Cognitive Psychology seminars

Traditional work in the study of human reward-based learning involves designing an experimental task---often inspired by Reinforcement Learning (RL) theory---and fits a small set of computational models---often inspired by RL algorithms---to that dataset. For example, researchers often model human behavior on bandit tasks using variants of Q-learning. While this approach has been highly productive, leading to landmark discoveries such as the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis, it also has limitations. This talk focuses on the lack of generalizability of such models: Even if they closely fit behavior on the original task, models derived from the one-task-one-model paradigm usually predict behavior on other tasks quite poorly. I argue that this lack of generalizability is a fundamental problem for the cognitive sciences: we intuitively expect our models to be robust to superficial task differences, such as variations in the number of choice options, reward probabilities, or the exact kind of non-stationarity. I will propose potential solutions to this problem along two dimensions: the behavioral dataset and the computational model. Regarding computational models, I will introduce work in which we moved beyond the limitations of hand-crafted one-off models by employing flexible, data-driven methods. These methods allowed us to compare classes of models instead of individual model instances, allowing us to cover the space of possible models more exhaustively, and innovate cognitive mechanisms very efficiently. For the behavioral dataset, we move from using single learning tasks to a comprehensive task space that encompasses most existing paradigms in the literature, while closing the gaps between them in a near-continuous fashion. Our results suggest that more general models in conjunction with broader datasets can pave the road toward increasingly general models of human reward-based learning and decision making, and a persistent departure from many aspects of RL theory. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2026-05-20. Recording duration: 00:51:19.

Reward expectations – one’s prediction about the likelihood of future outcomes - play a central role in shaping the satisfaction derived from those outcomes. Most existing research treats expectations as static, assuming they remain fixed in time. However, real-life expectations are often dynamic, fluctuating as new information becomes available. For example, during a soccer game, your expectations of seeing your team winning will likely rise and fall as the game unfolds. In the main part of this talk, I will present a series of studies demonstrating that human expectations can be tracked at sub-second timescales. Using slot machines as a case study, we leverage the continuous deceleration of the reels to elicit moment-by-moment fluctuations in rewardexpectations. To capture these dynamics, we take complementary approaches: we use the high temporal resolution of electroencephalography (EEG) to track neural signatures of evolving expectations, and we develop a novel behavioral paradigm (“Slot or Not”) designed to measure changes in expectations via betting behavior. Across four studies, we show that expectations fluctuate continuously and can be tracked both behaviorally and neurally. Extending these findings, a subsequent intracranial study shows that the human orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encodes the moment-by-moment changes of reward expectations. In the second part of this talk, I will return to the relationship between expectations andsatisfaction. If expectations shape satisfaction, and if they are best conceptualized as dynamic trajectories rather than static quantities, a key question arises: does the trajectory leading up to an outcome influence how that outcome is evaluated? I will outline a new research direction aimed at formalizing this relationship using computational modeling. This is ongoing work, and I welcome feedback on how best to formalize these ideas. Finally, I will discuss potential extensions of this framework to psychopathology, asking whether alterations in dynamic expectations may characterize conditions such as Major Depressive Disorder and Gambling disorder. Together, this work introduces a new framework for studying expectations as dynamic processes, offering a richer understanding Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2026-04-29. Recording duration: 00:42:25.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

Executive control processes and flexible behaviors rely on the integrity of, and dynamic interactions between, large-scale functional brain networks. The right insular cortex is a critical component of a salience/midcingulo-insular network that is thought to mediate interactions between brain networks involved in externally oriented (central executive/lateral frontoparietal network) and internally oriented (default mode/medial frontoparietal network) processes. How these brain systems reconfigure with development is a critical question for cognitive neuroscience, with implications for neurodevelopmental pathologies affecting brain connectivity. I will describe studies examining how brain network dynamics support flexible behaviors in typical and atypical development, presenting evidence suggesting a unique role for the dorsal anterior insular from studies of meta-analytic connectivity modeling, dynamic functional connectivity, and structural connectivity. These findings from adults, typically developing children, and children with autism suggest that structural and functional maturation of insular pathways is a critical component of the process by which human brain networks mature to support complex, flexible cognitive processes throughout the lifespan.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

