Cognitive Psychology seminars

Margaret Livingstone of Harvard Medical School presents in Princeton Neuroscience Institute's public seminar series. Livingstone's laboratory studies how visual recognition occurs in the primate brain using behavior, brain imaging, and electrophysiology.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

Understanding and potentially reversing memory decline necessitates a comprehensive examination of memory's evolution throughout life. Traditional memory assessments, however, suffer from a lack of comparability across different age groups due to the diverse nature of the tests employed. Addressing this gap, our study introduces a novel, ACT-R model-based memory assessment designed to provide a consistent metric for evaluating memory function across a lifespan, from 5 to 85-year-olds. This approach allows for direct comparison across various tasks and materials tailored to specific age groups. Our findings reveal a pronounced U-shaped trajectory of long-term memory function, with performance at age 5 mirroring those observed in elderly individuals with impairments, highlighting critical periods of memory development and decline. Leveraging this unified assessment method, we further investigate the therapeutic potential of rs-fMRI-guided TBS targeting area 8AV in individuals with early-onset Alzheimer’s Disease—a region implicated in memory deterioration and mood disturbances in this population. This research not only advances our understanding of memory's lifespan dynamics but also opens new avenues for targeted interventions in Alzheimer’s Disease, marking a significant step forward in the quest to mitigate memory decay.

There is a fundamental tension between storing discrete traces of individual experiences, which allows recall of particular moments in our past without interference, and extracting regularities across these experiences, which supports generalization and prediction in similar situations in the future. One influential proposal for how the brain resolves this tension is that it separates the processes anatomically into Complementary Learning Systems, with the hippocampus rapidly encoding individual episodes and the neocortex slowly extracting regularities over days, months, and years. But this does not explain our ability to learn and generalize from new regularities in our environment quickly, often within minutes. We have put forward a neural network model of the hippocampus that suggests that the hippocampus itself may contain complementary learning systems, with one pathway specializing in the rapid learning of regularities and a separate pathway handling the region’s classic episodic memory functions. This proposal has broad implications for how we learn and represent novel information of specific and generalized types, which we test across statistical learning, inference, and category learning paradigms. We also explore how this system interacts with slower-learning neocortical memory systems, with empirical and modeling investigations into how the hippocampus shapes neocortical representations during sleep. Together, the work helps us understand how structured information in our environment is initially encoded and how it then transforms over time.

First, a new measure of MI for reaction times is proposed that takes the entire RT distribution into account. Second, we present some recent developments in TWIN modeling, including a new proposal for the sound-induced flash illusion (SIFI).

Humans constantly make perceptual decisions on human faces and voices. These regularly come with the challenge of receiving only uncertain sensory evidence, resulting from noisy input and noisy neural processes. Efficiently adapting one’s internal decision system including prior expectations and subsequent metacognitive assessments to these challenges is crucial in everyday life. However, the exact decision mechanisms and whether these represent modifiable states remain unknown in the general population and clinical patients with psychosis. Using data from a laboratory-based sample of healthy controls and patients with psychosis as well as a complementary, large online sample of healthy controls, I will demonstrate how a combination of perceptual face and voice recognition decision fidelity, metacognitive ratings, and Bayesian computational modelling may be used as indicators to differentiate between non-clinical and clinical states in the future.

Explicit similarity judgments tend to emphasize relational information more than do difference judgments. In this talk, I propose and test the hypothesis that this asymmetry arises because human reasoners represent the relation different as the negation of the relation same (i.e., as not-same). This proposal implies that processing difference is more cognitively demanding than processing similarity. Both for verbal comparisons between word pairs, and for visual comparisons between sets of geometric shapes, participants completed a triad task in which they selected which of two options was either more similar to or more different from a standard. On unambiguous trials, one option was unambiguously more similar to the standard, either by virtue of featural similarity or by virtue of relational similarity. On ambiguous trials, one option was more featurally similar (but less relationally similar) to the standard, whereas the other was more relationally similar (but less featurally similar). Given the higher cognitive complexity of assessing relational similarity, we predicted that detecting relational difference would be particularly demanding. We found that participants (1) had more difficulty accurately detecting relational difference than they did relational similarity on unambiguous trials, and (2) tended to emphasize relational information more when judging similarity than when judging difference on ambiguous trials. The latter finding was captured by a computational model of comparison that weights relational information more heavily for similarity than for difference judgments. These results provide convergent evidence for a representational asymmetry between the relations same and different.

Vector-space models are used frequently to compare similarity and dimensionality among entity concepts. What happens when we apply these models to relational concepts? What is the evidence that such models do apply to relational concepts? If we use such a model, then one implication is that maximizing surface feature variation should improve relational concept learning. For example, in STEM instruction, the effectiveness of teaching by analogy is often limited by students’ focus on superficial features of the source and target exemplars. However, in contrast to the prediction of the vector-space computational model, the strategy of progressive alignment (moving from perceptually similar to different targets) has been suggested to address this issue (Gentner & Hoyos, 2017), and human behavioral evidence has shown benefits from progressive alignment. Here I will present some preliminary data that supports the computational approach. Participants were explicitly instructed to match stimuli based on relations while perceptual similarity of stimuli varied parametrically. We found that lower perceptual similarity reduced accurate relational matching. This finding demonstrates that perceptual similarity may interfere with relational judgements, but also hints at why progressive alignment maybe effective. These are preliminary, exploratory data and I to hope receive feedback on the framework and to start a discussion in a group on the utility of vector-space models for relational concepts in general.

