Cognition seminars

Outside the foveola, visual acuity and other visual functions gradually deteriorate with increasing eccentricity. Humans compensate for these limitations by relying on a tight link between perception and action; rapid gaze shifts (saccades) occur 2-3 times every second, separating brief “fixation” intervals in which visual information is acquired and processed. During fixation, however, the eye is not immobile. Small eye movements incessantly shift the image on the retina even when the attended stimulus is already foveated, suggesting a much deeper coupling between visual functions and oculomotor activity. Thanks to a combination of techniques allowing for high-resolution recordings of eye position, retinal stabilization, and accurate gaze localization, we examined how attention and eye movements are controlled at this scale. We have shown that during fixation, visual exploration of fine spatial detail unfolds following visuomotor strategies similar to those occurring at a larger scale. This behavior compensates for non-homogenous visual capabilities within the foveola and is finely controlled by attention, which facilitates processing at selected foveal locations. Ultimately, the limits of high acuity vision are greatly influenced by the spatiotemporal modulations introduced by fixational eye movements. These findings reveal that, contrary to common intuition, placing a stimulus within the foveola is necessary but not sufficient for high visual acuity; fine spatial vision is the outcome of an orchestrated synergy of motor, cognitive, and attentional factors.

Figure-ground organisation and perceptual grouping are classic topics in Gestalt and perceptual psychology. They often appear alongside one another in introductory textbook chapters on perception and have a long history of investigation. However, they are typically discussed as separate processes of perceptual organisation with their own distinct phenomena and mechanisms. Here, I will propose that perceptual grouping and figure-ground organisation are strongly linked. In particular, perceptual grouping can provide a basis for, and may share mechanisms with, a wide range of figure-ground principles. To support this claim, I will describe a new class of figure-ground principles based on perceptual grouping between edges and demonstrate that this inter-edge grouping (IEG) is a powerful influence on figure-ground organisation. I will also draw support from our other results showing that grouping between edges and regions (i.e., edge-region grouping) can affect figure-ground organisation (Palmer & Brooks, 2008) and that contextual influences in figure-ground organisation can be gated by perceptual grouping between edges (Brooks & Driver, 2010). In addition to these modern observations, I will also argue that we can describe some classic figure-ground principles (e.g., symmetry, convexity, etc.) using perceptual grouping mechanisms. These results suggest that figure-ground organisation and perceptual grouping have more than a mere association under the umbrella topics of Gestalt psychology and perceptual organisation. Instead, perceptual grouping may provide a mechanism underlying a broad class of new and extant figure-ground principles.

Narratives of human evolution have focused on cortical expansion and increases in brain size relative to body size, but considered that changes in life history, such as in age at sexual maturity and thus the extent of childhood and maternal dependence, or maximal longevity, are evolved features that appeared as consequences of selection for increased brain size, or increased cognitive abilities that decrease mortality rates, or due to selection for grandmotherly contribution to feeding the young. Here I build on my recent finding that slower life histories universally accompany increased numbers of cortical neurons across warm-blooded species to propose a simpler framework for human evolution: that slower development to sexual maturity and increased post-maturity longevity are features that do not require selection, but rather inevitably and immediately accompany evolutionary increases in numbers of cortical neurons, thus fostering human social interactions and cultural and technological evolution as generational overlap increases.

Humans are biologically adapted for cultural life in ways that other primates are not. Humans have unique motivations and cognitive skills for sharing emotions, experience, and collaborative actions (shared intentionality). These motivations and skills first emerge in human ontogeny at around one year of age, as infants begin to participate with other persons in various kinds of collaborative and joint attentional activities, including linguistic communication. Our nearest primate relatives understand important aspects of intentional action - especially in competitive situations - but they do not seem to have the motivations and cognitive skills necessary to engage in activities involving collaboration, shared intentionality, and, in general, things cultural.

Humans are incredible learners, a talent supported by our ability to detect and transfer relational similarities between items and events. Spotting these common relations despite perceptual differences is challenging, yet there’s evidence that this ability begins early, with infants as young as 3 months discriminating same and different (Anderson et al., 2018; Ferry et al., 2015). How? To understand the underlying mechanisms, I examine how learning outcomes in the first year correspond with changes in input and in infant age. I discuss the commonalities in this process with that seen in older children and adults, as well as differences due to interactions with other maturing processes like language and visual attention.