The eyes send a continuous stream of about two million nerve fibers to the brain, but only a fraction of this information is stored as visual memories. This talk will detail three neurocomputational models that attempt an understanding how the visual system makes on-the-fly decisions about how to encode that information. First, the STST family of models (Bowman & Wyble 2007; Wyble, Potter, Bowman & Nieuwenstein 2011) proposes mechanisms for temporal segmentation of continuous input. The conclusion of this work is that the visual system has mechanisms for rapidly creating brief episodes of attention that highlight important moments in time, and also separates each episode from temporally adjacent neighbors to benefit learning. Next, the RAGNAROC model (Wyble et al. 2019) describes a decision process for determining the spatial focus (or foci) of attention in a spatiotopic field and the neural mechanisms that provide enhancement of targets and suppression of highly distracting information. This work highlights the importance of integrating behavioral and electrophysiological data to provide empirical constraints on a neurally plausible model of spatial attention. The model also highlights how a neural circuit can make decisions in a continuous space, rather than among discrete alternatives. Finally, the binding pool (Swan & Wyble 2014; Hedayati, O’Donnell, Wyble in Prep) provides a mechanism for selectively encoding specific attributes (i.e. color, shape, category) of a visual object to be stored in a consolidated memory representation. The binding pool is akin to a holographic memory system that layers representations of select latent representations corresponding to different attributes of a given object. Moreover, it can bind features into distinct objects by linking them to token placeholders. Future work looks toward combining these models into a coherent framework for understanding the full measure of on-the-fly attentional mechanisms and how they improve learning.

To organize various experiences in a coherent mental representation, we need to properly estimate the duration and temporal order of different events. Yet, our perception of time is noisy and vulnerable to various illusions. Studying these illusions can elucidate the mechanism by which the brain perceives time. In this talk, I will review a few studies on how the brain perceives duration of events and the temporal order between self-generated motion and sensory feedback. Combined with computational models at different levels, these experiments illustrated that the brain incorporates the prior knowledge of the statistical distribution of the duration of stimuli and the decay of memory when estimating duration of an individual event, and adjusts its perception of temporal order to changes in the statistics of the environment.

Humans continuously need to learn to make good choices – be it using a new video-conferencing set up, figuring out what questions to ask to successfully secure a reliable babysitter, or just selecting which location in a house is least likely to be interrupted by toddlers during work calls. However, the goals we seek to attain – such as using zoom successfully – are often vaguely defined and previously unexperienced, and in that sense cannot be known by us as being rewarding. We hypothesized that learning to make good choices in such situations nevertheless leverages reinforcement learning processes, and that executive functions in general, and working memory in particular, play a crucial role in defining the reward function for arbitrary outcomes in such a way that they become reinforcing. I will show results from a novel behavioral protocol, as well as preliminary computational and imaging evidence supporting our hypothesis.

In many ways, cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to use physiological observation to clarify the mechanisms that shape behavior. Over the past 25 years, fMRI has provided a system-wide and yet somewhat spatially precise view of the response in human cortex evoked by a wide variety of stimuli and task contexts. The current talk focuses on the other direction of inference; the implications of this observed functional organization for behavior. To begin, we must interrogate the methodological and empirical frameworks underlying our derivation of this organization, partially by exploring its relationship to and predictability from gross neuroanatomy. Next, across a series of studies, the implications of two properties of functional organization for behavior will be explored: 1) the co-localization of visual working memory and perceptual processing and 2) implicit learning in the context of distributed responses. In sum, these results highlight the limitations of our current approach and hint at a new general mechanism for explaining observed behavior in context with the neural substrate.

Over the past decade, the domain of face identity processing has seen a surging interest in inter-individual differences, with a focus on individuals with superior skills, so-called Super-Recognizers (SRs; Ramon et al., 2019; Russell et al., 2009). Their study can provide valuable insights into brain-behavior relationships and advance our understanding of neural functioning. Despite a decade of research, and similarly to the field of developmental prosopagnosia, a consensus on diagnostic criteria for SR identification is lacking. Consequently, SRs are currently identified either inconsistently, via suboptimal individual tests, or via undocumented collections of tests. This state of the field has two major implications. Firstly, our scientific understanding of SRs will remain at best limited. Secondly, the needs of government agencies interested in deploying SRs for real-life identity verification (e.g., policing) are unlikely to be met. To counteract these issues, I suggest the following action points. Firstly, based on our and others’ work suggesting novel and challenging tests of face cognition (Bobak et al., 2019; Fysh et al., in press; Stacchi et al., 2019), and my collaborations with international security agencies, I recommend novel diagnostic criteria for SR identification. These are currently being used to screen the Berlin State Police’s >25K employees before identifying SRs via bespoke testing procedures we have collaboratively developed over the past years. Secondly, I introduce a cohort of SRs identified using these criteria, which is being studied in-depth using behavioral methods, psychophysics, eye-tracking, and neuroimaging. Finally, I suggest data acquired for these individuals should be curated to develop and share best practices with researchers and practitioners, and to gain an accurate and transparent description of SR cases to exploit their informative value.

Understanding and remembering realistic experiences in our everyday lives requires activating many kinds of structured knowledge about the world, including spatial maps, temporal event scripts, and semantic relationships. My recent projects have explored the ways in which we build up this schematic knowledge (during a single experiment and across developmental timescales) and can strategically deploy them to construct event representations that we can store in memory or use to make predictions. I will describe my lab's ongoing work developing new experimental and analysis techniques for conducting functional MRI experiments using narratives, movies, poetry, virtual reality, and "memory experts" to study complex naturalistic schemas.