Cognitive Psychology seminars

Margaret Livingstone of Harvard Medical School presents in Princeton Neuroscience Institute's public seminar series. Livingstone's laboratory studies how visual recognition occurs in the primate brain using behavior, brain imaging, and electrophysiology.

Reward expectations – one’s prediction about the likelihood of future outcomes - play a central role in shaping the satisfaction derived from those outcomes. Most existing research treats expectations as static, assuming they remain fixed in time. However, real-life expectations are often dynamic, fluctuating as new information becomes available. For example, during a soccer game, your expectations of seeing your team winning will likely rise and fall as the game unfolds. In the main part of this talk, I will present a series of studies demonstrating that human expectations can be tracked at sub-second timescales. Using slot machines as a case study, we leverage the continuous deceleration of the reels to elicit moment-by-moment fluctuations in rewardexpectations. To capture these dynamics, we take complementary approaches: we use the high temporal resolution of electroencephalography (EEG) to track neural signatures of evolving expectations, and we develop a novel behavioral paradigm (“Slot or Not”) designed to measure changes in expectations via betting behavior. Across four studies, we show that expectations fluctuate continuously and can be tracked both behaviorally and neurally. Extending these findings, a subsequent intracranial study shows that the human orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encodes the moment-by-moment changes of reward expectations. In the second part of this talk, I will return to the relationship between expectations andsatisfaction. If expectations shape satisfaction, and if they are best conceptualized as dynamic trajectories rather than static quantities, a key question arises: does the trajectory leading up to an outcome influence how that outcome is evaluated? I will outline a new research direction aimed at formalizing this relationship using computational modeling. This is ongoing work, and I welcome feedback on how best to formalize these ideas. Finally, I will discuss potential extensions of this framework to psychopathology, asking whether alterations in dynamic expectations may characterize conditions such as Major Depressive Disorder and Gambling disorder. Together, this work introduces a new framework for studying expectations as dynamic processes, offering a richer understanding Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2026-04-29. Recording duration: 00:42:25.

Vulnerability to distraction varies across the general population and significantly affects one’s capacity to stay focused on and successfully complete the task at hand, whether at school, on the road, or at work. In this talk, I will begin by discussing how distractibility is typically assessed in the literature and introduce our innovative ERP approach to measuring it. Since distractibility is a cardinal symptom of ADHD, I will introduce its most widely used paper-and-pencil screening tool for the general population as external validation. Following that, I will present the Load Theory of Attention and explain how we used perceptual load to test the reliability of our neural marker of distractibility. Finally, I will highlight potential future applications of this marker in clinical and educational settings.

Following the seminal structure mapping theory by Dedre Gentner, the process of mapping the corresponding structures of relations defining two analogs has been understood as a key component of analogy making. However, not without a merit, in recent years some semantic, pragmatic, and perceptual aspects of analogy mapping attracted primary attention of analogy researchers. For almost a decade, our team have been re-focusing on relational structure mapping, investigating its potential mechanisms across various analogy tasks, both abstract (semantically-lean) and more concrete (semantically-rich), using diverse methods (behavioral, correlational, eye-tracking, EEG). I will present the overview of our main findings. They suggest that structure mapping (1) consists of an incremental construction of the ultimate mental representation, (2) which strongly depends on working memory resources and reasoning ability, (3) even if as little as a single trivial relation needs to be represented mentally. The effective mapping (4) is related to the slowest brain rhythm – the delta band (around 2-3 Hz) – suggesting its highly integrative nature. Finally, we have developed a new task – Graph Mapping – which involves pure mapping of two explicit relational structures. This task allows for precise investigation and manipulation of the mapping process in experiments, as well as is one of the best proxies of individual differences in reasoning ability. Structure mapping is as crucial to analogy as Gentner advocated, and perhaps it is crucial to cognition in general.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Executive control processes and flexible behaviors rely on the integrity of, and dynamic interactions between, large-scale functional brain networks. The right insular cortex is a critical component of a salience/midcingulo-insular network that is thought to mediate interactions between brain networks involved in externally oriented (central executive/lateral frontoparietal network) and internally oriented (default mode/medial frontoparietal network) processes. How these brain systems reconfigure with development is a critical question for cognitive neuroscience, with implications for neurodevelopmental pathologies affecting brain connectivity. I will describe studies examining how brain network dynamics support flexible behaviors in typical and atypical development, presenting evidence suggesting a unique role for the dorsal anterior insular from studies of meta-analytic connectivity modeling, dynamic functional connectivity, and structural connectivity. These findings from adults, typically developing children, and children with autism suggest that structural and functional maturation of insular pathways is a critical component of the process by which human brain networks mature to support complex, flexible cognitive processes throughout the lifespan.

