Slot or Not”) designed to measure changes in expectations via betting behavior. Across four studies, we show that expectations fluctuate continuously and can be tracked both behaviorally and neurally. Extending these findings, a subsequent intracranial study shows that the human orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encodes the moment-by-moment changes of reward expectations. In the second part of this talk, I will return to the relationship between expectations andsatisfaction. If expectations shape satisfaction, and if they are best conceptualized as dynamic trajectories rather than static quantities, a key question arises: does the trajectory leading up to an outcome influence how that outcome is evaluated? I will outline a new research direction aimed at formalizing this relationship using computational modeling. This is ongoing work, and I welcome feedback on how best to formalize these ideas. Finally, I will discuss potential extensions of this framework to psychopathology, asking whether alterations in dynamic expectations may characterize conditions such as Major Depressive Disorder and Gambling disorder. Together, this work introduces a new framework for studying expectations as dynamic processes, offering a richer understanding Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2026-04-29. Recording duration: 00:42:25.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence have led to new forms of misinformation, including highly realistic “deepfake” synthetic media. We conduct three experiments to investigate how and why retail investors react to deepfake financial news. Results from the first two experiments provide evidence that investors use a “realism heuristic,” responding more intensely to audio and video deepfakes as their perceptual realism increases. In the third experiment, we introduce an intervention to prompt analytical thinking, varying whether participants make analytical judgments about credibility or intuitive investment judgments. When making intuitive investment judgments, investors are strongly influenced by both more and less realistic deepfakes. When making analytical credibility judgments, investors are able to discern the non-credibility of less realistic deepfakes but struggle with more realistic deepfakes. Thus, while analytical thinking can reduce the impact of less realistic deepfakes, highly realistic deepfakes are able to overcome this analytical scrutiny. Our results suggest that deepfake financial news poses novel threats to investors.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

Vocabulary learning applications like Duolingo have millions of users around the world, but yet are based on very simple heuristics to choose teaching material to provide to their users. In this presentation, we will discuss the possibility to develop more advanced artificial teachers, which would be based on modeling of the learner’s inner characteristics. In the case of teaching vocabulary, understanding how the learner memorizes is enough. When it comes to picking grammar exercises, it becomes essential to assess how the learner reasons, in particular by analogy. This second application will illustrate how analogical and case-based reasoning can be employed in an alternative way in education: not as the teaching algorithm, but as a part of the learner’s model.

Magnitude estimation and stimulus discrimination tasks are affected by perceptual biases that cause the stimulus parameter to be perceived as shifted toward the mean of its distribution. These biases have been extensively studied in psychophysics and, more recently and to a lesser extent, with neural activity recordings. New computational techniques allow us to train spiking recurrent neural networks on the tasks used in the experiments. This provides us with another valuable tool with which to investigate the network mechanisms responsible for the biases and how behavior could be modeled. As an example, in this talk I will consider networks trained to discriminate the durations of temporal intervals. The trained networks presented the contraction bias, even though they were trained with a stimulus sequence without temporal correlations. The neural activity during the delay period carried information about the stimuli of the current trial and previous trials, this being one of the mechanisms that originated the contraction bias. The population activity described trajectories in a low-dimensional space and their relative locations depended on the prior distribution. The results can be modeled as an ideal observer that during the delay period sees a combination of the current and the previous stimuli. Finally, I will describe how the neural trajectories in state space encode an estimate of the interval duration. The approach could be applied to other cognitive tasks.

Human cognitive abilities seem qualitatively different from the cognitive abilities of other primates, a difference Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli (2008) attribute to role-based relational reasoning—inferences and generalizations based on the relational roles to which objects (and other relations) are bound, rather than just the features of the objects themselves. Role-based relational reasoning depends on the ability to dynamically bind arguments to relational roles. But dynamic binding cannot be sufficient for relational thinking: Some non-human animals solve the dynamic binding problem, at least in some domains; and many non-human species generalize affordances to completely novel objects and scenes, a kind of universal generalization that likely depends on dynamic binding. If they can solve the dynamic binding problem, then why can they not reason about relations? What are they missing? I will present simulations with the LISA model of analogical reasoning (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) suggesting that the missing pieces are multi-role integration (the capacity to combine multiple role bindings into complete relations) and structure mapping (the capacity to map different systems of role bindings onto one another). When LISA is deprived of either of these capacities, it can still generalize affordances universally, but it cannot reason symbolically; granted both abilities, LISA enjoys the full power of relational (symbolic) thought. I speculate that one reason it may have taken relational reasoning so long to evolve is that it required evolution to solve both problems simultaneously, since neither multi-role integration nor structure mapping appears to confer any adaptive advantage over simple role binding on its own.

