Cognition seminars

Having conscious experience is arguably the most important reason why it matters to us whether we are alive or dead. A powerful paradigm to identify neural correlates of consciousness is binocular rivalry, wherein a constant visual stimulus evokes a varying conscious percept. It has recently been suggested that activity modulations observed during rivalry may represent the act of report rather than the conscious percept itself. Here, we performed single-unit recordings from face patches in macaque inferotemporal (IT) cortex using a novel no-report paradigm in which the animal’s conscious percept was inferred from eye movements. These experiments reveal two new results concerning the neural correlates of consciousness. First, we found that high proportions of IT neurons represented the conscious percept even without active report. Using high-channel recordings, including a new 128-channel Neuropixels-like probe, we were able to decode the conscious percept on single trials. Second, we found that even on single trials, modulation to rivalrous stimuli was weaker than that to unambiguous stimuli, suggesting that cells may encode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus. To test this hypothesis, we varied the identity of the suppressed stimulus during binocular rivalry; we found that indeed, we could decode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus from neural activity. Moreover, the same cells that were strongly modulated by the conscious percept also tended to be strongly modulated by the suppressed stimulus. Together, our findings indicate that (1) IT cortex possesses a true neural correlate of consciousness even in the absence of report, and (2) this correlate consists of a population code wherein single cells multiplex representation of the conscious percept and veridical physical stimulus, rather than a subset of cells perfectly reflecting consciousness.

Drosophila can learn to associate odours with reward or punishment and the resulting memories direct odour-specific approach or avoidance behaviours. Recent progress has revealed a straightforward model for learning in which reinforcing dopaminergic neurons assign valence to odour representations in the neural ensemble of the mushroom bodies. Dopamine directed synaptic depression alters the route of odour-driven activity through the mushroom body output network. This circuit configuration and influence of internal state guide the expression of appropriate behaviour. Importantly, learned behaviour is flexible and can be updated as the fly accumulates additional experience. Our latest studies demonstrate that well-informed behaviour is guided by combining parallel conflicting and complementary memories of opposite valence.

Sequential temporal ordering and patterning are key features of natural signals, used by the brain to decode stimuli and perceive them as sensory objects. Touch is one sensory modality where temporal patterning carries key information, and the rodent whisker system is a prominent model for understanding neuronal coding and plasticity underlying touch sensation. Neurons in this system are precise encoders of fluctuations in whisker dynamics down to a timescale of milliseconds, but it is not clear whether they can refine their encoding abilities as a result of learning patterned stimuli. For example, can they enhance temporal integration to become better at distinguishing sequences? To explore how cortical coding plasticity underpins sequence discrimination, we developed a task in which mice distinguished between tactile ‘word’ sequences constructed from distinct vibrations delivered to the whiskers, assembled in different orders. Animals licked to report the presence of the target sequence. Optogenetic inactivation showed that the somatosensory cortex was necessary for sequence discrimination. Two-photon imaging in layer 2/3 of the primary somatosensory “barrel” cortex (S1bf) revealed that, in well-trained animals, neurons had heterogeneous selectivity to multiple task variables including not just sensory input but also the animal’s action decision and the trial outcome (presence or absence of the predicted reward). Many neurons were activated preceding goal-directed licking, thus reflecting the animal’s learnt action in response to the target sequence; these neurons were found as soon as mice learned to associate the rewarded sequence with licking. In contrast, learning evoked smaller changes in sensory response tuning: neurons responding to stimulus features were already found in naïve mice, and training did not generate neurons with enhanced temporal integration or categorical responses. Therefore, in S1bf sequence learning results in neurons whose activity reflects the learnt association between target sequence and licking, rather than a refined representation of sensory features. Taken together with results from other laboratories, our findings suggest that neurons in sensory cortex are involved in task-specific processing and that an animal does not sense the world independently of what it needs to feel in order to guide behaviour.

My lab seeks to understand how the mammalian brain performs the computations that underlie cognitive functions, including decision-making, short-term memory, and spatial navigation, at the level of the building blocks of the nervous system, cell types and neural populations organized into circuits. We have developed methods to measure, manipulate, and analyze neural circuits across various spatial and temporal scales, including technology for virtual reality, optical imaging, optogenetics, intracellular electrophysiology, molecular sensors, and computational modeling. I will present recent work that uses large scale calcium imaging to reveal the functional organization of the mouse posterior cortex for flexible decision-making during spatial navigation in virtual reality. I will also discuss work that uses optogenetics and calcium imaging during a variety of decision-making tasks to highlight how cognitive experience and context greatly alter the cortical circuits necessary for navigation decisions.

