Psychology seminars

Relational thinking involves comparing abstract relationships between mental representations that vary in complexity; however, this complexity is rarely made explicit during everyday comparisons. This study explored how people naturally navigate relational complexity and interference using a novel relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task with both minimal and relationally directed instruction to observe changes in performance across three levels of relational complexity: perceptual, analogy, and system mappings. Individual working memory and relational abilities were examined to understand RMTS performance and susceptibility to interfering relational structures. Trials were presented without practice across four blocks and participants received feedback after each attempt to guide learning. Experiment 1 instructed participants to select the target that best matched the sample, while Experiment 2 additionally directed participants’ attention to same and different relations. Participants in Experiment 2 demonstrated improved performance when solving analogical mappings, suggesting that directing attention to relational characteristics affected behavior. Higher performing participants—those above chance performance on the final block of system mappings—solved more analogical RMTS problems and had greater visuospatial working memory, abstraction, verbal analogy, and scene analogy scores compared to lower performers. Lower performers were less dynamic in their performance across blocks and demonstrated negative relationships between analogy and system mapping accuracy, suggesting increased interference between these relational structures. Participant performance on RMTS problems did not change monotonically with relational complexity, suggesting that increases in relational complexity places nonlinear demands on working memory. We argue that competing relational information causes additional interference, especially in individuals with lower executive function abilities.

In this talk I will present our recent behavioural and neuroscience research on how the brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so. I will propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. We show that belief change occurs when the potential outcomes of holding it alters, for example when moving from a safe environment to a threatening environment. Our findings yield predictions about how belief formation alters as a function of mental health. We test these predictions using a linguistic analysis of participants’ web searches ‘in the wild’ to quantify the affective properties of information they consume and relate those to reported psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I will present a study in which we used our framework to alter the incentive structure of social media platforms to reduce the spread of misinformation and improve belief accuracy.

Vocabulary learning applications like Duolingo have millions of users around the world, but yet are based on very simple heuristics to choose teaching material to provide to their users. In this presentation, we will discuss the possibility to develop more advanced artificial teachers, which would be based on modeling of the learner’s inner characteristics. In the case of teaching vocabulary, understanding how the learner memorizes is enough. When it comes to picking grammar exercises, it becomes essential to assess how the learner reasons, in particular by analogy. This second application will illustrate how analogical and case-based reasoning can be employed in an alternative way in education: not as the teaching algorithm, but as a part of the learner’s model.

Theory of mind, which consists of reasoning about the knowledge, belief, desire, and similar mental states of others, is a key component of social reasoning and social interaction. While it has been studied by cognitive scientists for decades, none of the prevailing theories of the processes that underlie theory of mind reasoning and development explain the breadth of experimental findings. I propose that this is because theory of mind is, like much of human reasoning, inherently analogical. In this talk, I will discuss several theory of mind findings from the psychology literature, the challenges they pose for our understanding of theory of mind, and bring in evidence from the Analogical Theory of Mind (AToM) cognitive model that demonstrates how these findings fit into an analogical understanding of theory of mind reasoning.

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property, or that time is represented through representations having temporal properties themselves. To add to this debate, we investigated alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. In this talk, I will discuss two studies that we have done in relation to answering this question. In study 1, we investigated whether perceptual switches in fixed intervals altered felt time. In three experiments we showed that a break in visual experience (via a perceptual switch) also leads to a break in felt time. In study 2, we are currently looking at figure-ground perception in ambigous displays. Here, in experiment 1 we show that differences in flicker frequencies on ambigous regions can induce figure-ground segregation. To see if a reverse complementarity exists for felt time, we ask participants to view ambigous regions as figure/ground and show that they have different temporal resolutions for the same region based on whether it is seen as figure or background. Overall, the two studies provide evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception.