Adolescent development is not only shaped by the mere passing of time and accumulating experience, but it also depends on pubertal timing and the cascade of maturational processes orchestrated by gonadal hormones. Although individual variability in puberty onset confounds adolescent studies, it has not been efficiently controlled for. Here we introduce ultrasonic bone age assessment to estimate biological maturity and disentangle the independent effects of chronological and biological age on adolescent cognitive abilities, emotional development, and brain maturation. Comparing cognitive performance of participants with different skeletal maturity we uncover the impact of biological age on both IQ and specific abilities. With respect to emotional development, we find narrow windows of highest vulnerability determined by biological age. In terms of neural development, we focus on the relevance of neural states unrelated to sensory stimulation, such as cortical activity during sleep and resting states, and we uncover a novel anterior-to-posterior pattern of human brain maturation. Based on our findings, bone age is a promising biomarker of adolescent maturity.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

Magnitude estimation and stimulus discrimination tasks are affected by perceptual biases that cause the stimulus parameter to be perceived as shifted toward the mean of its distribution. These biases have been extensively studied in psychophysics and, more recently and to a lesser extent, with neural activity recordings. New computational techniques allow us to train spiking recurrent neural networks on the tasks used in the experiments. This provides us with another valuable tool with which to investigate the network mechanisms responsible for the biases and how behavior could be modeled. As an example, in this talk I will consider networks trained to discriminate the durations of temporal intervals. The trained networks presented the contraction bias, even though they were trained with a stimulus sequence without temporal correlations. The neural activity during the delay period carried information about the stimuli of the current trial and previous trials, this being one of the mechanisms that originated the contraction bias. The population activity described trajectories in a low-dimensional space and their relative locations depended on the prior distribution. The results can be modeled as an ideal observer that during the delay period sees a combination of the current and the previous stimuli. Finally, I will describe how the neural trajectories in state space encode an estimate of the interval duration. The approach could be applied to other cognitive tasks.

Executive control processes and flexible behaviors rely on the integrity of, and dynamic interactions between, large-scale functional brain networks. The right insular cortex is a critical component of a salience/midcingulo-insular network that is thought to mediate interactions between brain networks involved in externally oriented (central executive/lateral frontoparietal network) and internally oriented (default mode/medial frontoparietal network) processes. How these brain systems reconfigure with development is a critical question for cognitive neuroscience, with implications for neurodevelopmental pathologies affecting brain connectivity. I will describe studies examining how brain network dynamics support flexible behaviors in typical and atypical development, presenting evidence suggesting a unique role for the dorsal anterior insular from studies of meta-analytic connectivity modeling, dynamic functional connectivity, and structural connectivity. These findings from adults, typically developing children, and children with autism suggest that structural and functional maturation of insular pathways is a critical component of the process by which human brain networks mature to support complex, flexible cognitive processes throughout the lifespan.

To efficiently process sensory information, the brain relies on statistical regularities in the input. While generally improving the reliability of sensory estimates, this strategy also induces perceptual illusions that help reveal the underlying computational principles. Focusing on auditory and visual perception, in my talk I will describe how the brain exploits statistical regularities within and across the senses for the perception space, time and multisensory integration. In particular, I will show how results from a series of psychophysical experiments can be interpreted in the light of Bayesian Decision Theory, and I will demonstrate how such canonical computations can be implemented into simple and biologically plausible neural circuits. Finally, I will show how such principles of sensory information processing can be leveraged in virtual and augmented reality to overcome display limitations and expand human perception.

I will present my recent work on mathematical modeling of human memory. I will argue that memory recall of random lists of items is governed by the universal algorithm resulting in the analytical relation between the number of items in memory and the number of items that can be successfully recalled. The retention of items in memory on the other hand is not universal and differs for different types of items being remembered, in particular retention curves for words and sketches is different even when sketches are made to only carry information about an object being drawn. I will discuss the putative reasons for these observations and introduce the phenomenological model predicting retention curves.

Several lines of research have demonstrated that internally generated sensory experience - such as during memory, dreaming and mental imagery - activates similar neural representations as externally triggered perception. This overlap raises a fundamental challenge: how is the brain able to keep apart signals reflecting imagination and reality? In a series of online psychophysics experiments combined with computational modelling, we investigated to what extent imagination and perception are confused when the same content is simultaneously imagined and perceived. We found that simultaneous congruent mental imagery consistently led to an increase in perceptual presence responses, and that congruent perceptual presence responses were in turn associated with a more vivid imagery experience. Our findings can be best explained by a simple signal detection model in which imagined and perceived signals are added together. Perceptual reality monitoring can then easily be implemented by evaluating whether this intermixed signal is strong or vivid enough to pass a ‘reality threshold’. Our model suggests that, in contrast to self-generated sensory changes during movement, our brain does not discount self-generated sensory signals during mental imagery. This has profound implications for our understanding of reality monitoring and perception in general.

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies and variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to the frequently suboptimal inference strategies used by humans. We examined inference problems involving rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that were suboptimal relative to the Bayesian ideal observer. These suboptimal strategies reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but high bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but displayed weaker, near-normative bias. Our results yield new insights into the principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference, and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that are sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality of the inference process.

Selection is the hallmark of attention: processing improves for attended items but is relatively impaired for unattended items. It is well known that visual spatial attention changes sensory signals and perception in this selective fashion. In the work I will present, we asked whether and how attentional selection happens across time. First, our experiments revealed that voluntary temporal attention (attention to specific points in time) is selective, resulting in perceptual tradeoffs across time. Second, we measured small eye movements called microsaccades and found that directing voluntary temporal attention increases the stability of the eyes in anticipation of an attended stimulus. Third, we developed a computational model of dynamic attention, which proposes specific mechanisms underlying temporal attention and its selectivity. Lastly, I will mention how we are testing predictions of the model with MEG. Altogether, this research shows how precisely timed voluntary attention helps manage inherent limits in visual processing across short time intervals, advancing our understanding of attention as a dynamic process.