Seminars

How can the hippocampal system transition from episodic one-shot learning to a multi-shot learning regime and what is the utility of the resultant neural representations? This talk will explore the role of the dentate gyrus (DG) anatomy in this context. The canonical DG model suggests it performs pattern separation. More recent experimental results challenge this standard model, suggesting DG function is more complex and also supports the precise binding of objects and events to space and the integration of information across episodes. Very recent studies attribute pattern separation and pattern integration to anatomically distinct parts of the DG (the suprapyramidal blade vs the infrapyramidal blade). We propose a computational model that investigates this distinction. In the model the two processing streams (potentially localized in separate blades) contribute to the storage of distinct episodic memories, and the integration of information across episodes, respectively. The latter forms generalized expectations across episodes, eventually forming a cognitive map. We train the model with two data sets, MNIST and plausible entorhinal cortex inputs. The comparison between the two streams allows for the calculation of a prediction error, which can drive the storage of poorly predicted memories and the forgetting of well-predicted memories. We suggest that differential processing across the DG aids in the iterative construction of spatial cognitive maps to serve the generation of location-dependent expectations, while at the same time preserving episodic memory traces of idiosyncratic events.

Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

Why do individuals, both humans and animals, exhibit personal biases in two-alternative decision-making tasks, even when no clear reason exists to favor one alternative over another? In this talk, I will explore two competing hypotheses to explain these idiosyncratic biases. The first suggests that such tendencies arise from unique personal experiences, where past associations between actions and feedback influence future choices. The second hypothesis proposes that the bias reflects irreducible microscopic heterogeneities in the dynamics of decision-making networks. I will present experimental data and theoretical findings that support the latter hypothesis, shedding new light on the neural mechanisms behind seemingly irrational preferences. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2025-03-05. Recording duration: 00:50:36.

Vulnerability to distraction varies across the general population and significantly affects one’s capacity to stay focused on and successfully complete the task at hand, whether at school, on the road, or at work. In this talk, I will begin by discussing how distractibility is typically assessed in the literature and introduce our innovative ERP approach to measuring it. Since distractibility is a cardinal symptom of ADHD, I will introduce its most widely used paper-and-pencil screening tool for the general population as external validation. Following that, I will present the Load Theory of Attention and explain how we used perceptual load to test the reliability of our neural marker of distractibility. Finally, I will highlight potential future applications of this marker in clinical and educational settings.

Digital Minds: Brain Development in the Age of Technology examines how our increasingly connected world shapes mental and cognitive health. From screen time and social media to virtual interactions, this seminar delves into the latest research on how technology influences brain development, relationships, and emotional well-being. Join us to explore strategies for harnessing technology's benefits while mitigating its potential challenges, empowering you to thrive in a digital age.

The primary visual cortex (V1) directly projects to the superior colliculus (SC) and is believed to provide sensory drive for eye movements. Consistent with this, a majority of saccade-related SC neurons also exhibit short-latency, stimulus-driven visual responses, which are additionally feature-tuned. However, direct neurophysiological comparisons of the visual response properties of the two anatomically-connected brain areas are surprisingly lacking, especially with respect to active looking behaviors. I will describe a series of experiments characterizing visual response properties in primate V1 and SC neurons, exploring feature dimensions like visual field location, spatial frequency, orientation, contrast, and luminance polarity. The results suggest a substantial, qualitative reformatting of SC visual responses when compared to V1. For example, SC visual response latencies are actively delayed, independent of individual neuron tuning preferences, as a function of increasing spatial frequency, and this phenomenon is directly correlated with saccadic reaction times. Such “coarse-to-fine” rank ordering of SC visual response latencies as a function of spatial frequency is much weaker in V1, suggesting a dissociation of V1 responses from saccade timing. Consistent with this, when we next explored trial-by-trial correlations of individual neurons’ visual response strengths and visual response latencies with saccadic reaction times, we found that most SC neurons exhibited, on a trial-by-trial basis, stronger and earlier visual responses for faster saccadic reaction times. Moreover, these correlations were substantially higher for visual-motor neurons in the intermediate and deep layers than for more superficial visual-only neurons. No such correlations existed systematically in V1. Thus, visual responses in SC and V1 serve fundamentally different roles in active vision: V1 jumpstarts sensing and image analysis, but SC jumpstarts moving. I will finish by demonstrating, using V1 reversible inactivation, that, despite reformatting of signals from V1 to the brainstem, V1 is still a necessary gateway for visually-driven oculomotor responses to occur, even for the most reflexive of eye movement phenomena. This is a fundamental difference from rodent studies demonstrating clear V1-independent processing in afferent visual pathways bypassing the geniculostriate one, and it demonstrates the importance of multi-species comparisons in the study of oculomotor control.