Playing action video games involves both explicit (conscious) and implicit (non-conscious) expectations of timed events, such as the appearance of foes. While studies revealed that explicit attention skills are improved in action video game players (VGPs), their implicit skills remained untested. To this end, we investigated explicit and implicit temporal processing in VGPs and non-VGPs (control participants). In our variable foreperiod task, participants were immersed in a virtual reality and instructed to respond to a visual target appearing at variable delays after a cue. I will present behavioral, oculomotor and EEG data and discuss possible markers of the implicit passage of time and explicit temporal attention processing. All evidence indicates that VGPs have enhanced implicit skills to track the passage of time, which does not require conscious attention. Thus, action video game play may improve a temporal processing found altered in psychopathologies, such as schizophrenia. Could digital (game-based) interventions help remediate temporal processing deficits in psychiatric populations?

The gradual accumulation of hyperphosphorylated forms of the Tau protein (pTau) in the human brain correlate with cognitive dysfunction and neurodegeneration. I will present our recent findings on the consequences of human pTau aggregation in the hippocampal formation of a mouse tauopathy model. We show that pTau preferentially accumulates in deep-layer pyramidal neurons, leading to their neurodegeneration. In aged but not younger mice, pTau spreads to oligodendrocytes. During ‘goal-directed’ navigation, we detect fewer high-firing pyramidal cells, but coupling to network oscillations is maintained in the remaining cells. The firing patterns of individually recorded and labelled pyramidal and GABAergic neurons are similar in transgenic and non-transgenic mice, as are network oscillations, suggesting intact neuronal coordination. This is consistent with a lack of pTau in subcortical brain areas that provide rhythmic input to the cortex. Spatial memory tests reveal a reduction in short-term familiarity of spatial cues but unimpaired spatial working and reference memory. These results suggest that preserved subcortical network mechanisms compensate for the widespread pTau aggregation in the hippocampal formation. I will also briefly discuss ideas on the subcortical origins of spatial memory and the concept of the cortex as a monitoring device.

Affectively charged analogies are commonly used in literature and art, but also in politics and argumentation. There are reasons to think we may process these analogies differently. Notably, analogical reasoning is a complex process that requires the use of cognitive resources, which are limited. In the presence of affectively charged content, some of these resources might be directed towards affective processing and away from analogical reasoning. To investigate this idea, I investigated effects of affective charge on differences in brain activity evoked by sound versus unsound analogies. The presentation will detail the methods and results for two such experiments, one in which participants saw analogies formed of neutral and negative words and one in which they were created by combining conditioned symbols. I will also briefly discuss future research aiming to investigate the effects of analogical reasoning on brain activity related to affective processing.

Working memory is the sketchpad of consciousness, the fundamental mechanism the brain uses to gain volitional control over its thoughts and actions. For the past 50 years, working memory has been thought to rely on cortical neurons that fire continuous impulses that keep thoughts “online”. However, new work from our lab has revealed more complex dynamics. The impulses fire sparsely and interact with brain rhythms of different frequencies. Higher frequency gamma (>35 Hz) rhythms help carry the contents of working memory while lower frequency alpha/beta (~8-30 Hz) rhythms act as control signals that gate access to and clear out working memory. In other words, a rhythmic dance between brain rhythms may underlie your ability to control your own thoughts.

Natural soundscapes such as from a forest, a busy restaurant, or a busy intersection are generally composed of a cacophony of sounds that the brain needs to interpret either independently or collectively. In certain instances sounds - such as from moving cars, sirens, and people talking - are perceived in unison and are recognized collectively as single sound (e.g., city noise). In other instances, such as for the cocktail party problem, multiple sounds compete for attention so that the surrounding background noise (e.g., speech babble) interferes with the perception of a single sound source (e.g., a single talker). I will describe results from my lab on the perception and neural representation of auditory textures. Textures, such as a from a babbling brook, restaurant noise, or speech babble are stationary sounds consisting of multiple independent sound sources that can be quantitatively defined by summary statistics of an auditory model (McDermott & Simoncelli 2011). How and where in the auditory system are summary statistics represented and the neural codes that potentially contribute towards their perception, however, are largely unknown. Using high-density multi-channel recordings from the auditory midbrain of unanesthetized rabbits and complementary perceptual studies on human listeners, I will first describe neural and perceptual strategies for encoding and perceiving auditory textures. I will demonstrate how distinct statistics of sounds, including the sound spectrum and high-order statistics related to the temporal and spectral correlation structure of sounds, contribute to texture perception and are reflected in neural activity. Using decoding methods I will then demonstrate how various low and high-order neural response statistics can differentially contribute towards a variety of auditory tasks including texture recognition, discrimination, and categorization. Finally, I will show examples from our recent studies on how high-order sound statistics and accompanying neural activity underlie difficulties for recognizing speech in background noise.

