Seminars

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

While anatomical connectivity changes slowly through synaptic learning, the functional connectivity of neurons changes rapidly with ongoing activity of neurons and their functional interactions. Functional networks of neurons and neural populations reflect how their interactions change with behaviors, stimulus types, and internal states. Therefore, the information propagation across a network can be analyzed through the varying topological properties of the functional networks. Our study investigates the functional networks of the visual cortex at both the single-cell and population levels. Our analyses of functional connectivity of single neurons, constructed from spiking activity in neural populations of the visual cortex, reveal local and global network structures shaped by stimulus complexity. In addition, we propose a new method for inferring functional interactions between neural populations that preserves biologically constrained anatomical connectivity and signs. Applying our method to 2-photon data from the mouse visual cortex, we uncover functional interactions between cell types and cortical layers, suggesting distinct pathways for processing expected and unexpected visual information. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2024-11-06. Recording duration: 00:49:10.

Humans and other animals approach reward and avoid punishment and pay attention to cues predicting these events. Such motivated behavior thus appears to be guided by value, which directs behavior towards or away from positively or negatively valenced outcomes. Moreover, it is facilitated by (top-down) salience, which enhances attention to behaviorally relevant learned cues predicting the occurrence of valenced outcomes. Using human neuroimaging, we recently separated value (ventral striatum, posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex) from salience (anterior ventromedial cortex, occipital cortex) in the domain of liquid reward and punishment. Moreover, we investigated potential drivers of learned salience: the probability and uncertainty with which valenced and non-valenced outcomes occur. We find that the brain dissociates valenced from non-valenced probability and uncertainty, which indicates that reinforcement matters for the brain, in addition to information provided by probability and uncertainty alone, regardless of valence. Finally, we assessed learning signals (unsigned prediction errors) that may underpin the acquisition of salience. Particularly the insula appears to be central for this function, encoding a subjective salience prediction error, similarly at the time of positively and negatively valenced outcomes. However, it appears to employ domain-specific time constants, leading to stronger salience signals in the aversive than the appetitive domain at the time of cues. These findings explain why previous research associated the insula with both valence-independent salience processing and with preferential encoding of the aversive domain. More generally, the distinction of value and salience appears to provide a useful framework for capturing the neural basis of motivated behavior.

Contrary to the original normative decision-making standpoint, empirical studies have repeatedly reported that risk preferences are affected by the disclosure of choice outcomes (feedback). Although no consensus has yet emerged regarding the properties and mechanisms of this effect, a widespread and intuitive hypothesis is that repeated feedback affects risk preferences by means of a learning effect, which alters the representation of subjective probabilities. Here, we ran a series of seven experiments (N= 538), tailored to decipher the effects of feedback on risk preferences. Our results indicate that the presence of feedback consistently increases risk-taking, even when the risky option is economically less advantageous. Crucially, risk-taking increases just after the instructions, before participants experience any feedback. These results challenge the learning account, and advocate for a dispositional effect, induced by the mere anticipation of feedback information. Epistemic curiosity and regret avoidance may drive this effect in partial and complete feedback conditions, respectively.

Deep learning provides new data-driven tools to relate neural activity to perception and cognition, aiding scientists in developing theories of neural computation that increasingly resemble biological systems both at the level of behavior and of neural activity. But what in a deep neural network should correspond to what in a biological system? This question is addressed implicitly in the use of comparison measures that relate specific neural or behavioral dimensions via a particular functional form. However, distinct comparison methodologies can give conflicting results in recovering even a known ground-truth model in an idealized setting, leaving open the question of what to conclude from the outcome of a systems comparison using any given methodology. Here, we develop a framework to make explicit and quantitative the effect of both hypothesis-driven aspects—such as details of the architecture of a deep neural network—as well as methodological choices in a systems comparison setting. We demonstrate via the learning dynamics of deep neural networks that, while the role of the comparison methodology is often de-emphasized relative to hypothesis-driven aspects, this choice can impact and even invert the conclusions to be drawn from a comparison between neural systems. We provide evidence that the right way to adjudicate a comparison depends on the use case—the scientific hypothesis under investigation—which could range from identifying single-neuron or circuit-level correspondences to capturing generalizability to new stimulus properties

There are over 30 million people with drug-resistant epilepsy worldwide. When neuroimaging and non-invasive neural recordings fail to localise seizure onset zones (SOZ), intracranial recordings become the best chance for localisation and seizure-freedom in those patients. However, intracranial neural activities remain hard to visually discriminate across recording channels, which limits the success of intracranial visual investigations. In this presentation, I present methods which quantify intracranial neural time series and combine them with explainable machine learning algorithms to localise the SOZ in the epileptic brain. I present the potentials and limitations of our methods in the localisation of SOZ in epilepsy providing insights for future research in this area.

Recent high-profile scientific achievements by machine learning (ML) and especially deep learning (DL) systems have reinvigorated interest in ML for automated scientific discovery (eg, Wang et al. 2023). Much of this work is motivated by the thought that DL methods might facilitate the efficient discovery of phenomena, hypotheses, or even models or theories more efficiently than traditional, theory-driven approaches to discovery. This talk considers some of the more specific obstacles to automated, DL-driven discovery in frontier science, focusing on gravitational-wave astrophysics (GWA) as a representative case study. In the first part of the talk, we argue that despite these efforts, prospects for DL-driven discovery in GWA remain uncertain. In the second part, we advocate a shift in focus towards the ways DL can be used to augment or enhance existing discovery methods, and the epistemic virtues and vices associated with these uses. We argue that the primary epistemic virtue of many such uses is to decrease opportunity costs associated with investigating puzzling or anomalous signals, and that the right framework for evaluating these uses comes from philosophical work on pursuitworthiness.