Cognitive Psychology seminars

It seems we see the world in full detail. However, the eye is not a camera nor is the brain a computer. Incredible metabolic constraints render us unable to encode more than a fraction of information available in each glance. Instead, our illusion of stable and complete perception is accomplished by parsimonious representation relying on natural order inherent in the surrounding environment. I will begin by discussing previous behavioral work from our lab demonstrating one such strategy by which the visual system represents average properties of Gestalt-grouped sets of individual objects, warping individual object representations toward the Gestalt-defined mean. I will then discuss on-going work using a behavioral index of averaging Gestalt-grouped information established in our previous work in conjunction with an ERP-index of VSTM capacity (the CDA) to measure whether the Gestalt-grouping and perceptual averaging strategy acts to boost memory capacity above the classic “four-item” limit. Finally, I will outline our pre-registered study to determine whether this perceptual strategy is indeed engaged in a “smart” manner under normal circumstances, or compromises fidelity for capacity by perceptually-averaging in trials with only four items that could otherwise be individually represented.

Behavioural measurements are often overlooked by computational neuroscientists, who prefer to focus on electrophysiological recordings or neuroimaging data. This attitude is largely due to perceived lack of depth/richness in relation to behavioural datasets. I will show how contemporary psychophysics can deliver extremely rich and highly constraining datasets that naturally interface with computational modelling. More specifically, I will demonstrate how psychophysics can be used to guide/constrain/refine computational models, and how models can be exploited to design/motivate/interpret psychophysical experiments. Examples will span a wide range of topics (from feature detection to natural scene understanding) and methodologies (from cascade models to deep learning architectures).

A striking range of individual differences has been reported in a variety of visual search tasks, which naturally leads to the idea that some people are better at finding things than others. However, this conclusion appears to be premature. We carried out a replication of three recent visual search experiments and found that each task showed a wide range of individual differences as predicted, and observed good test-retest reliability in all three. However, performance on any one task was not correlated with the performance in the others: participants who naturally adopt efficient search strategies in one paradigm may perform at chance in another! Furthermore, we also show that behaviour in different versions of the same paradigm can be radically different: When simple line segments are used for search items, a large range of search strategies are found. If we instead use more complex search items, all our participants effortlessly adopt an optimal strategy. These results suggest search strategies are stable over time, but context-specific. To understand visual search we, therefore, need to account not only for differences between individuals but also how individuals interact with the search task and context.

Nicole Rust is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research investigates how the brain gives rise to the mind and to behavior, with an emphasis on memory. Much of her work lies at the nexus of real and artificial intelligence, as well as experiment and theory.

Visual attention refers to a set of processes allowing selection of relevant and filtering out of irrelevant information in the visual environment. A large amount of research on visual attention has involved visual search paradigms, where observers are asked to report whether a single target is present or absent. However, recent studies have revealed that these classic single-target visual search tasks only provide a snapshot of how attention is allocated in the visual environment, and that multitarget visual foraging tasks may capture the dynamics visual attention more accurately. In visual foraging, observers are asked to select multiple instances of multiple target types, as fast as they can. A critical question in foraging research concerns the factors driving the next target selection. Most likely, this would require two steps: (1) identifying a set of candidates for the next selection, and (2) selecting the best option among these candidates. After having briefly described the advantage of visual foraging over visual search, I will review recent visual foraging studies testing the influence of several manipulations (e.g., target crypticity, number of items, selection modality) on foraging behaviour. Overall, these studies revealed that the next target selection during visual foraging is determined by the competition between three factors: target value, target proximity, and priming of features. I will explain how the analysis of individual differences in foraging behaviour can provide important information, with the idea that individuals show by-default internal biases toward value, proximity and priming that determine their search strategy and behaviour.

Deciding whether two different face photographs or voice samples are from the same person represent fundamental challenges within applied settings. To date, most research has focussed on average performance in these tests, failing to consider individual differences and within-person consistency in responses. In the current studies, participants completed the same face or voice matching test on two separate occasions, allowing comparison of overall accuracy across the two timepoints as well as consistency in trial-level responses. In both experiments, participants were highly consistent in their performances. In addition, we demonstrated a large association between consistency and accuracy, with the most accurate participants also tending to be the most consistent. This is an important result for applied settings in which organisational groups of super-matchers are deployed in real-world contexts. Being able to reliably identify these high performers based upon only a single test informs regarding recruitment for law enforcement agencies worldwide.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

