Cognitive Psychology seminars

Neural correlates of visual working memory have been found in early visual, parietal, and prefrontal regions. These findings have spurred fruitful debate over how and where in the brain memories might be represented. Here, I will present data from multiple experiments to demonstrate how a focus on behavioral requirements can unveil a more comprehensive understanding of the visual working memory system. Specifically, items in working memory must be maintained in a highly robust manner, resilient to interference. At the same time, storage mechanisms must preserve a high degree of flexibility in case of changing behavioral goals. Several examples will be explored in which visual memory representations are shown to undergo transformations, and even shift their cortical locus alongside their coding format based on specifics of the task.

Several studies have showed that face stimuli elicit extremely fast and involuntary saccadic responses toward them, relative to other categories of visual stimuli. In the talk, I will mainly focus on a quite recent research done in our team that investigated to what extent face stimuli influence the programming and execution of saccades. In this research, two experiments were performed using a saccadic choice task: two images (one with a face, one with a vehicle) were simultaneously displayed in the left and right visual fields of participants who had to execute a saccade toward the image (Experiment 1) or toward a cross added in the center of the image (Experiment 2) containing a target stimulus (a face or a vehicle). As expected participants were faster to execute a saccade toward a face than toward a vehicle and did less errors. We also observed shorter saccades toward vehicle than face targets, even if participants were explicitly asked to perform their saccades toward a specific location (Experiment 2). Further analyses, that I will detailed in the talk, showed that error saccades might be interrupted in mid-fight to initiate a concurrently programmed corrective saccade.

Uncertainty regarding which psychological mechanisms are fundamental in mediating SSRI treatment outcomes and wide-ranging variability in their efficacy has raised more questions than it has solved. Since subjective mood states are an abstract scientific construct, only available through self-report in humans, and likely involving input from multiple top-down and bottom-up signals, it has been difficult to model at what level SSRIs interact with this process. Converging translational evidence indicates a role for serotonin in modulating context-dependent parameters of action selection, affect, and social cognition; and concurrently supporting learning mechanisms, which promote adaptability and behavioural flexibility. We examine the theoretical basis, ecological validity, and interaction of these constructs and how they may or may not exert a clinical benefit. Specifically, we bridge crucial gaps between disparate lines of research, particularly findings from animal models and human clinical trials, which often seem to present irreconcilable differences. In determining how SSRIs exert their effects, our approach examines the endogenous functions of 5-HT neurons, how 5-HT manipulations affect behaviour in different contexts, and how their therapeutic effects may be exerted in humans – which may illuminate issues of translational models, hierarchical mechanisms, idiographic variables, and social cognition.

To date, neuroimaging research has had a limited focus on non-social features of autism. As a result, neurobiological explanations for atypical sensory perception in autism are lacking. To address this, we quantitively condensed findings from the non-social autism fMRI literature in line with the current best practices for neuroimaging meta-analyses. Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), we conducted a series of robust meta-analyses across 83 experiments from 52 fMRI studies investigating differences between autistic (n = 891) and typical (n = 967) participants. We found that typical controls, compared to autistic people, show greater activity in the prefrontal cortex (BA9, BA10) during perception tasks. More refined analyses revealed that, when compared to typical controls, autistic people show greater recruitment of the extrastriate V2 cortex (BA18) during visual processing. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of current theories of autistic perception, and highlight some of the challenges of cognitive neuroscience research in autism.