Not all individuals are equally competent at recognizing the faces they interact with. Revealing how the brains of different individuals support variations in this ability is a crucial step to develop an understanding of real-world human visual behaviour. In this talk, I will present findings from a large high-density EEG dataset (>100k trials of participants processing various stimulus categories) and computational approaches which aimed to characterise the brain representations behind real-world proficiency of “super-recognizers”—individuals at the top of face recognition ability spectrum. Using decoding analysis of time-resolved EEG patterns, we predicted with high precision the trial-by-trial activity of super-recognizers participants, and showed that evidence for face recognition ability variations is disseminated along early, intermediate and late brain processing steps. Computational modeling of the underlying brain activity uncovered two representational signatures supporting higher face recognition ability—i) mid-level visual & ii) semantic computations. Both components were dissociable in brain processing-time (the first around the N170, the last around the P600) and levels of computations (the first emerging from mid-level layers of visual Convolutional Neural Networks, the last from a semantic model characterising sentence descriptions of images). I will conclude by presenting ongoing analyses from a well-known case of acquired prosopagnosia (PS) using similar computational modeling of high-density EEG activity.

Even young children seem to have an early understanding of the world around them, and the people in it. Before children can reliably say "ball", "wall", or "Saul", they expect balls to not go through walls, and for Saul to go right for a ball (if there's no wall). What is the formal conceptual structure underlying this commonsense reasoning about objects and agents? I will raise several possibilities for models underlying core intuitive physics as a way of talking about models of core knowledge and intuitive theories more generally. In particular, I will present some recent ML work trying to capture early expectations about object solidly, cohesion, and permanence, that relies on a rough-derendering approach.

I will begin by describing recent research taking a new, model-based approach to perceptual development. This approach uncovers fundamental changes in information processing underlying the protracted development of perception, action, and decision-making in childhood. For example, integration of multiple sensory estimates via reliability-weighted averaging – widely used by adults to improve perception – is often not seen until surprisingly late into childhood, as assessed by both behaviour and neural representations. This approach forms the basis for a newer question: the scope for the nervous system to deploy useful computations (e.g. reliability-weighted averaging) to optimise perception and action using newly-learned sensory signals provided by technology. Our initial model system is augmenting visual depth perception with devices translating distance into auditory or vibro-tactile signals. This problem has immediate applications to people with partial vision loss, but the broader question concerns our scope to use technology to tune in to any signal not available to our native biological receptors. I will describe initial progress on this problem, and our approach to operationalising what it might mean to adopt a new signal comparably to a native sense. This will include testing for its integration (weighted averaging) alongside the native senses, assessing the level at which this integration happens in the brain, and measuring the degree of ‘automaticity’ with which new signals are used, compared with native perception.

The idea that behavior results from a dynamic interplay between automatic and controlled processing underlies much of decision science, but has also generated considerable controversy. In this talk, I will highlight behavioral and neural data showing how recently-developed computational models of decision making can be used to shed new light on whether, when, and how decisions result from distinct processes operating at different timescales. Across diverse domains ranging from altruism to risky choice biases and self-regulation, our work suggests that a model of prioritized attentional sampling and evidence accumulation may provide an alternative explanation for many phenomena previously interpreted as supporting dual process models of choice. However, I also show how some features of the model might be taken as support for specific aspects of dual-process models, providing a way to reconcile conflicting accounts and generating new predictions and insights along the way.

