Cognition seminars

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property, or that time is represented through representations having temporal properties themselves. To add to this debate, we investigated alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. In this talk, I will discuss two studies that we have done in relation to answering this question. In study 1, we investigated whether perceptual switches in fixed intervals altered felt time. In three experiments we showed that a break in visual experience (via a perceptual switch) also leads to a break in felt time. In study 2, we are currently looking at figure-ground perception in ambigous displays. Here, in experiment 1 we show that differences in flicker frequencies on ambigous regions can induce figure-ground segregation. To see if a reverse complementarity exists for felt time, we ask participants to view ambigous regions as figure/ground and show that they have different temporal resolutions for the same region based on whether it is seen as figure or background. Overall, the two studies provide evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception.

Theories of consciousness are commonly grouped into "first-order" and "higher-order" families. As conventional wisdom has it, many more animals are likely to be conscious if a first-order theory is correct. But two recent developments have put pressure on the first/higher-order distinction. One is the argument (from Shea and Frith) that an effective global workspace mechanism must involve a form of metacognition. The second is Lau's "perceptual reality monitoring" (PRM) theory, a member of the "higher-order" family in which conscious sensory content is not re-represented, only tagged with a temporal index and marked as reliable. I argue that the first/higher-order distinction has become so blurred that it is no longer particularly useful. Moreover, the conventional wisdom about animals should not be trusted. It could be, for example, that the distribution of PRM in the animal kingdom is wider than the distribution of global broadcasting.

Clinical assessment of consciousness is a significant issue, with recent research suggesting some brain-damaged patients who are assessed as unconscious are in fact conscious. Misdiagnosis of consciousness can also be detrimental when it comes to general anaesthesia, causing numerous psychological problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Avoiding awareness with overdose of anaesthetics, however, can also lead to cognitive impairment. Currently available objective assessment of consciousness is limited in accuracy or requires expensive equipment with major barriers to translation. In this talk, we will outline our recent theory-guided and data-driven approaches to develop new, optimized consciousness measures that will be robustly evaluated on an unprecedented breadth of high-quality neural data, recorded from the fly model system. We will overcome the subjective-choice problem in data-driven and theory-guided approaches with a comprehensive data analytic framework, which has never been applied to consciousness detection, integrating previously disconnected streams of research in consciousness detection to accelerate the translation of objective consciousness measures into clinical settings.

We examine consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer science (TCS), a branch of mathematics concerned with understanding the underlying principles of computation and complexity, including the implications and surprising consequences of resource limitations. We propose a formal TCS model, the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM). The CTM is influenced by Alan Turing's simple yet powerful model of computation, the Turing machine (TM), and by the global workspace theory (GWT) of consciousness originated by cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, George Mashour, and others. However, the CTM is not a standard Turing Machine. It’s not the input-output map that gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness, but what’s under the hood. Nor is the CTM a standard GW model. In addition to its architecture, what gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness is its predictive dynamics (cycles of prediction, feedback and learning), its internal multi-modal language Brainish, and certain special Long Term Memory (LTM) processors, including its Inner Speech and Model of the World processors. Phenomena generally associated with consciousness, such as blindsight, inattentional blindness, change blindness, dream creation, and free will, are considered. Explanations derived from the model draw confirmation from consistencies at a high level, well above the level of neurons, with the cognitive neuroscience literature. Reference. L. Blum and M. Blum, "A theory of consciousness from a theoretical computer science perspective: Insights from the Conscious Turing Machine," PNAS, vol. 119, no. 21, 24 May 2022. https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2115934119

Peripersonal space (PPS) defines the portion of space where interactions between our body and the external environment more likely occur. There is no physical boundary defining the PPS with respect to the extrapersonal space, but PPS is continuously constructed by a dedicated neural system integrating external stimuli and tactile stimuli on the body, as a function of their potential interaction. This mechanism represents a primary interface between the individual and the environment. In this talk, I will present most recent evidence and highlight the current debate about the neural and computational mechanisms of PPS, its main functions and properties. I will discuss novel data showing how PPS dynamically shapes to optimize body-environment interactions. I will describe a novel electrophysiological paradigm to study and measure PPS, and show how this has been used to search for a basic marker of potentials of self-environment interaction in newborns and patients with disorders of consciousness. Finally, I will discuss how PPS is also involved in, and in turn shaped by, social interactions. Under these acceptances, I will discuss how PPS plays a key role in self-consciousness.

Scientific studies of consciousness can be roughly categorized into two directions: (1) How/where does consciousness emerge? (the mechanism of consciousness) and (2) Why is there consciousness? (the function of consciousness). I will summarize my past research on the quest for consciousness in these two directions.

Prof. Marcello Massimini will give a talk addressed to the Humanitas University Undergraduate Neurological Society students and Humanitas Neuro Center members about consciousness and his groundbreaking studies on this topic. Prof. Maurizio Cecconi and Dr. Villa will then give their clinical point of view as neurointensivists on the pathologic states of consciousness.

Polaris Koi (Philosophy) and Jake Gavenas (Neuroscience) begin the seminar by arguing that agentive control is the key requirement for free will, drawing on folk-philosophy findings to support this claim (Gavenas et al., in prep). They explore how two executive control processes that functionally involve consciousness—inhibition and top-down control of attention—connect self-control and free will.