Lapses in attention are ubiquitous and, unfortunately, the cause of many tragic accidents. One potential solution may be to develop assistance systems which can use objective, physiological signals to monitor attention levels and predict a lapse in attention before it occurs. As it stands, it is unclear which physiological signals are the most reliable markers of inattention, and even less is known about how reliably they will work in a more naturalistic setting. My project aims to address these questions across two experiments: a lab-based experiment and a more ‘real-world’ experiment. In this talk I will present the findings from my lab experiment, in which we combined EEG and pupillometry to detect markers of inattention during two computerised sustained attention tasks. I will then present the methods for my second, more ‘naturalistic’ experiment in which we use the same methods (EEG and pupillometry) to examine whether these markers can still be extracted from noisier data.

The brain has a highly complex structure in terms of cell types and wiring between different regions. What is it for, if anything? I'll start this talk by asking what might an answer to this question even look like given that we can't run an alternative universe where our brains are structured differently. (Preview: we can do this with models!) I'll then talk about some of our work in two areas: (1) does the modular structure of the brain contribute to specialisation of function? (2) how do different cell types and architectures contribute to multimodal sensory processing?

Memories of emotionally-salient events are long-lasting, guiding behavior from minutes to years after learning. The prelimbic cortex (PL) is required for fear memory retrieval across time and is densely interconnected with many subcortical and cortical areas involved in recent and remote memory recall, including the temporal association area (TeA). While the behavioral expression of a memory may remain constant over time, the neural activity mediating memory-guided behavior is dynamic. In PL, different neurons underlie recent and remote memory retrieval and remote memory-encoding neurons have preferential functional connectivity with cortical association areas, including TeA. TeA plays a preferential role in remote compared to recent memory retrieval, yet how TeA circuits drive remote memory retrieval remains poorly understood. Here we used a combination of activity-dependent neuronal tagging, viral circuit mapping and miniscope imaging to investigate the role of the PL-TeA circuit in fear memory retrieval across time in mice. We show that PL memory ensembles recruit PL-TeA neurons across time, and that PL-TeA neurons have enhanced encoding of salient cues and behaviors at remote timepoints. This recruitment depends upon ongoing synaptic activity in the learning-activated PL ensemble. Our results reveal a novel circuit encoding remote memory and provide insight into the principles of memory circuit reorganization across time.

The centre of memory is the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and especially the hippocampus. In our research, a more flexible brain-inspired computational microcircuit of the CA1 region of the mammalian hippocampus was upgraded and used to examine how information retrieval could be affected under different conditions. Six models (1-6) were created by modulating different excitatory and inhibitory pathways. The results showed that the increase in the strength of the feedforward excitation was the most effective way to recall memories. In other words, that allows the system to access stored memories more accurately.

Our ability to recognize an object amongst many others is one of the most important features of the human mind. However, object recognition requires tremendous computational effort, as we need to solve a complex and recursive environment with ease and proficiency. This challenging feat is dependent on the implementation of an effective organization of knowledge in the brain. Here I put forth a novel understanding of how object knowledge is organized in the brain, by proposing that the organization of object knowledge follows key object-related dimensions, analogously to how sensory information is organized in the brain. Moreover, I will also put forth that this knowledge is topographically laid out in the cortical surface according to these object-related dimensions that code for different types of representational content – I call this contentopic mapping. I will show a combination of fMRI and behavioral data to support these hypotheses and present a principled way to explore the multidimensionality of object processing.

Memory is essential for shaping how we interpret the world, plan for the future, and understand ourselves, yet effective cognitive interventions for real-world episodic memory loss remain scarce. This talk introduces HippoCamera, a smartphone-based intervention inspired by how the brain supports memory, designed to enhance real-world episodic recollection by replaying high-fidelity autobiographical cues. It will showcase how our approach improves memory, mood, and hippocampal activity while uncovering links between memory distinctiveness, well-being, and the perception of time.