Framing effects in individual decision-making have puzzled economists for decades because they are hard, if at all, to explain with rational choice theories. Why should mere changes in the description of a choice problem affect decision-making? Here, we examine the hypothesis that changes in framing cause changes in the allocation of attention to the different options – measured via eye-tracking – and give rise to changes in decision-making. We document that the framing of a sure alternative as a gain – as opposed to a loss – in a risk-taking task increases the attentional advantage of the sure option and induces a higher choice frequency of that option – a finding that is predicted by the attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM). The model also correctly predicts other key findings such as that the increased attentional advantage of the sure option in the gain frame should also lead quicker decisions in this frame. In addition, the data reveal that increasing risk aversion at higher stake sizes may also be driven by attentional processes because the sure option receives significantly more attention – regardless of frame – at higher stakes. We also corroborate the causal impact of framing-induced changes of attention on choice with an additional experiment that manipulates attention exogenously. Finally, to study the precise mechanisms underlying the framing effect we structurally estimate an aDDM that allows for frame and option-dependent parameters. The estimation results indicate that – in addition to the direct effects of framing-induced changes in attention on choice – the gain frame also causes (i) an increase in the attentional discount of the gamble and (ii) an increased concavity of utility. Our findings suggest that the traditional explanation of framing effects in risky choice in terms of a more concave value function in the gain domain is seriously incomplete and that attentional mechanisms as hypothesized in the aDDM play a key role.

Emotion processing is thought to be impaired in autism and linked to atypical visual exploration and arousal modulation to others faces and gaze, yet evidence is equivocal. We propose that, where observed, atypical socioemotional processing is due to alexithymia, a distinct but frequently co-occurring condition which affects emotional self-awareness and Interoception. In study 1 (N = 80), we tested this hypothesis by studying the spatio-temporal dynamics and entropy of eye-gaze during emotion processing tasks. Evidence from traditional and novel methods revealed that atypical eye-gaze and emotion recognition is best predicted by alexithymia in both autistic and non-autistic individuals. In Study 2 (N = 70), we assessed interoceptive and autonomic signals implicated in socioemotional processing, and found evidence for alexithymia (not autism) driven effects on gaze and arousal modulation to emotions. We also conducted two large-scale studies (N = 1300), using confirmatory factor-analytic and network modelling and found evidence that Alexithymia and Autism are distinct at both a latent level and their intercorrelations. We argue that: 1) models of socioemotional processing in autism should conceptualise difficulties as intrinsic to alexithymia, and 2) assessment of alexithymia is crucial for diagnosis and personalised interventions in autism.

n natural vision, active vision refers to the changes in visual input resulting from self-initiated eye movements. In this talk, I will present studies that show that the stimulus-related activity during active vision differs substantially from that occurring during classical flashed-stimuli paradigms. Our results uncover novel and efficient mechanisms that improve visual perception. In a general way, the nervous system appears to engage in sensory modulation mechanisms, precisely timed to self-initiated stimulus changes, thus coordinating neural activity across different cortical areas and serving as a general mechanism for the global coordination of visual perception.

Global responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have resulted in various forms of “lockdown” being imposed on citizens. These lockdown measures have resulted in significant changes to all aspects of daily life for all those who live under them. Lockdowns have however, also provided a unique opportunity for psychologists to examine how changes in the structure of daily life influence our experience of time. This talk will review recent research examining the impact on covid-19 on real-world time experience. It will look to discuss whether the factors which influence “normal” time experience also influenced time experience during lockdown. Finally, it will try to highlight some potential future directions for enhancing our understanding of real-life time distortion.

Cognitive bias is a "subjective reality" that is uniquely created in the brain and affects our various behaviors. It may lead to what is widely called irrationality in behavioral economics, such as inaccurate judgment and illogical interpretation, but it also has an adaptive aspect in terms of mental hygiene. When such cognitive bias is regarded as a product of information processing in the brain, the approach to clarify the mechanism in the brain will play a part in finding the direct relations between the brain and the mind. In my talk, I will introduce our studies investigating the neural and molecular bases of cognitive biases, especially focusing on the role of dopamine.

