Cognitive Psychology seminars

The challenges of problem solving do not exclusively lie in how to perform heuristic search, but they begin with how we understand a given task: How to cognitively represent the task domain and its components can determine how quickly someone is able to progress towards a solution, whether advanced strategies can be discovered, or even whether a solution is found at all. While this challenge of constructing and changing representations has been acknowledged early on in problem solving research, for the most part it has been sidestepped by focussing on simple, well-defined problems whose representation is almost fully determined by the task instructions. Thus, the established theory of problem solving as heuristic search in problem spaces has little to say on this. In this talk, I will present a study designed to explore this issue, by virtue of finding and refining an adequate problem representation being its main challenge. In this exploratory case study, it was investigated how pairs of participants acquaint themselves with a complex spatial transformation task in the domain of iterated mental paper folding over the course of several days. Participants have to understand the geometry of edges which occurs when repeatedly mentally folding a sheet of paper in alternating directions without the use of external aids. Faced with the difficulty of handling increasingly complex folds in light of limited cognitive capacity, participants are forced to look for ways in which to represent folds more efficiently. In a qualitative analysis of video recordings of the participants' behaviour, the development of their conceptualisation of the task domain was traced over the course of the study, focussing especially on their use of gesture and the spontaneous occurrence and use of metaphors in the construction of new representations. Based on these observations, I will conclude the talk with several theoretical speculations regarding the roles of metaphor and cognitive capacity in representational change.

Magnitude estimation and stimulus discrimination tasks are affected by perceptual biases that cause the stimulus parameter to be perceived as shifted toward the mean of its distribution. These biases have been extensively studied in psychophysics and, more recently and to a lesser extent, with neural activity recordings. New computational techniques allow us to train spiking recurrent neural networks on the tasks used in the experiments. This provides us with another valuable tool with which to investigate the network mechanisms responsible for the biases and how behavior could be modeled. As an example, in this talk I will consider networks trained to discriminate the durations of temporal intervals. The trained networks presented the contraction bias, even though they were trained with a stimulus sequence without temporal correlations. The neural activity during the delay period carried information about the stimuli of the current trial and previous trials, this being one of the mechanisms that originated the contraction bias. The population activity described trajectories in a low-dimensional space and their relative locations depended on the prior distribution. The results can be modeled as an ideal observer that during the delay period sees a combination of the current and the previous stimuli. Finally, I will describe how the neural trajectories in state space encode an estimate of the interval duration. The approach could be applied to other cognitive tasks.

Learning does not occur in isolation. From parent-child interactions to formal classroom environments, humans explore, learn, and communicate in rich, diverse social contexts. Rather than simply observing and copying their conspecifics, humans engage in a range of epistemic practices that actively recruit those around them. What makes human social learning so distinctive, powerful, and smart? In this talk, I will present a series of studies that reveal the remarkably sophisticated inferential abilities that young children show not only in how they learn from others but also in how they help others learn. Children interact with others as learners and as teachers to learn and communicate about the world, about others, and even about the self. The results collectively paint a picture of human social learning that is far more than copying and imitation: It is active, bidirectional, and cooperative. I will end by discussing ongoing work that extends this picture beyond what we typically call “social learning”, with implications for building better machines that learn from and interact with humans.

Children need inference in order to learn the meanings of words. They must infer the referent from the situation in which a target word is said. Furthermore, to be able to use the word in other situations, they also need to infer what other referents the word can be generalized to. As verbs refer to relations between arguments, verb learning requires relational analogical inference, something which is challenging to young children. To overcome this difficulty, young children recruit a diverse range of cues in their inference of verb meanings, including, but not limited to, syntactic cues and social and pragmatic cues as well as statistical cues. They also utilize perceptual similarity (object similarity) in progressive alignment to extract relational verb meanings and further to gain insights about relational verb meanings. However, just having a list of these cues is not useful: the cues must be selected, combined, and coordinated to produce the optimal interpretation in a particular context. This process involves abductive reasoning, similar to what scientists do to form hypotheses from a range of facts or evidence. In this talk, I discuss how children use a chain of inferences to learn meanings of verbs. I consider not only the process of analogical mapping and progressive alignment, but also how children use abductive inference to find the source of analogy and gain insights into the general principles underlying verb learning. I also present recent findings from my laboratory that show that prelinguistic human infants use a rudimentary form of abductive reasoning, which enables the first step of word learning.

n the ‘orthodox’ view, cognition has been seen as manipulation of symbolic, mental representations, separate from the body. This dualist Cartesian approach characterised much of twentieth-century thought and is still taken for granted by many people today. Language, too, has for a long time been treated across scientific domains as a system operating largely independently from perception, action, and the body (articulatory-perceptual organs notwithstanding). This could lead one into believing that to emulate linguistic behaviour, it would suffice to develop ‘software’ operating on abstract representations that would work on any computational machine. Yet the brain is not the sole problem-solving resource we have at our disposal. The disembodied picture is inaccurate for numerous reasons, which will be presented addressing the issue of the indissoluble link between cognition, language, body, and environment in understanding and learning. The talk will conclude with implications and suggestions for pedagogy, relevant for disciplines as diverse as instruction in language, mathematics, and sports.

