Cognitive Psychology seminars

First, a new measure of MI for reaction times is proposed that takes the entire RT distribution into account. Second, we present some recent developments in TWIN modeling, including a new proposal for the sound-induced flash illusion (SIFI).

The defining characteristic of development prosopagnosia is severe difficulty recognising familiar faces in everyday life. Numerous studies have reported that the condition is highly heterogeneous in terms of both presentation and severity with many mixed findings in the literature. I will present behavioural data from a large face processing test battery (n = 24 DPs) as well as some early findings from a larger survey of the lived experience of individuals with DP and discuss how insights from individuals' real-world experience can help to understand and interpret lab-based data.

In our daily lives, we perceive things as possessing a mind (e.g., people) or lacking one (e.g., shoes). Intriguingly, how much mind we attribute to people can vary, with real people perceived to have more mind than depictions of individuals, such as photographs. Drawing from a range of research methodologies, including naturalistic observation, mobile eye tracking, and surreptitious behavior monitoring, I discuss how various shades of mind influence human attention and behaviour. The findings suggest the novel concept that overt attention (where one looks) in real-life is fundamentally supported by covert attention (attending to someone out of the corner of one's eye).

People largely differ with respect to how well they can learn, memorize, and perceive faces. In this talk, I address two potential sources of variation. One factor might be people’s ability to adapt their perception to the kind of faces they are currently exposed to. For instance, some studies report that those who show larger adaptation effects are also better at performing face learning and memory tasks. Another factor might be people’s sensitivity to perceive fine differences between similar-looking faces. In fact, one study shows that the brain of good performers in a face memory task shows larger neural differences between similar-looking faces. Capitalizing on this body of evidence, I present a behavioural study where I explore the relationship between people’s perceptual adaptability and sensitivity and their individual face processing performance.

An understanding of the self helps explain not only human thoughts, feelings, attitudes but also many aspects of everyday behaviour. This talk focuses on a viewpoint - self as processes. This viewpoint emphasizes the dynamics of the self that best connects with the development of the self over time and its realist orientation. We are combining psychological experiments and data mining to comprehend the stability and adaptability of the self across various populations. In this talk, I draw on evidence from experimental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and machine learning approaches to demonstrate why and how self-association affects cognition and how it is modulated by various social experiences and situational factors

Working memory is about the past but for the future. Adopting such a future-focused perspective shifts the narrative of working memory as a limited-capacity storage system to working memory as an anticipatory buffer that helps us prepare for potential and sequential upcoming behaviour. In my talk, I will present a series of our recent studies that have started to reveal emerging principles of a working memory that looks forward – highlighting, amongst others, how selective attention plays a vital role in prioritising internal contents for behaviour, and the bi-directional links between visual working memory and action. These studies show how studying the dynamics of working memory, selective attention, and action together paves way for an integrated understanding of how mind serves behaviour.

Neurofeedback provides a feedback display which is linked with on-going brain activity and thus allows self-regulation of neural activity in specific brain regions associated with certain cognitive functions and is considered a promising tool for clinical interventions. Recent reviews of neurofeedback have stressed the importance of applying the “double-blind” experimental design where critically the patient is unaware of the neurofeedback treatment condition. An important question then becomes; is double-blind even possible? Or are subjects aware of the purposes of the neurofeedback experiment? – this question is related to the issue of how we assess awareness or the absence of awareness to certain information in human subjects. Fortunately, methods have been developed which employ neurofeedback implicitly, where the subject is claimed to have no awareness of experimental purposes when performing the neurofeedback. Implicit neurofeedback is intriguing and controversial because it runs counter to the first neurofeedback study, which showed a link between awareness of being in a certain brain state and control of the neurofeedback-derived brain activity. Claiming that humans are unaware of a specific type of mental content is a notoriously difficult endeavor. For instance, what was long held as wholly unconscious phenomena, such as dreams or subliminal perception, have been overturned by more sensitive measures which show that degrees of awareness can be detected. In this talk, I will discuss whether we will critically examine the claim that we can know for certain that a neurofeedback experiment was performed in an unconscious manner. I will present evidence that in certain neurofeedback experiments such as manipulations of attention, participants display residual degrees of awareness of experimental contingencies to alter their cognition.