Not all individuals are equally competent at recognizing the faces they interact with. Revealing how the brains of different individuals support variations in this ability is a crucial step to develop an understanding of real-world human visual behaviour. In this talk, I will present findings from a large high-density EEG dataset (>100k trials of participants processing various stimulus categories) and computational approaches which aimed to characterise the brain representations behind real-world proficiency of “super-recognizers”—individuals at the top of face recognition ability spectrum. Using decoding analysis of time-resolved EEG patterns, we predicted with high precision the trial-by-trial activity of super-recognizers participants, and showed that evidence for face recognition ability variations is disseminated along early, intermediate and late brain processing steps. Computational modeling of the underlying brain activity uncovered two representational signatures supporting higher face recognition ability—i) mid-level visual & ii) semantic computations. Both components were dissociable in brain processing-time (the first around the N170, the last around the P600) and levels of computations (the first emerging from mid-level layers of visual Convolutional Neural Networks, the last from a semantic model characterising sentence descriptions of images). I will conclude by presenting ongoing analyses from a well-known case of acquired prosopagnosia (PS) using similar computational modeling of high-density EEG activity.

The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.

To date, neuroimaging research has had a limited focus on non-social features of autism. As a result, neurobiological explanations for atypical sensory perception in autism are lacking. To address this, we quantitively condensed findings from the non-social autism fMRI literature in line with the current best practices for neuroimaging meta-analyses. Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), we conducted a series of robust meta-analyses across 83 experiments from 52 fMRI studies investigating differences between autistic (n = 891) and typical (n = 967) participants. We found that typical controls, compared to autistic people, show greater activity in the prefrontal cortex (BA9, BA10) during perception tasks. More refined analyses revealed that, when compared to typical controls, autistic people show greater recruitment of the extrastriate V2 cortex (BA18) during visual processing. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of current theories of autistic perception, and highlight some of the challenges of cognitive neuroscience research in autism.

It seems we see the world in full detail. However, the eye is not a camera nor is the brain a computer. Incredible metabolic constraints render us unable to encode more than a fraction of information available in each glance. Instead, our illusion of stable and complete perception is accomplished by parsimonious representation relying on natural order inherent in the surrounding environment. I will begin by discussing previous behavioral work from our lab demonstrating one such strategy by which the visual system represents average properties of Gestalt-grouped sets of individual objects, warping individual object representations toward the Gestalt-defined mean. I will then discuss on-going work using a behavioral index of averaging Gestalt-grouped information established in our previous work in conjunction with an ERP-index of VSTM capacity (the CDA) to measure whether the Gestalt-grouping and perceptual averaging strategy acts to boost memory capacity above the classic “four-item” limit. Finally, I will outline our pre-registered study to determine whether this perceptual strategy is indeed engaged in a “smart” manner under normal circumstances, or compromises fidelity for capacity by perceptually-averaging in trials with only four items that could otherwise be individually represented.

The eyes send a continuous stream of about two million nerve fibers to the brain, but only a fraction of this information is stored as visual memories. This talk will detail three neurocomputational models that attempt an understanding how the visual system makes on-the-fly decisions about how to encode that information. First, the STST family of models (Bowman & Wyble 2007; Wyble, Potter, Bowman & Nieuwenstein 2011) proposes mechanisms for temporal segmentation of continuous input. The conclusion of this work is that the visual system has mechanisms for rapidly creating brief episodes of attention that highlight important moments in time, and also separates each episode from temporally adjacent neighbors to benefit learning. Next, the RAGNAROC model (Wyble et al. 2019) describes a decision process for determining the spatial focus (or foci) of attention in a spatiotopic field and the neural mechanisms that provide enhancement of targets and suppression of highly distracting information. This work highlights the importance of integrating behavioral and electrophysiological data to provide empirical constraints on a neurally plausible model of spatial attention. The model also highlights how a neural circuit can make decisions in a continuous space, rather than among discrete alternatives. Finally, the binding pool (Swan & Wyble 2014; Hedayati, O’Donnell, Wyble in Prep) provides a mechanism for selectively encoding specific attributes (i.e. color, shape, category) of a visual object to be stored in a consolidated memory representation. The binding pool is akin to a holographic memory system that layers representations of select latent representations corresponding to different attributes of a given object. Moreover, it can bind features into distinct objects by linking them to token placeholders. Future work looks toward combining these models into a coherent framework for understanding the full measure of on-the-fly attentional mechanisms and how they improve learning.