Perception and action are biased by our recent experiences. Even when a sequence of stimuli are randomly presented, responses are sometimes attracted toward the past. The mechanism of such bias, recently termed serial dependence, is still under investigation. Currently, there is mixed evidence indicating that such bias could be either from a sensory and perceptual origin or occurring only at decisional stages. In this talk, I will present recent findings from our group showing that biases are decreased when disrupting the memory trace in a premotor region in a simple visuomotor task. In addition, we have shown that this bias is stable over periods of up to 8 s. At the end, I will show ongoing analysis of a recent experiment and argue that serial dependence may rely on distributed memory representations of stimuli and task relevant features.

Language production is a form of behavior and as such involves executive control and the prefrontal function. The cognitive architecture of prefrontal executive function thus certainly plays an important role in shaping language production. In this talk, I will review the main features of the prefrontal executive function we have uncovered during the last two decades and I will discuss how these features may help understanding language production.

Analogical reasoning is one of the most complex cognitive functions in humans that allows abstract thinking, high-level reasoning, and learning. Based on analogical reasoning, one can extract an abstract and general concept (i.e., an analogy schema) from a familiar situation and apply it to a new context or domain (i.e., analogy transfer). These processes allow us to solve problems we never encountered before and generate new ideas. However, the place of analogy transfer in problem solving mechanisms is unclear. This presentation will describe several experiments with three main findings. First, we show how analogy transfer facilitates problem-solving, replicating existing empirical data largely based on the radiation/fortress problems with four new riddles. Second, we propose a new experimental task that allows us to quantify analogy transfer. Finally, using science network methodology, we show how restructuring the mental representation of a problem can predict successful solving of an analogous problem. These results shed new light on the cognitive mechanism underlying solution transfer by analogy and provide a new tool to quantify individual abilities.

Studies reported the effects of different types and different levels of abstraction of analogical stimuli on designers. However, specific, single visual analogical stimuli on the effects of designers have not been reported. We define this type of stimuli as specific analogical stimuli. We used the extended linkography method to analyze the facilitating and limiting effects of specific analogical stimuli and free association analogical stimuli (nonspecific analogical stimuli) on the students' creativity at different design levels. Through an empirical study, we explored the differences in the effects of specific analogy stimuli on the students at different design levels. It clarifies the use of analogical stimuli in design and the teaching of analogical design methods in design education.

Analogical reasoning is related to everyday learning and scholastic learning and is a robust predictor of g. Therefore, children's ability to reason by analogy is often measured in a school context to gain insight into children's cognitive and intellectual functioning. Often, the ability to reason by analogy is measured by means of conventional, static instruments. Static tests are criticised by researchers and practitioners to provide an overview of what individuals have learned in the past and for this reason are assumed not to tap into the potential for learning, based on Vygotsky's zone of proximal development. This seminar will focus on children's potential for reasoning by analogy, as measured by means of a dynamic test, which has a test-training-test design. In so doing, the potential relationship between dynamic test outcomes and executive functioning will be explored.

Abstracts: https://www.sites.google.com/site/analogylist/cross-cultural-symposium

Executive control processes and flexible behaviors rely on the integrity of, and dynamic interactions between, large-scale functional brain networks. The right insular cortex is a critical component of a salience/midcingulo-insular network that is thought to mediate interactions between brain networks involved in externally oriented (central executive/lateral frontoparietal network) and internally oriented (default mode/medial frontoparietal network) processes. How these brain systems reconfigure with development is a critical question for cognitive neuroscience, with implications for neurodevelopmental pathologies affecting brain connectivity. I will describe studies examining how brain network dynamics support flexible behaviors in typical and atypical development, presenting evidence suggesting a unique role for the dorsal anterior insular from studies of meta-analytic connectivity modeling, dynamic functional connectivity, and structural connectivity. These findings from adults, typically developing children, and children with autism suggest that structural and functional maturation of insular pathways is a critical component of the process by which human brain networks mature to support complex, flexible cognitive processes throughout the lifespan.

Playing action video games involves both explicit (conscious) and implicit (non-conscious) expectations of timed events, such as the appearance of foes. While studies revealed that explicit attention skills are improved in action video game players (VGPs), their implicit skills remained untested. To this end, we investigated explicit and implicit temporal processing in VGPs and non-VGPs (control participants). In our variable foreperiod task, participants were immersed in a virtual reality and instructed to respond to a visual target appearing at variable delays after a cue. I will present behavioral, oculomotor and EEG data and discuss possible markers of the implicit passage of time and explicit temporal attention processing. All evidence indicates that VGPs have enhanced implicit skills to track the passage of time, which does not require conscious attention. Thus, action video game play may improve a temporal processing found altered in psychopathologies, such as schizophrenia. Could digital (game-based) interventions help remediate temporal processing deficits in psychiatric populations?