Space is the universal donor for relations" (Gentner, 2014). This quote is the foundation of my talk. I will explore how and why visual representations and analogies are related, and why. I will also explore how considering the relation between analogy and spatial reasoning can shed light on why and how spatial thinking is correlated with learning in STEM fields. For example, I will consider children’s numbers sense and learning of the number line from the perspective of analogical reasoning.

Theories of consciousness are commonly grouped into "first-order" and "higher-order" families. As conventional wisdom has it, many more animals are likely to be conscious if a first-order theory is correct. But two recent developments have put pressure on the first/higher-order distinction. One is the argument (from Shea and Frith) that an effective global workspace mechanism must involve a form of metacognition. The second is Lau's "perceptual reality monitoring" (PRM) theory, a member of the "higher-order" family in which conscious sensory content is not re-represented, only tagged with a temporal index and marked as reliable. I argue that the first/higher-order distinction has become so blurred that it is no longer particularly useful. Moreover, the conventional wisdom about animals should not be trusted. It could be, for example, that the distribution of PRM in the animal kingdom is wider than the distribution of global broadcasting.

Previous experiments have shown that a comparison of two written narratives highlights their shared relational structure, which in turn facilitates the retrieval of analogous narratives from the past (e.g., Gentner, Loewenstein, Thompson, & Forbus, 2009). However, analogical retrieval occurs across domains that appear more conceptually distant than merely different narratives, and the deepest analogies use matches in higher-order relational structure. The present study investigated whether comparison can facilitate analogical retrieval of higher-order relations across written narratives and abstract symbolic problems. Participants read stories which became retrieval targets after a delay, cued by either analogous stories or letter-strings. In Experiment 1 we replicated Gentner et al. who used narrative retrieval cues, and also found preliminary evidence for retrieval between narrative and symbolic domains. In Experiment 2 we found clear evidence that a comparison of analogous letter-string problems facilitated the retrieval of source stories with analogous higher-order relations. Experiment 3 replicated the retrieval results of Experiment 2 but with a longer delay between encoding and recall, and a greater number of distractor source stories. These experiments offer support for the schema induction account of analogical retrieval (Gentner et al., 2009) and show that the schemas abstracted from comparison of narratives can be transferred to non-semantic symbolic domains.

SES neuroscience, using imaging and other methods, has revealed generalizations of interest for population neuroscience and the study of individual differences. But beyond its scientific interest, SES is a topic of societal importance. Does neuroscience offer any useful insights for promoting socioeconomic justice and reducing the harms of poverty? In this talk I will use research from my own lab and others’ to argue that SES neuroscience has the potential to contribute to policy in this area, although its application is premature at present. I will also attempt to forecast the ways in which practical solutions to the problems of poverty may emerge from SES neuroscience. Bio: Martha Farah has conducted groundbreaking research on face and object recognition, visual attention, mental imagery, and semantic memory and - in more recent times - has been at the forefront of interdisciplinary research into neuroscience and society. This deals with topics such as using fMRI for lie detection, ethics of cognitive enhancement, and effects of social deprivation on brain development.

How and why are analogies spontaneously generated? Despite the prominence of analogy in learning and reasoning, there is little research on whether and how analogy is spontaneously generated in everyday settings. Here we fill this gap by gathering parents' answers to children's real questions, and examining analogy use in parental explanations. Study 1 found that parents used analogy spontaneously in their explanations, despite no prompt nor mention of analogy in the instruction. Study 2 found that these analogical explanations were rated highly by parents, schoolteachers, and university students alike. In Study 3, six-year-olds also rated good analogical explanations highly, but unlike their parents, did not rate them higher than causal, non-analogical explanations. We discuss what makes an analogy a good explanation, and how theories from both explanation and analogy research explain one’s motivation for spontaneously generating analogies.