fMRI results have shown that the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the basal ganglia, most often discussed in their roles in generating action, are engaged by beat-based timing even in the absence of movement. Some have argued that the motor system is “recruited” by beat-based timing tasks due to the presence of motor-like timescales, but a deeper understanding of the roles of these motor structures is lacking. Reviewing a body of motor neurophysiology literature and drawing on the “active inference” framework, I argue that we can see the motor and timing functions of these brain areas as examples of dynamic sub-second prediction informed by sensory event timing. I hypothesize that in both cases, sub-second dynamics in SMA predict the progress of a temporal process outside the brain, and direct pathway activation in basal ganglia selects temporal and sensory predictions for the upcoming interval -- the only difference is that in motor processes, these predictions are made manifest through motor effectors. If we can unify our understanding of beat-based timing and motor control, we can draw on the substantial motor neuroscience literature to make conceptual leaps forward in the study of predictive timing and musical rhythm.

Medium-spiny neurons (MSNs) in the striatum are required for interval timing, or the estimation of the time over several seconds via a motor response. We and others have shown that striatal MSNs can encode the duration of temporal intervals via time-dependent ramping activity, progressive monotonic changes in firing rate preceding behaviorally salient points in time. Here, we investigated how timing-related activity within striatal ensembles changes with experience. We leveraged a rodent-optimized interval timing task in which mice ‘switch’ response ports after an amount of time has passed without reward. We report three main results. First, we found that the proportion of MSNs exhibiting time-dependent modulations of firing rate increased after 10 days of task overtraining. Second, temporal decoding by MSN ensembles increased with experience and was largely driven by time-related ramping activity. Finally, we found that time-related ramping activity generalized across both correct and error trials. These results enhance our understanding of striatal temporal processing by demonstrating that time-dependent activity within MSN ensembles evolves with experience and is dissociable from motor- and reward-related processes.

The eyes send a continuous stream of about two million nerve fibers to the brain, but only a fraction of this information is stored as visual memories. This talk will detail three neurocomputational models that attempt an understanding how the visual system makes on-the-fly decisions about how to encode that information. First, the STST family of models (Bowman & Wyble 2007; Wyble, Potter, Bowman & Nieuwenstein 2011) proposes mechanisms for temporal segmentation of continuous input. The conclusion of this work is that the visual system has mechanisms for rapidly creating brief episodes of attention that highlight important moments in time, and also separates each episode from temporally adjacent neighbors to benefit learning. Next, the RAGNAROC model (Wyble et al. 2019) describes a decision process for determining the spatial focus (or foci) of attention in a spatiotopic field and the neural mechanisms that provide enhancement of targets and suppression of highly distracting information. This work highlights the importance of integrating behavioral and electrophysiological data to provide empirical constraints on a neurally plausible model of spatial attention. The model also highlights how a neural circuit can make decisions in a continuous space, rather than among discrete alternatives. Finally, the binding pool (Swan & Wyble 2014; Hedayati, O’Donnell, Wyble in Prep) provides a mechanism for selectively encoding specific attributes (i.e. color, shape, category) of a visual object to be stored in a consolidated memory representation. The binding pool is akin to a holographic memory system that layers representations of select latent representations corresponding to different attributes of a given object. Moreover, it can bind features into distinct objects by linking them to token placeholders. Future work looks toward combining these models into a coherent framework for understanding the full measure of on-the-fly attentional mechanisms and how they improve learning.

According to the concreteness fading approach, instruction should start with concrete representations and progress stepwise to representations that are more idealized. Various researchers have suggested that concreteness fading is a broadly applicable instructional approach. In this talk, we conceptually analyze examples of concreteness fading in mathematics and various science domains. In this analysis, we draw on theories of analogical and relational reasoning and on the literature about learning with multiple representations. Furthermore, we report on an experimental study in which we employed concreteness fading in advanced physics education. The results of the conceptual analysis and the experimental study indicate that concreteness fading may not be as generalizable as has been suggested. The reasons for this limited generalizability are twofold. First, the types of representations and the relations between them differ across different domains. Second, the instructional goals between domains and the subsequent roles of the representations vary.

My research focuses, broadly speaking, on how emotions impact decision making. Specifically, I am interested in affective biases, a phenomenon known to be important in depression. Using a rodent decision-making task, combined with computational modelling I have investigated how different antidepressant and pro-depressant manipulations that are known to alter mood in humans alter judgement bias, and provided insight into the decision processes that underlie these behaviours. I will also highlight how the combination of behaviour and modelling can provide a truly translation approach, enabling comparison and interpretation of the same cognitive processes between animal and human research.

