Psychology seminars

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies and variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to the frequently suboptimal inference strategies used by humans. We examined inference problems involving rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that were suboptimal relative to the Bayesian ideal observer. These suboptimal strategies reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but high bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but displayed weaker, near-normative bias. Our results yield new insights into the principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference, and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that are sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality of the inference process.

Error monitoring refers to the ability to monitor one's own task performance without explicit feedback. This ability is studied typically in two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigms. Recent research showed that humans can also keep track of the magnitude and direction of errors in different magnitude domains (e.g., numerosity, duration, length). Based on the evidence that suggests a shared mechanism for magnitude representations, we aimed to investigate whether metric error monitoring ability is commonly governed across different magnitude domains. Participants reproduced/estimated temporal, numerical, and spatial magnitudes after which they rated their confidence regarding first order task performance and judged the direction of their reproduction/estimation errors. Participants were also tested in a 2AFC perceptual decision task and provided confidence ratings regarding their decisions. Results showed that variability in reproductions/estimations and metric error monitoring ability, as measured by combining confidence and error direction judgements, were positively related across temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Metacognitive sensitivity in these metric domains was also positively associated with each other but not with metacognitive sensitivity in the 2AFC perceptual decision task. In conclusion, the current findings point at a general metric error monitoring ability that is shared across different metric domains with limited generalizability to perceptual decision-making.

Recent economics literature has seen a revival of interest to psychologically-grounded theories of decision under risk. We review the recent proposals in this direction, compare it to classical estimations based on utility functions, and discuss their appropriateness using some original experimental data.

The seminar will first outline the architecture of the human mind, specifying general and domain-specific mental processes. The place of causal reasoning and its relations with the other processes will be specified. Experimental, psychometric, developmental, and brain-based evidence will be summarized. The main message of the talk is that causal thought involves domain-specific core processes rooted in perception and served by special brain networks which capture interactions between objects. With development, causal reasoning is increasingly associated with a general abstraction system which generates general principles underlying inductive, analogical, and deductive reasoning and also heuristics for specifying causal relations. These associations are discussed in some detail. Possible implications for artificial intelligence and educational implications are also discussed.

It is well established that the opportunity to compare learning stimuli in a novel word learning/extension task elicits a larger number of conceptually relevant generalizations than standard no-comparison conditions. I will present results suggesting that the effectiveness of comparison depends on factors such as semantic distance, number of training items, dimension distinctiveness and interactions with age. I will address these issues in the case of familiar and unfamiliar object nouns and relational nouns. The alignment strategies followed by children during learning and at test (i.e., when learning items are compared and how children reach a solution) will be described with eye-tracking data. We will also assess the extent to which children’s performance in these tasks are associated with executive functions (inhibition and flexibility) and world knowledge. Finally, we will consider these issues in children with cognitive deficits (Intellectual deficiency, DLD)

When we remember a stimulus we rarely maintain a full fidelity representation of the observed item. Our working memory instead maintains a mixture of the observed feature values and categorical/gist information. I will discuss evidence from computational models supporting a mix of categorical and fine-detail information in working memory. Having established the need for two memory formats in working memory, I will discuss whether categorical and fine-detailed information for a stimulus are represented separately or as a single unified representation. Computational models of these two potential cognitive structures make differing predictions about the pattern of responses in visual working memory recall tests. The present study required participants to remember the orientation of stimuli for later reproduction. The pattern of responses are used to test the competing representational structures and to quantify the relative amount of fine-detailed and categorical information maintained. The effects of set size, encoding time, serial order, and response order on memory precision, categorical information, and guessing rates are also explored. (This is a 60 min talk).

Sleep is classically presented as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Yet, there is increasing evidence showing that sleep and wakefulness can actually intermingle and that wake-like and sleep-like activity can be observed concomitantly in different brain regions. I will here explore the implications of this conception of sleep as a local phenomenon for cognition and consciousness. In the first part of my presentation, I will show how local modulations of sleep depth during sleep could support the processing of sensory information by sleepers. I will also how, under certain circumstances, sleepers can learn while sleeping but also how they can forget. In the second part, I will show how the reverse phenomenon, sleep intrusions during waking, can explain modulations of attention. I will focus in particular on modulations of subjective experience and how the local sleep framework can inform our understanding of everyday phenomena such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Through this presentation and the exploration of both sleep and wakefulness, I will seek to connect changes in neurophysiology with changes in behaviour and subjective experience.

In the past few years, there has been growing evidence that the basic ability for relational generalization starts in early infancy, with 3-month-olds seeming to learn relational abstractions with little training. Further, work with toddlers seem to suggest that relational generalizations are no more difficult than those based on objects, and they can readily consider both simultaneously. Likewise, causal learning research with adults suggests that people infer causal relationships at multiple levels of abstraction simultaneously as they learn about novel causal systems. These findings all appear counter to theories of concept learning that posit when concepts are first learned they tend to be concrete (tied to specific contexts and features) and abstraction proceeds incrementally as learners encounter more examples. The current talk will not question the veracity of any of these findings but will present several others from my and others’ research on relational learning that suggests that when the perceptual or conceptual content becomes more complex, patterns of incremental abstraction re-emerge. Further, the specific contexts and task parameters that support or hinder abstraction reveal the underlying cognitive processes. I will then consider whether the models that posit simultaneous, immediate learning at multiple levels of abstraction can accommodate these more complex patterns.