A core question in human development is how we bring meaning to conventional symbols. This question is deeply connected to understanding how children learn mathematics—a symbol system with unique vocabularies, syntaxes, and written forms. In this talk, I will present findings from a program of research focused on children’s acquisition of place value symbols (i.e., multidigit number meanings). The base-10 symbol system presents a variety of obstacles to children, particularly in English. Children who cannot overcome these obstacles face years of struggle as they progress through the mathematics curriculum of the upper elementary and middle school grades. Through a combination of longitudinal, cross-sectional, and pretest-training-posttest approaches, I aim to illuminate relational learning mechanisms by which children sometimes succeed in mastering the place value system, as well as instructional techniques we might use to help those who do not.

Prior studies of A:B::C:D verbal analogies have identified several factors that affect performance, including the semantic similarity between source and target domains (semantic distance), the semantic association between the C-term and incorrect answers (distracter salience), and the type of relations between word pairs (e.g., categorical, compositional, and causal). However, it is unclear how these stimulus properties affect performance when utilized together. Moreover, how do these item factors interact with individual differences such as crystallized intelligence and creative thinking? Several studies reveal interactions among these item and individual difference factors impacting verbal analogy performance. For example, a three-way interaction demonstrated that the effects of semantic distance and distracter salience had a greater impact on performance for compositional and causal relations than for categorical ones (Jones, Kmiecik, Irwin, & Morrison, 2022). Implications for analogy theories and future directions are discussed.

Extensive research on science teaching has shown the effectiveness of analogies as a didactic tool which, when appropriately and effectively used, facilitates the learning process of abstract concepts. This seminar does not contradict the efficacy of such a didactic use of analogies in this seminar but switches attention and interest on their heuristic use in approaching and understanding of what previously unknown. Such a use of analogies derives from research with 10 to 17 year-olds, who, when asked to make predictions in novel situations and to then provide explanations about these predictions, they self-generated analogies and used them by reasoning on their basis. This heuristic use of analogies can be used in science teaching in revealing how students approach situations they have not considered before as well as the sources they draw upon in doing so.

The challenges of problem solving do not exclusively lie in how to perform heuristic search, but they begin with how we understand a given task: How to cognitively represent the task domain and its components can determine how quickly someone is able to progress towards a solution, whether advanced strategies can be discovered, or even whether a solution is found at all. While this challenge of constructing and changing representations has been acknowledged early on in problem solving research, for the most part it has been sidestepped by focussing on simple, well-defined problems whose representation is almost fully determined by the task instructions. Thus, the established theory of problem solving as heuristic search in problem spaces has little to say on this. In this talk, I will present a study designed to explore this issue, by virtue of finding and refining an adequate problem representation being its main challenge. In this exploratory case study, it was investigated how pairs of participants acquaint themselves with a complex spatial transformation task in the domain of iterated mental paper folding over the course of several days. Participants have to understand the geometry of edges which occurs when repeatedly mentally folding a sheet of paper in alternating directions without the use of external aids. Faced with the difficulty of handling increasingly complex folds in light of limited cognitive capacity, participants are forced to look for ways in which to represent folds more efficiently. In a qualitative analysis of video recordings of the participants' behaviour, the development of their conceptualisation of the task domain was traced over the course of the study, focussing especially on their use of gesture and the spontaneous occurrence and use of metaphors in the construction of new representations. Based on these observations, I will conclude the talk with several theoretical speculations regarding the roles of metaphor and cognitive capacity in representational change.

Sex-based modulation of cognitive processes could set the stage for individual differences in vulnerability to neuropsychiatric disorders. While value-based decision making processes in particular have been proposed to be influenced by sex differences, the overall correct performance in decision making tasks often show variable or minimal differences across sexes. Computational tools allow us to uncover latent variables that define different decision making approaches, even in animals with similar correct performance. Here, we quantify sex differences in mice in the latent variables underlying behavior in a classic value-based decision making task: a restless two-armed bandit. While male and female mice had similar accuracy, they achieved this performance via different patterns of exploration. Male mice tended to make more exploratory choices overall, largely because they appeared to get ‘stuck’ in exploration once they had started. Female mice tended to explore less but learned more quickly during exploration. Together, these results suggest that sex exerts stronger influences on decision making during periods of learning and exploration than during stable choices. Exploration during decision making is altered in people diagnosed with addictions, depression, and neurodevelopmental disabilities, pinpointing the neural mechanisms of exploration as a highly translational avenue for conferring sex-modulated vulnerability to neuropsychiatric diagnoses.