Classical models of perceptual decision-making assume that animals use a single, consistent strategy to integrate sensory evidence and form decisions during an experiment. In this talk, I aim to convince you that this common view is incorrect. I will show results from applying a latent variable framework, the “GLM-HMM”, to hundreds of thousands of trials of mouse choice data. Our analysis reveals that mice don’t lapse. Instead, mice switch back and forth between engaged and disengaged behavior within a single session, and each mode of behavior lasts tens to hundreds of trials.

Recent advances in deep learning have produced models that far outstrip human performance in a number of domains. However, where machine learning approaches still fall far short of human-level performance is in the capacity to transfer knowledge across domains. While a human learner will happily apply knowledge acquired in one domain (e.g., mathematics) to a different domain (e.g., cooking; a vinaigrette is really just a ratio between edible fat and acid), machine learning models still struggle profoundly at such tasks. I will present a case that human intelligence might be (at least partially) usefully characterised by our ability to transfer knowledge widely, and a framework that we have developed for learning representations that support such transfer. The model is compared to current machine learning approaches.

Classic economists proposed that economic choices rely on the computation and comparison of subjective values. This hypothesis continues to inform economic theory and experimental research, but behavioral measures are ultimately not sufficient to prove the proposal. Consistent with the hypothesis, when agents make choices, neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encode the subjective value of offered and chosen goods. Moreover, neuronal activity in this area suggests the formation of a decision. However, it is unclear whether these neural processes are causally related to choices. More generally, the evidence linking choices to value signals in the brain remains correlational. In my talk, I will present recent results showing that neuronal activity in OFC are causal to economic choices.

Despite undeniable progress in the science of consciousness, there is no consensus on even fundamental theoretical and empirical questions, such as whether ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is a scientifically respectable concept, whether phenomenal consciousness overflows access consciousness, or whether the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness are in the front or in the back of the cerebral cortex. Notably, disagreement also concerns proposed theories of consciousness. However, since not all theories are mutually incompatible, there have been attempts to make theoretical progress by integrating or unifying them. I shall argue that this is preferable over proposing yet another theory, but that one should not expect it to yield a complete theory of consciousness. Rather, theoretical work in consciousness research should focus on core hypotheses about consciousness that different theories of consciousness have in common. Such a ‘minimal unifying model’ of consciousness can then be used as a basis for formulating more specific hypotheses about consciousness.

Analogies, broadly defined, map novel concepts onto familiar concepts, making them essential for perception, reasoning, and communication. We argue that analogy-building served a critical role in the evolution of cumulative culture, by allowing humans to learn and transmit complex behavioural sequences that would otherwise be too cognitively demanding or opaque to acquire. The emergence of a protolanguage consisting of simple labels would have provided early humans with the cognitive tools to build explicit analogies and to communicate them to others. This focus on analogy-building can shed new light on the coevolution of cognition and culture, and addresses recent calls for better integration of the field of cultural evolution with cognitive science. This talk will address what cumulative cultural evolution is, how we define analogy-building, how analogy-building applies to cumulative cultural evolution, how analogy-building fits into language evolution, and the implications of analogy-building for causal understanding and cognitive evolution.

A key component of humans' striking creativity in solving problems is our ability to construct novel descriptions to help us characterize novel categories. Bongard problems, which challenge the problem solver to come up with a rule for distinguishing visual scenes that fall into two categories, provide an elegant test of this ability. Bongard problems are challenging for both human and machine category learners because only a handful of example scenes are presented for each category, and they often require the open-ended creation of new descriptions. A new sub-type of Bongard problem called Physical Bongard Problems (PBPs) is introduced, which require solvers to perceive and predict the physical spatial dynamics implicit in the depicted scenes. The PATHS (Perceiving And Testing Hypotheses on Structures) computational model which can solve many PBPs is presented, and compared to human performance on the same problems. PATHS and humans are similarly affected by the ordering of scenes within a PBP, with spatially and temporally juxtaposed scenes promoting category learning when they are similar and belong to different categories, or dissimilar and belong to the same category. The core theoretical commitments of PATHS which we believe to also exemplify human open-ended category learning are a) the continual perception of new scene descriptions over the course of category learning; b) the context-dependent nature of that perceptual process, in which the scenes establish the context for one another; c) hypothesis construction by combining descriptions into logical expressions; and d) bi-directional interactions between perceiving new aspects of scenes and constructing hypotheses for the rule that distinguishes categories.