Previous work looking at individual differences in face identity processing (FIP) has found that most commonly used lab-based performance assessments are unfortunately not sufficiently sensitive on their own for measuring performance in both the upper and lower tails of the general population simultaneously. So more recently, researchers have begun incorporating multiple testing procedures into their assessments. Still, though, the growing consensus seems to be that at the individual level, there is quite a bit of variability between test scores. The overall consequence of this is that extreme scores will still occur simply by chance in large enough samples. To mitigate this issue, our recent work has developed measures of intra-individual FIP consistency to refine selection of those with superior abilities (i.e. from the upper tail). For starters, we assessed consistency of face matching and recognition in neurotypical controls, and compared them to a sample of SRs. In terms of face matching, we demonstrated psychophysically that SRs show significantly greater consistency than controls in exploiting spatial frequency information than controls. Meanwhile, we showed that SRs’ recognition of faces is highly related to memorability for identities, yet effectively unrelated among controls. So overall, at the high end of the FIP spectrum, consistency can be a useful tool for revealing both qualitative and quantitative individual differences. Finally, in conjunction with collaborators from the Rheinland-Pfalz Police, we developed a pair of bespoke work samples to get bias-free measures of intraindividual consistency in current law enforcement personnel. Officers with higher composite scores on a set of 3 challenging FIP tests tended to show higher consistency, and vice versa. Overall, this suggests that not only is consistency a reasonably good marker of superior FIP abilities, but could present important practical benefits for personnel selection in many other domains of expertise.

Self-control is a central aspect of free will. Because self-control is often described in terms of resisting temptations, research on the cognitive neuroscience of free will often focuses on mechanisms of top-down regulation. We argue that this obscures a crucial temporal dimension of free will: now-then regulation. We distinguish now-then regulation from top-down regulation, and situate now-then regulation within a broader account of temporally extended agency. In highlighting this temporal dimension of control, we aim to provide a more nuanced account of how motivation informs action over time, different kinds of regulatory processes underlying the planning and execution of action, and the temporal components of reasons-responsiveness.

Multisensory perception is often studied through the effects of inter-sensory conflict, such as in the McGurk effect, the Ventriloquist illusion, and the Rubber Hand Illusion. Moreover, Bayesian approaches to cue fusion and causal inference overwhelmingly draw on cross-modal conflict to measure and to model multisensory perception. Given the prevalence of conflict, it is remarkable that accounts of multisensory perception have so far neglected the theory of conflict monitoring and cognitive control, established about twenty years ago. I hope to make a case for the role of conflict monitoring and resolution during multisensory perception. To this end, I will present EEG and fMRI data showing that cross-modal conflict in speech, resulting in either integration or segregation, triggers neural mechanisms of conflict detection and resolution. I will also present data supporting a role of these mechanisms during perceptual conflict in general, using Binocular Rivalry, surrealistic imagery, and cinema. Based on this preliminary evidence, I will argue that it is worth considering the potential role of conflict in multisensory perception and its incorporation in a causal inference framework. Finally, I will raise some potential problems associated with this proposal.

In decision-making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: (1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, (2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and (3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as eleven alternative models each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants’ data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants’ choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.

Natural behavior reveals the way that gaze serves the needs of the current task, and the complex cognitive control mechanisms that are involved. It has become increasingly clear that even the simplest actions involve complex decision processes that depend on an interaction of visual information, knowledge of the current environment, and the intrinsic costs and benefits of actions choices. I will explore these ideas in the context of walking in natural terrain, where we are able to recover the 3D structure of the visual environment. We show that subjects choose flexible paths that depend on the flatness of the terrain over the next few steps. Subjects trade off flatness with straightness of their paths towards the goal, indicating a nuanced trade-off between stability and energetic costs on both the time scale of the next step and longer-range constraints.

The tight relationship between attention and conscious perception has been extensively researched in the past decades. However, whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particularly when it came to abstract and high-level processing. I will talk about a recent study where we utilized the Stroop paradigm to show that task load gates unconscious semantic processing. In a series of psychophysical experiments, the unconscious word semantics influenced conscious task performance only under the low task load condition, but not the high task load condition. Intriguingly, with enough practice in the high task load condition, the unconscious effect reemerged. These findings suggest a competition of attentional resources between unconscious and conscious processes, challenging the automaticity account of unconscious processing.

In this talk, I shall not argue for any single thesis or theory in the realm of the (un)consciousness and (in)attention. Instead I will discuss specific examples where philosophers and psychologists can have genuine collaborations in this area. Since issues concerning phenomenological overflow is already too familiar for this audience, I will briefly discuss it only, and focus on other issues that have not been overworked. The exact contents are to be determined, but I will perhaps focus on recent controversies over “sustained representation of perspectival shape” (Morales, Bax, and Firestone, 2020, 2021).

The talk will give a tour of Guided Search 6.0 (GS6), the latest evolution of the Guided Search model of visual search. Part 1 describes The Mechanics of Search. Because we cannot recognize more than a few items at a time, selective attention is used to prioritize items for processing. Selective attention to an item allows its features to be bound together into a representation that can be matched to a target template in memory or rejected as a distractor. The binding and recognition of an attended object is modeled as a diffusion process taking > 150 msec/item. Since selection occurs more frequently than that, it follows that multiple items are undergoing recognition at the same time, though asynchronously, making GS6 a hybrid serial and parallel model. If a target is not found, search terminates when an accumulating quitting signal reaches a threshold. Part 2 elaborates on the five sources of Guidance that are combined into a spatial “priority map” to guide the deployment of attention (hence “guided search”). These are (1) top-down and (2) bottom-up feature guidance, (3) prior history (e.g. priming), (4) reward, and (5) scene syntax and semantics. Finally, in Part 3, we will consider the internal representation of what we are searching for; what is often called “the search template”. That search template is really two templates: a guiding template (probably in working memory) and a target template (in long term memory). Put these pieces together and you have GS6.

In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.