I will begin by describing recent research taking a new, model-based approach to perceptual development. This approach uncovers fundamental changes in information processing underlying the protracted development of perception, action, and decision-making in childhood. For example, integration of multiple sensory estimates via reliability-weighted averaging – widely used by adults to improve perception – is often not seen until surprisingly late into childhood, as assessed by both behaviour and neural representations. This approach forms the basis for a newer question: the scope for the nervous system to deploy useful computations (e.g. reliability-weighted averaging) to optimise perception and action using newly-learned sensory signals provided by technology. Our initial model system is augmenting visual depth perception with devices translating distance into auditory or vibro-tactile signals. This problem has immediate applications to people with partial vision loss, but the broader question concerns our scope to use technology to tune in to any signal not available to our native biological receptors. I will describe initial progress on this problem, and our approach to operationalising what it might mean to adopt a new signal comparably to a native sense. This will include testing for its integration (weighted averaging) alongside the native senses, assessing the level at which this integration happens in the brain, and measuring the degree of ‘automaticity’ with which new signals are used, compared with native perception.

Behavioural measurements are often overlooked by computational neuroscientists, who prefer to focus on electrophysiological recordings or neuroimaging data. This attitude is largely due to perceived lack of depth/richness in relation to behavioural datasets. I will show how contemporary psychophysics can deliver extremely rich and highly constraining datasets that naturally interface with computational modelling. More specifically, I will demonstrate how psychophysics can be used to guide/constrain/refine computational models, and how models can be exploited to design/motivate/interpret psychophysical experiments. Examples will span a wide range of topics (from feature detection to natural scene understanding) and methodologies (from cascade models to deep learning architectures).

Nicole Rust is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research investigates how the brain gives rise to the mind and to behavior, with an emphasis on memory. Much of her work lies at the nexus of real and artificial intelligence, as well as experiment and theory.

In this talk I’ll discuss translation of findings of multisensory facilitation of learning to cognitive training. I’ll first review some early findings of multisensory facilitation of learning and then discuss how we have been translating these basic science approaches into gamified training interventions to improve cognitive functions. I’ll touch on approaches to training vision, hearing and working memory that we are developing at the UCR Brain Game Center for Mental Fitness and Well-being. I look forward to discussing both the basic science but also the complexities of how to translate approaches from basic science into the more complex frameworks often used in interventions.

The idea that behavior results from a dynamic interplay between automatic and controlled processing underlies much of decision science, but has also generated considerable controversy. In this talk, I will highlight behavioral and neural data showing how recently-developed computational models of decision making can be used to shed new light on whether, when, and how decisions result from distinct processes operating at different timescales. Across diverse domains ranging from altruism to risky choice biases and self-regulation, our work suggests that a model of prioritized attentional sampling and evidence accumulation may provide an alternative explanation for many phenomena previously interpreted as supporting dual process models of choice. However, I also show how some features of the model might be taken as support for specific aspects of dual-process models, providing a way to reconcile conflicting accounts and generating new predictions and insights along the way.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

Concerns about the impact of social media use on adolescent well-being and mental health are common. While the amount of research in this area has increased rapidly over the last 5 years, most outputs are still marred by a multitude of limitations. These shortcomings have left our understanding of social media effects severely limited, holding back both scientific discovery and policy interventions. This talk discusses how developmental, cognitive and neuroscientific approaches might provide a new and improved way of studying social media effects. It will detail new studies in support of this idea, and raise potential avenues for collaborative work across the Cambridge Neuroscience community. As the digital world now (re)shapes what it means for us to live, communicate and develop, only an interdisciplinary approach will allow us to truly understand its impacts.

In a few months, human infants develop complex capacities in numerous cognitive domains. They learn their native language, recognize their parents, refine their numerical capacities and their perception of the world around them but are they conscious and how can we study consciousness when no verbal report is possible? One way to approach this question is to rely on the neural responses correlated with conscious perception in adults (i.e. a global increase of activity in notably frontal regions with top-down amplification of the sensory levels). We can thus study at what age the developing anatomical architecture might be mature enough to allow this type of responses, but moreover we can use similar experimental paradigms than in adults in which we expect to observe a similar pattern of functional responses.