Flow is defined as an altered state of consciousness with excessive attention and enormous sense of pleasure, when engaged in a challenging task, first postulated by a psychologist, the late M. Csikszentmihayli. The main focus of this talk will be “Team Flow,” but there were two lines of previous studies in our laboratory as its background. First is inter-body and inter-brain coordination/synchrony between individuals. Considering various rhythmic echoing/synchronization phenomena in animal behavior, it could be regarded as the biological, sub-symbolic and implicit origin of social interactions. The second line of precursor research is on the state of Solo Flow in game playing. We employed attenuation of AEP (Auditory Evoked Potential) to task-irrelevant sound probes as an objective-neural indicator of such a Flow status, and found that; 1) Mutual link between the ACC & the TP is critical, and 2) overall, top-down influence is enhanced while bottom-up causality is attenuated. Having these as the background, I will present our latest study of Team Flow in game playing. We found that; 3) the neural correlates of Team Flow is distinctively different from those of Solo Flow nor of non-flow social, 4) the left medial temporal cortex seems to form an integrative node for Team Flow, receiving input related to Solo Flow state from the right PFC and input related to social state from the right IFC, and 5) Intra-brain (dis)similarity of brain activity well predicts (dis)similarity of skills/cognition as well as affinity for inter-brain coherence.

Can we learn without conscious awareness? Numerous evidences in the research of implicit learning have indicated that people can learn the statistical structure of the stimuli but seemingly without any awareness of its underlying rules. However, it remains unclear what types of knowledge can be learned in implicit learning, what is the relationship between conscious and unconscious knowledge, and what are the neural substrates for the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge. In this talk, I will discuss with you about these ongoing questions.

In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.

In the first part of this talk, I will briefly present the unfolding argument by Doerig et al. (2019) and the various replies in the philosophical and neuroscientific literature. In the second part of the talk, I will explore the ramifications that this debate has for the science of consciousness and its philosophy, with particular focus on these questions: (i) which type of explanation should a theory of consciousness provide? (ii) what is the evidential basis for theories of consciousness?

I will build from Niccolo's discussion of the Blockhead argument to argue that having an FeedForward Network (FN) responding like an recurrent network (RN) in a consciousness experiment is not enough to convince us the two are the same with regards to the posession of mental states and conscious experience. I will then argue that a robust functional equivalence between FFN and RN is akso not supported by the mathematical work on the Universal Approximator theorem, and is also unlikely to hold, as a conjecture, given data in cognitive neuroscience; I will argue that an equivalence of RN and FFN may only apply to static functions between input/output layers and not to the temporal patterns or to the network's reactions to structural perturbations. Finally, I review data indicating that consciousness has functional characteristics, such as a flexible control of behavior, and that cognitive/brain dynamics reveal interacting top-down and bottom-up processes, which are necessary for the mediation of such control processes.

Sleep is classically presented as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Yet, there is increasing evidence showing that sleep and wakefulness can actually intermingle and that wake-like and sleep-like activity can be observed concomitantly in different brain regions. I will here explore the implications of this conception of sleep as a local phenomenon for cognition and consciousness. In the first part of my presentation, I will show how local modulations of sleep depth during sleep could support the processing of sensory information by sleepers. I will also how, under certain circumstances, sleepers can learn while sleeping but also how they can forget. In the second part, I will show how the reverse phenomenon, sleep intrusions during waking, can explain modulations of attention. I will focus in particular on modulations of subjective experience and how the local sleep framework can inform our understanding of everyday phenomena such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Through this presentation and the exploration of both sleep and wakefulness, I will seek to connect changes in neurophysiology with changes in behaviour and subjective experience.

Recent breakthroughs in neurobiology indicate that time is ripe to understand the cellular-level mechanisms of conscious experience. Accordingly, we have recently proposed that conscious processing depends on the integration between top-down and bottom-up information streams and that there exists a specific cellular mechanism that gates this integration. I will first describe this cellular mechanism and demonstrate how it controls signal propagation within the thalamocortical system. Then I will show how this cellular-level mechanism provides a natural explanation for why conscious experience is modulated by top-down processing. Besides shining new light on the neural basis of consciousness, this perspective unravels the mechanisms of internally generated perception, such as dreams, imagery, and hallucinations.

In this talk, I’ll introduce the formal concept of a (pre)sheaf as data attached to a topological space. Sheaves capture the notion of patching local sources of information to form a global whole, e.g., the binding of visual features such as colour and shape. The formal theory appears to be closely related to the foundational properties asserted by the Information Integration Theory (IIT) for phenomenology. A comparison is intended to engender discussion on ways that phenomenology may benefit from a sheaf theory, or (more generally) a category theory approach.

Neuroscientific methods successfully account for a system’s functional properties, but leave out the subjective properties of the accompanying experience. According to IIT, phenomenology can be studied scientifically by unfolding the cause-effect structure specified by a system. To illustrate how, in this talk I compare two systems (a grid and a map) to show that they can be functionally equivalent in performing fixation, but only one can specify a cause-effect structure that accounts for the extendedness of phenomenal space.