Despite her still poor visual acuity and minimal visual experience, a 2-3 month old baby will reliably respond to facial expressions, smiling back at her caretaker or older sibling. But what if that same baby had been deprived of her early visual experience? Will she be able to appropriately respond to seemingly mundane interactions, such as a peer’s facial expression, if she begins seeing at the age of 10? My work is part of Project Prakash, a dual humanitarian/scientific mission to identify and treat curably blind children in India and then study how their brain learns to make sense of the visual world when their visual journey begins late in life. In my talk, I will give a brief overview of Project Prakash, and present findings from one of my primary lines of research: plasticity of face perception with late sight onset. Specifically, I will discuss a mixed methods effort to probe and explain the differential windows of plasticity that we find across different aspects of distributed face recognition, from distinguishing a face from a nonface early in the developmental trajectory, to recognizing facial expressions, identifying individuals, and even identifying one’s own caretaker. I will draw connections between our empirical findings and our recent theoretical work hypothesizing that children with late sight onset may suffer persistent face identification difficulties because of the unusual acuity progression they experience relative to typically developing infants. Finally, time permitting, I will point to potential implications of our findings in supporting newly-sighted children as they transition back into society and school, given that their needs and possibilities significantly change upon the introduction of vision into their lives.

A fundamental question in affective sciences is how the human mind decides if, and in what intensity, to elicit an affective response. Appraisal theories assume that preceding the affective response, there is an evaluation stage in which dimensions of an event are being appraised. Common to most appraisal theories is the assumption that the evaluation phase involves the assessment of the stimulus’ relevance to the perceiver’s well-being. In this talk, I first discuss conceptual and methodological challenges in investigating relevance appraisal. Next, I present two lines of experiments that ask how the human mind uses information about objective and subjective probabilities in the decision about the intensity of the emotional response and how these are affected by the valence of the event. The potential contribution of the results to appraisal theory is discussed.

Humans constantly make perceptual decisions on human faces and voices. These regularly come with the challenge of receiving only uncertain sensory evidence, resulting from noisy input and noisy neural processes. Efficiently adapting one’s internal decision system including prior expectations and subsequent metacognitive assessments to these challenges is crucial in everyday life. However, the exact decision mechanisms and whether these represent modifiable states remain unknown in the general population and clinical patients with psychosis. Using data from a laboratory-based sample of healthy controls and patients with psychosis as well as a complementary, large online sample of healthy controls, I will demonstrate how a combination of perceptual face and voice recognition decision fidelity, metacognitive ratings, and Bayesian computational modelling may be used as indicators to differentiate between non-clinical and clinical states in the future.

The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one's own behavior and, through them, external events. Why is this subjective feeling important for humans? Is it just a by-product of our actions? Previous studies have shown that the sense of agency can affect the intensity of sensory input because we predict the input from our motor intention. However, my research has found that the sense of agency plays more roles than just predictions. It enhances perceptual processes of sensory input and potentially helps to harvest more information about the link between the external world and the self. Furthermore, our recent research found both indirect and direct evidence that the sense of agency is important for people's exploratory behaviors, and this may be linked to proximal exploitations of one's control in the environment. In this talk, I will also introduce the paradigms we use to study the sense of agency as a result of perceptual processes, and our findings of individual differences in this sense and the implications.

Visual working memory (VWM) is limited in capacity, but memorizing meaningful objects may refine this limitation. However, meaningless and meaningful stimuli usually differ perceptually and an object’s association with meaning is typically already established before the actual experiment. We applied a strict control over these potential confounds by asking observers (N=45) to actively learn associations of (initially) meaningless objects. To this end, a change detection task presented Chinese characters, which were meaningless to our observers. Subsequently, half of the characters were consistently paired with pictures of animals. Then, the initial change detection task was repeated. The results revealed enhanced VWM performance after learning, in particular for meaning-associated characters (though not quite reaching the accuracy level attained by N=20 native Chinese observers). These results thus provide direct experimental evidence that the short-term retention of objects benefits from active learning of an object’s association with meaning in long-term memory.