Humans and other primates exhibit rich and versatile behaviour, switching nimbly between tasks as the environmental context requires. I will discuss the neural coding patterns that make this possible in humans and deep networks. First, using deep network simulations, I will characterise two distinct solutions to task acquisition (“lazy” and “rich” learning) which trade off learning speed for robustness, and depend on the initial weights scale and network sparsity. I will chart the predictions of these two schemes for a context-dependent decision-making task, showing that the rich solution is to project task representations onto orthogonal planes on a low-dimensional embedding space. Using behavioural testing and functional neuroimaging in humans, we observe BOLD signals in human prefrontal cortex whose dimensionality and neural geometry are consistent with the rich learning regime. Next, I will discuss the problem of continual learning, showing that behaviourally, humans (unlike vanilla neural networks) learn more effectively when conditions are blocked than interleaved. I will show how this counterintuitive pattern of behaviour can be recreated in neural networks by assuming that information is normalised and temporally clustered (via Hebbian learning) alongside supervised training. Together, this work offers a picture of how humans learn to partition knowledge in the service of structured behaviour, and offers a roadmap for building neural networks that adopt similar principles in the service of multitask learning. This is work with Andrew Saxe, Timo Flesch, David Nagy, and others.

It has long been known that when viewing a set of images, we misjudge individual elements as being closer to the mean than they are (Hollingworth, 1910) and recall seeing the (absent) set mean (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott (1995). Recent studies found that viewing sets of images, simultaneously or sequentially, leads to perception of set statistics (mean, range) with poor memory for individual elements. Ensemble perception was found for sets of simple images (e.g. circles varying in size or brightness; lines of varying orientation), complex objects (e.g. faces of varying emotion), as well as for objects belonging to the same category. When the viewed set does not include its mean or prototype, nevertheless, observers report and act as if they have seen this central image or object – a form of false memory. Physiologically, detailed sensory information at cortical input levels is processed hierarchically to form an integrated scene gist at higher levels. However, we are aware of the gist before the details. We propose that images and objects belonging to a set or category are represented as their gist, mean or prototype, plus individual differences from that gist. Under constrained viewing conditions, only the gist is perceived and remembered. This theory also provides a basis for compressed neural representation. Extending this theory to scenes and episodes supplies a generalized basis for false memories. They seem right, match generalized expectations, so are believable without challenging examination. This theory could be tested by analyzing the typicality of false memories, compared to rejected alternatives.

One of the central challenges facing the science of consciousness is that of identifying ways of measuring consciousness. Can we go beyond our pre-theoretical ways of detecting consciousness and develop independently validated measures of consciousness. Some theorists think not, arguing that we cannot go beyond the everyday markers of consciousness with which we begin. Others are more optimistic, and hold that we will be able to develop independent measures of consciousness, or "consciousness meters". This talk discusses various ways in which one might attempt to validate a consciousness meter, arguing that the most promising approach involves treating consciousness as a natural kind.

Existing accounts of analogical transfer highlight the importance of comparison-based schema abstraction in aiding retrieval of relevant prior knowledge from memory. In this talk, we discuss an alternative view, the category status hypothesis—which states that if knowledge of a target principle is represented as a relational category, it is easier to activate as a result of categorizing (as opposed to cue-based reminding)—and briefly review supporting evidence. We then further investigate this hypothesis by designing study tasks that promote different facets of category-level representations and assess their impact on spontaneous analogical transfer. A Baseline group compared two analogous cases; the remaining groups experienced comparison plus another task intended to impact the category status of the knowledge representation. The Intension group read an abstract statement of the principle with a supporting task of generating a new case. The Extension group read two more positive cases with the task of judging whether each exemplified the target principle. The Mapping group read a contrast case with the task of revising it into a positive example of the target principle (thereby providing practice moving in both directions between type and token, i.e., evaluating a given case relative to knowledge and using knowledge to generate a revised case). The results demonstrated that both Intension and Extension groups led to transfer improvements over Baseline (with the former demonstrating both improved accessibility of prior knowledge and ability to apply relational concepts). Implications for theories of analogical transfer are discussed.