Face matching tests have traditionally been developed to assess human face perception in the neurotypical range, but methods that underlie their development often make it difficult for these measures to be applied in atypical populations (developmental prosopagnosics, super recognizers) due to unadjusted difficulty. We have recently presented the development of the Oxford Face Matching Test, a measure that bases individual item-difficulty on algorithmically derived similarity of presented stimuli. The measure seems useful as it can be given online or in-laboratory, has good discriminability and high test-retest reliability in the neurotypical groups. In addition, it has good validity in separating atypical groups at either of the spectrum ends. In this talk, I examine the stability of the OFMT and other traditionally used measures in atypical groups. On top of the theoretical significance of determining whether reliability of tests is equivalent in atypical population, this is an important question because of the practical concerns of retesting the same participants across different lab groups. Theoretical and practical implications for further test development and data sharing are discussed.

The eyes send a continuous stream of about two million nerve fibers to the brain, but only a fraction of this information is stored as visual memories. This talk will detail three neurocomputational models that attempt an understanding how the visual system makes on-the-fly decisions about how to encode that information. First, the STST family of models (Bowman & Wyble 2007; Wyble, Potter, Bowman & Nieuwenstein 2011) proposes mechanisms for temporal segmentation of continuous input. The conclusion of this work is that the visual system has mechanisms for rapidly creating brief episodes of attention that highlight important moments in time, and also separates each episode from temporally adjacent neighbors to benefit learning. Next, the RAGNAROC model (Wyble et al. 2019) describes a decision process for determining the spatial focus (or foci) of attention in a spatiotopic field and the neural mechanisms that provide enhancement of targets and suppression of highly distracting information. This work highlights the importance of integrating behavioral and electrophysiological data to provide empirical constraints on a neurally plausible model of spatial attention. The model also highlights how a neural circuit can make decisions in a continuous space, rather than among discrete alternatives. Finally, the binding pool (Swan & Wyble 2014; Hedayati, O’Donnell, Wyble in Prep) provides a mechanism for selectively encoding specific attributes (i.e. color, shape, category) of a visual object to be stored in a consolidated memory representation. The binding pool is akin to a holographic memory system that layers representations of select latent representations corresponding to different attributes of a given object. Moreover, it can bind features into distinct objects by linking them to token placeholders. Future work looks toward combining these models into a coherent framework for understanding the full measure of on-the-fly attentional mechanisms and how they improve learning.

Perception can be strongly serially-dependent (i.e. biased toward previously seen stimuli). Recently, serial dependencies in perception were proposed as a mechanism for perceptual stability, increasing the apparent continuity of the complex environments we experience in everyday life. For example, stable scene perception can be actively achieved by the visual system through global serial dependencies, a special kind of serial dependence between summary statistical representations. Serial dependence occurs also between emotional expressions, but it is highly selective for the same identity. Overall, these results further support the notion of serial dependence as a global, highly specialized, and purposeful mechanism. However, serial dependence could also be a deleterious phenomenon in unnatural or unpredictable situations, such as visual search in radiological scans, biasing current judgments toward previous ones even when accurate and unbiased perception is needed. For example, observers make consistent perceptual errors when classifying a tumor- like shape on the current trial, seeing it as more similar to the shape presented on the previous trial. In a separate localization test, observers make consistent errors when reporting the perceived position of an objects on the current trial, mislocalizing it toward the position in the preceding trial. Taken together, these results show two opposite sides of serial dependence; it can be a beneficial mechanism which promotes perceptual stability, but at the same time a deleterious mechanism which impairs our percept when fine recognition is needed.

Emotion processing is thought to be impaired in autism and linked to atypical visual exploration and arousal modulation to others faces and gaze, yet evidence is equivocal. We propose that, where observed, atypical socioemotional processing is due to alexithymia, a distinct but frequently co-occurring condition which affects emotional self-awareness and Interoception. In study 1 (N = 80), we tested this hypothesis by studying the spatio-temporal dynamics and entropy of eye-gaze during emotion processing tasks. Evidence from traditional and novel methods revealed that atypical eye-gaze and emotion recognition is best predicted by alexithymia in both autistic and non-autistic individuals. In Study 2 (N = 70), we assessed interoceptive and autonomic signals implicated in socioemotional processing, and found evidence for alexithymia (not autism) driven effects on gaze and arousal modulation to emotions. We also conducted two large-scale studies (N = 1300), using confirmatory factor-analytic and network modelling and found evidence that Alexithymia and Autism are distinct at both a latent level and their intercorrelations. We argue that: 1) models of socioemotional processing in autism should conceptualise difficulties as intrinsic to alexithymia, and 2) assessment of alexithymia is crucial for diagnosis and personalised interventions in autism.