The eyes send a continuous stream of about two million nerve fibers to the brain, but only a fraction of this information is stored as visual memories. This talk will detail three neurocomputational models that attempt an understanding how the visual system makes on-the-fly decisions about how to encode that information. First, the STST family of models (Bowman & Wyble 2007; Wyble, Potter, Bowman & Nieuwenstein 2011) proposes mechanisms for temporal segmentation of continuous input. The conclusion of this work is that the visual system has mechanisms for rapidly creating brief episodes of attention that highlight important moments in time, and also separates each episode from temporally adjacent neighbors to benefit learning. Next, the RAGNAROC model (Wyble et al. 2019) describes a decision process for determining the spatial focus (or foci) of attention in a spatiotopic field and the neural mechanisms that provide enhancement of targets and suppression of highly distracting information. This work highlights the importance of integrating behavioral and electrophysiological data to provide empirical constraints on a neurally plausible model of spatial attention. The model also highlights how a neural circuit can make decisions in a continuous space, rather than among discrete alternatives. Finally, the binding pool (Swan & Wyble 2014; Hedayati, O’Donnell, Wyble in Prep) provides a mechanism for selectively encoding specific attributes (i.e. color, shape, category) of a visual object to be stored in a consolidated memory representation. The binding pool is akin to a holographic memory system that layers representations of select latent representations corresponding to different attributes of a given object. Moreover, it can bind features into distinct objects by linking them to token placeholders. Future work looks toward combining these models into a coherent framework for understanding the full measure of on-the-fly attentional mechanisms and how they improve learning.

Our senses are constantly bombarded with a myriad of diverse signals. Transforming this sensory cacophony into a coherent percept of our environment relies on solving two computational challenges: First, we need to solve the causal inference problem - deciding whether signals come from a common cause and thus should be integrated, or come from different sources and be treated independently. Second, when there is a common cause, we should integrate signals across the senses weighted in proportion to their sensory reliabilities. I discuss recent research at the behavioural, computational and neural systems level that investigates how the brain addresses these two computational challenges in multisensory perception.

To organize various experiences in a coherent mental representation, we need to properly estimate the duration and temporal order of different events. Yet, our perception of time is noisy and vulnerable to various illusions. Studying these illusions can elucidate the mechanism by which the brain perceives time. In this talk, I will review a few studies on how the brain perceives duration of events and the temporal order between self-generated motion and sensory feedback. Combined with computational models at different levels, these experiments illustrated that the brain incorporates the prior knowledge of the statistical distribution of the duration of stimuli and the decay of memory when estimating duration of an individual event, and adjusts its perception of temporal order to changes in the statistics of the environment.

Learning by analogy is a powerful tool children’s developmental repertoire, as well as in educational contexts such as mathematics, where the key knowledge base involves building flexible schemas. However, noticing and learning from analogies develops over time and is cognitively resource intensive. I review studies that provide insight into the relationship between mechanisms driving children’s developing analogy skills, highlighting environmental inputs (parent talk and prior experiences priming attention to relations) and neuro-cognitive factors (Executive Functions and brain injury). I then note implications for mathematics learning, reviewing experimental findings that show analogy can improve learning, but also that both individual differences in EFs and environmental factors that reduce available EFs such as performance pressure can predict student learning.

Humans continuously need to learn to make good choices – be it using a new video-conferencing set up, figuring out what questions to ask to successfully secure a reliable babysitter, or just selecting which location in a house is least likely to be interrupted by toddlers during work calls. However, the goals we seek to attain – such as using zoom successfully – are often vaguely defined and previously unexperienced, and in that sense cannot be known by us as being rewarding. We hypothesized that learning to make good choices in such situations nevertheless leverages reinforcement learning processes, and that executive functions in general, and working memory in particular, play a crucial role in defining the reward function for arbitrary outcomes in such a way that they become reinforcing. I will show results from a novel behavioral protocol, as well as preliminary computational and imaging evidence supporting our hypothesis.

Cognitive architectures are attempts to build larger-scale models of minds. This talk will explore how structure-mapping models of analogical matching, retrieval, and generalization are used in the Companion cognitive architecture. Examples will include modeling conceptual change, learning by reading, and analogical Q/A training.