Our senses are constantly bombarded with a myriad of diverse signals. Transforming this sensory cacophony into a coherent percept of our environment relies on solving two computational challenges: First, we need to solve the causal inference problem - deciding whether signals come from a common cause and thus should be integrated, or come from different sources and be treated independently. Second, when there is a common cause, we should integrate signals across the senses weighted in proportion to their sensory reliabilities. I discuss recent research at the behavioural, computational and neural systems level that investigates how the brain addresses these two computational challenges in multisensory perception.

From robots to humans, the ability to learn from experience turns a rigid response system into a flexible, adaptive one. In this talk, I will discuss emerging findings regarding the neural and cognitive mechanisms by which learning shapes decisions. The lecture will focus on how multiple brain regions interact to support learning, what this means for how memories are built, and the consequences for how decisions are made. Results emerging from this work challenge the traditional view of separate learning systems and advance understanding of how memory biases decisions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways.

To organize various experiences in a coherent mental representation, we need to properly estimate the duration and temporal order of different events. Yet, our perception of time is noisy and vulnerable to various illusions. Studying these illusions can elucidate the mechanism by which the brain perceives time. In this talk, I will review a few studies on how the brain perceives duration of events and the temporal order between self-generated motion and sensory feedback. Combined with computational models at different levels, these experiments illustrated that the brain incorporates the prior knowledge of the statistical distribution of the duration of stimuli and the decay of memory when estimating duration of an individual event, and adjusts its perception of temporal order to changes in the statistics of the environment.

Perceptual learning (PL) is defined as long-term performance improvement on a perceptual task as a result of perceptual experience (Sasaki, Nanez& Watanabe, 2011, Nat Rev Neurosci, 2011). We first found that PL occurs for task-irrelevant and subthreshold features and that pairing task-irrelevant features with rewards is the key to form task-irrelevant PL (TIPL) (Watanabe, Nanez & Sasaki, Nature, 2001; Watanabe et al, 2002, Nature Neuroscience; Seitz & Watanabe, Nature, 2003; Seitz, Kim & Watanabe, 2009, Neuron; Shibata et al, 2011, Science). These results suggest that PL occurs as a result of interactions between reinforcement and bottom-up stimulus signals (Seitz & Watanabe, 2005, TICS). On the other hand, fMRI study results indicate that lateral prefrontal cortex fails to detect and thus to suppress subthreshold task-irrelevant signals. This leads to the paradoxical effect that a signal that is below, but close to, one’s discrimination threshold ends up being stronger than suprathreshold signals (Tsushima, Sasaki & Watanabe, 2006, Science). We confirmed this mechanism with the following results: Task-irrelevant learning occurs only when a presented feature is under and close to the threshold with younger individuals (Tsushima et al, 2009, Current Biol), whereas with older individuals who tend to have less inhibitory control task-irrelevant learning occurs with a feature whose signal is much greater than the threshold (Chang et al, 2014, Current Biol). From all of these results, we conclude that attention and reward play important but different roles in PL. I will further discuss different stages and phases in mechanisms of PL (Seitz et al, 2005, PNAS; Yotsumoto, Watanabe & Sasaki, Neuron, 2008; Yotsumoto et al, Curr Biol, 2009; Watanabe & Sasaki, 2015, Ann Rev Psychol; Shibata et al, 2017, Nat Neurosci; Tamaki et al, 2020, Nat Neurosci).

Humans continuously need to learn to make good choices – be it using a new video-conferencing set up, figuring out what questions to ask to successfully secure a reliable babysitter, or just selecting which location in a house is least likely to be interrupted by toddlers during work calls. However, the goals we seek to attain – such as using zoom successfully – are often vaguely defined and previously unexperienced, and in that sense cannot be known by us as being rewarding. We hypothesized that learning to make good choices in such situations nevertheless leverages reinforcement learning processes, and that executive functions in general, and working memory in particular, play a crucial role in defining the reward function for arbitrary outcomes in such a way that they become reinforcing. I will show results from a novel behavioral protocol, as well as preliminary computational and imaging evidence supporting our hypothesis.