Individuals vary widely in how they categorize novel phenomena. This individual variation has led canonical theories in cognitive and social science to suggest that communication in large social networks leads populations to construct divergent category systems. Yet, anthropological data indicates that large, independent societies consistently arrive at similar categories across a range of topics. How is it possible for diverse populations, consisting of individuals with significant variation in how they view the world, to independently construct similar categories? Through a series of online experiments, I show how large communication networks within cultures can promote the formation of similar categories across cultures. For this investigation, I designed an online “Grouping Game” to observe how people construct categories in both small and large populations when tasked with grouping together the same novel and ambiguous images. I replicated this design for English-speaking subjects in the U.S. and Mandarin-speaking subjects in China. In both cultures, solitary individuals and small social groups produced highly divergent category systems. Yet, large social groups separately and consistently arrived at highly similar categories both within and across cultures. These findings are accurately predicted by a simple mathematical model of critical mass dynamics. Altogether, I show how large communication networks can filter lexical diversity among individuals to produce replicable society-level patterns, yielding unexpected implications for cultural evolution. In particular, I discuss how participants in both cultures readily harnessed analogies when categorizing novel stimuli, and I examine the role of communication networks in promoting cross-cultural similarities in analogy-making as the key engine of category formation.

From a workout at the gym to helping a colleague with their work, everyday we make decisions about whether we are willing to exert effort to obtain some sort of benefit. Increases in how effortful actions and cognitive processes are perceived to be has been linked to clinically severe impairments to motivation, such as apathy and fatigue, across many neurological and psychiatric conditions. However, the vast majority of neuroscience research has focused on understanding the benefits for acting, the rewards, and not on the effort required. As a result, the computational and neural mechanisms underlying how effort is processed are poorly understood. How do we compute how effortful we perceive a task to be? How does this feed into our motivation and decisions of whether to act? How are such computations implemented in the brain? and how do they change in different environments? I will present a series of studies examining these questions using novel behavioural tasks, computational modelling, fMRI, pharmacological manipulations, and testing in a range of different populations. These studies highlight how the brain represents the costs of exerting effort, and the dynamic processes underlying how our sensitivity to effort changes as a function of our goals, traits, and socio-cognitive processes. This work provides new computational frameworks for understanding and examining impaired motivation across psychiatric and neurological conditions, as well as why all of us, sometimes, can’t be bothered.

Children need inference in order to learn the meanings of words. They must infer the referent from the situation in which a target word is said. Furthermore, to be able to use the word in other situations, they also need to infer what other referents the word can be generalized to. As verbs refer to relations between arguments, verb learning requires relational analogical inference, something which is challenging to young children. To overcome this difficulty, young children recruit a diverse range of cues in their inference of verb meanings, including, but not limited to, syntactic cues and social and pragmatic cues as well as statistical cues. They also utilize perceptual similarity (object similarity) in progressive alignment to extract relational verb meanings and further to gain insights about relational verb meanings. However, just having a list of these cues is not useful: the cues must be selected, combined, and coordinated to produce the optimal interpretation in a particular context. This process involves abductive reasoning, similar to what scientists do to form hypotheses from a range of facts or evidence. In this talk, I discuss how children use a chain of inferences to learn meanings of verbs. I consider not only the process of analogical mapping and progressive alignment, but also how children use abductive inference to find the source of analogy and gain insights into the general principles underlying verb learning. I also present recent findings from my laboratory that show that prelinguistic human infants use a rudimentary form of abductive reasoning, which enables the first step of word learning.