It has long been known that when viewing a set of images, we misjudge individual elements as being closer to the mean than they are (Hollingworth, 1910) and recall seeing the (absent) set mean (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott (1995). Recent studies found that viewing sets of images, simultaneously or sequentially, leads to perception of set statistics (mean, range) with poor memory for individual elements. Ensemble perception was found for sets of simple images (e.g. circles varying in size or brightness; lines of varying orientation), complex objects (e.g. faces of varying emotion), as well as for objects belonging to the same category. When the viewed set does not include its mean or prototype, nevertheless, observers report and act as if they have seen this central image or object – a form of false memory. Physiologically, detailed sensory information at cortical input levels is processed hierarchically to form an integrated scene gist at higher levels. However, we are aware of the gist before the details. We propose that images and objects belonging to a set or category are represented as their gist, mean or prototype, plus individual differences from that gist. Under constrained viewing conditions, only the gist is perceived and remembered. This theory also provides a basis for compressed neural representation. Extending this theory to scenes and episodes supplies a generalized basis for false memories. They seem right, match generalized expectations, so are believable without challenging examination. This theory could be tested by analyzing the typicality of false memories, compared to rejected alternatives.

Perceptual learning (PL) is defined as long-term performance improvement on a perceptual task as a result of perceptual experience (Sasaki, Nanez& Watanabe, 2011, Nat Rev Neurosci, 2011). We first found that PL occurs for task-irrelevant and subthreshold features and that pairing task-irrelevant features with rewards is the key to form task-irrelevant PL (TIPL) (Watanabe, Nanez & Sasaki, Nature, 2001; Watanabe et al, 2002, Nature Neuroscience; Seitz & Watanabe, Nature, 2003; Seitz, Kim & Watanabe, 2009, Neuron; Shibata et al, 2011, Science). These results suggest that PL occurs as a result of interactions between reinforcement and bottom-up stimulus signals (Seitz & Watanabe, 2005, TICS). On the other hand, fMRI study results indicate that lateral prefrontal cortex fails to detect and thus to suppress subthreshold task-irrelevant signals. This leads to the paradoxical effect that a signal that is below, but close to, one’s discrimination threshold ends up being stronger than suprathreshold signals (Tsushima, Sasaki & Watanabe, 2006, Science). We confirmed this mechanism with the following results: Task-irrelevant learning occurs only when a presented feature is under and close to the threshold with younger individuals (Tsushima et al, 2009, Current Biol), whereas with older individuals who tend to have less inhibitory control task-irrelevant learning occurs with a feature whose signal is much greater than the threshold (Chang et al, 2014, Current Biol). From all of these results, we conclude that attention and reward play important but different roles in PL. I will further discuss different stages and phases in mechanisms of PL (Seitz et al, 2005, PNAS; Yotsumoto, Watanabe & Sasaki, Neuron, 2008; Yotsumoto et al, Curr Biol, 2009; Watanabe & Sasaki, 2015, Ann Rev Psychol; Shibata et al, 2017, Nat Neurosci; Tamaki et al, 2020, Nat Neurosci).

Humans continuously need to learn to make good choices – be it using a new video-conferencing set up, figuring out what questions to ask to successfully secure a reliable babysitter, or just selecting which location in a house is least likely to be interrupted by toddlers during work calls. However, the goals we seek to attain – such as using zoom successfully – are often vaguely defined and previously unexperienced, and in that sense cannot be known by us as being rewarding. We hypothesized that learning to make good choices in such situations nevertheless leverages reinforcement learning processes, and that executive functions in general, and working memory in particular, play a crucial role in defining the reward function for arbitrary outcomes in such a way that they become reinforcing. I will show results from a novel behavioral protocol, as well as preliminary computational and imaging evidence supporting our hypothesis.

In many ways, cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to use physiological observation to clarify the mechanisms that shape behavior. Over the past 25 years, fMRI has provided a system-wide and yet somewhat spatially precise view of the response in human cortex evoked by a wide variety of stimuli and task contexts. The current talk focuses on the other direction of inference; the implications of this observed functional organization for behavior. To begin, we must interrogate the methodological and empirical frameworks underlying our derivation of this organization, partially by exploring its relationship to and predictability from gross neuroanatomy. Next, across a series of studies, the implications of two properties of functional organization for behavior will be explored: 1) the co-localization of visual working memory and perceptual processing and 2) implicit learning in the context of distributed responses. In sum, these results highlight the limitations of our current approach and hint at a new general mechanism for explaining observed behavior in context with the neural substrate.