Metacognition has long been defined as “cognition about cognition”. One of its aspects is the error monitoring ability, which includes being aware of one’s own errors without external feedback. This ability is mostly investigated in two-alternative forced choice tasks, where the performance has all or none nature in terms of accuracy. The previous literature documents the effect of different influences on the error monitoring ability, such as working memory, feedback and sensorimotor involvement. However, these demonstrations fall short of generalizing to the real life scenarios where the errors often have a magnitude and a direction. To bridge this gap, recent studies showed that humans could keep track of the magnitude and the direction of their errors in temporal, spatial and numerical domains in two metrics: confidence and short-long/few-more judgements. This talk will cover how the documented effects that are obtained in the two alternative forced choices tasks apply to the temporal error monitoring ability. Finally, how magnitude and direction monitoring (i.e., confidence and short-long judgements) can be differentiated as the two indices of temporal error monitoring ability will be discussed.

Precisely estimating event timing is essential for survival, yet temporal distortions are ubiquitous in our daily sensory experience. Here, we tested whether the relative position, duration, and distance in time of two sequentially-organized events—standard S, with constant duration, and comparison C, with duration varying trial-by-trial—are causal factors in generating temporal distortions. We found that temporal distortions emerge when the first event is shorter than the second event. Importantly, a significant interaction suggests that a longer inter-stimulus interval (ISI) helps to counteract such serial distortion effect only when the constant S is in the first position, but not if the unpredictable C is in the first position. These results imply the existence of a perceptual bias in perceiving ordered event durations, mechanistically contributing to distortion in time perception. Our results clarify the mechanisms generating time distortions by identifying a hitherto unknown duration-dependent encoding inefficiency in human serial temporal perception, something akin to a strong prior that can be overridden for highly predictable sensory events but unfolds for unpredictable ones.

Explicit similarity judgments tend to emphasize relational information more than do difference judgments. In this talk, I propose and test the hypothesis that this asymmetry arises because human reasoners represent the relation different as the negation of the relation same (i.e., as not-same). This proposal implies that processing difference is more cognitively demanding than processing similarity. Both for verbal comparisons between word pairs, and for visual comparisons between sets of geometric shapes, participants completed a triad task in which they selected which of two options was either more similar to or more different from a standard. On unambiguous trials, one option was unambiguously more similar to the standard, either by virtue of featural similarity or by virtue of relational similarity. On ambiguous trials, one option was more featurally similar (but less relationally similar) to the standard, whereas the other was more relationally similar (but less featurally similar). Given the higher cognitive complexity of assessing relational similarity, we predicted that detecting relational difference would be particularly demanding. We found that participants (1) had more difficulty accurately detecting relational difference than they did relational similarity on unambiguous trials, and (2) tended to emphasize relational information more when judging similarity than when judging difference on ambiguous trials. The latter finding was captured by a computational model of comparison that weights relational information more heavily for similarity than for difference judgments. These results provide convergent evidence for a representational asymmetry between the relations same and different.

Analogical reasoning is a common reasoning tool for learning and problem-solving. Existing research has extensively studied children’s reasoning when comparing, or choosing from ready-made analogies. Relatively less is known about how children come up with analogies in authentic learning environments. Design education provides a suitable context to investigate how children generate analogies for creative learning purposes. Meanwhile, the frequent use of visual analogies in design provides an additional opportunity to understand the role of spatial reasoning in design-by-analogy. Spatial reasoning is one of the most studied human cognitive factors and is critical to the learning of science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics (STEAM). There is growing interest in exploring the interplay between analogical reasoning and spatial reasoning. In this talk, I will share qualitative findings from a case study, where a class of 11-to-12-year-olds in the Netherlands participated in a biomimicry design project. These findings illustrate (1) practical ways to support children’s analogical reasoning in the ideation process and (2) the potential role of spatial reasoning as seen in children mapping form-function relationships in nature analogically and adaptively to those in human designs.