Psychology seminars

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

The ‘Hunt the Sex Difference’ agenda has informed brain research for decades, if not centuries. This talk aims to demonstrate how a fixed belief in differences between ‘male’ and ‘female’ brains can narrow and even distort the research process. This can include the questions that are asked, the methodology selected and the analytical pipeline. It can also powerfully inform the interpretation of results and the ‘spin’ used in the public communication of such research.

Progress in psychology has been frustrated by challenges concerning replicability, generalizability, strategy selection, inferential reproducibility, and computational reproducibility. Although often discussed separately, I argue that these five challenges share a common cause: insufficient investment of resources into the typical psychology study. I further suggest that big team science can help address these challenges by allowing researchers to pool their resources to efficiently and drastically increase the amount of resources available for a single study. However, the current incentives, infrastructure, and institutions in academic science have all developed under the assumption that science is conducted by solo Principal Investigators and their dependent trainees. These barriers must be overcome if big team science is to be sustainable. Big team science likely also carries unique risks, such as the potential for big team science institutions to monopolize power, become overly conservative, make mistakes at a grand scale, or fail entirely due to mismanagement and a lack of financial sustainability. I illustrate the promise, barriers, and risks of big team science with the experiences of the Psychological Science Accelerator, a global research network of over 1400 members from 70+ countries.

The COINTOB (conditional intention and integration to bound) model provides a heuristic framework of processes in Libet-style experiments. The model is based on three assumptions. First, brain activation preceding conscious intentions in Libet-style experiments does not reflect an unconscious decision but rather the unfolding of a decision process. Second, the time of conscious decision (W) reflects the moment in time when the decision boundary is crossed. This interpretation of W is consistent with our apparent intuition that we decide in the moment we experience the conscious intention to act. Third, the decision process is configured by conscious intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment based on the experimental instruction. Brass and Mele discuss the model, conceptual background for it, and the model’s bearing on free will.

What do other people really think of you? In this talk, I highlight the unique perspective that other people have on the most consequential aspects of our personalities—how we treat others, our best and worst qualities, and our moral character. First, I compare how people thought they behaved with how they actually behaved in everyday life (based on observer ratings of unobtrusive audio recordings; 217 people, 2,519 observations). I show that when people think they are being kind (vs. rude), others do not necessarily agree. This suggests that people may have blind spots about how well they are treating others in the moment. Next, I compare what 463 people thought their own best and worst traits were with what their friends thought about them. The results reveal that friends are more likely to point out flaws in the prosocial and moral domains (e.g., “inconsiderate”, “selfish”, “manipulative”) than are people themselves. Does this imply that others might want us to be more moral? To find out, I compare what targets (N = 800) want to change about their own personalities with what their close others (N = 958) want to change about them. The results show that people don’t particularly want to be more moral, and their close others don’t want them to be more moral, either. I conclude with future directions on honest feedback as a pathway to self-insight and, ultimately, self-improvement.

Concerns about the impact of social media use on adolescent well-being and mental health are common. While the amount of research in this area has increased rapidly over the last 5 years, most outputs are still marred by a multitude of limitations. These shortcomings have left our understanding of social media effects severely limited, holding back both scientific discovery and policy interventions. This talk discusses how developmental, cognitive and neuroscientific approaches might provide a new and improved way of studying social media effects. It will detail new studies in support of this idea, and raise potential avenues for collaborative work across the Cambridge Neuroscience community. As the digital world now (re)shapes what it means for us to live, communicate and develop, only an interdisciplinary approach will allow us to truly understand its impacts.

Join us for a conversation on the science of uncertainty, mind wandering and creativity!

Join us for a conversation on the science of uncertainty, mind wandering and creativity!

Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable deaths and illnesses in the United States and globally. Sexual, racial, ethnic minorities, young adults, and populations from rural areas and lower socioeconomic positions are disproportionately impacted by the health harms of tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke. In this talk, Andy Tan, Associate Professor at the Annenberg School for Communication, will provide an overview of integrating communication science to address inequalities in health information exposure, message processing, and behavioral effects associated with pro- and anti-tobacco communications among vulnerable populations. He will present findings from recent work including examining inequities in tobacco advertising exposure among young adult sexual minorities, experiences of smoking risk and protective factors among transgender and gender expansive adults, and development of a culturally responsive communication intervention to increase resilience against tobacco marketing influences and reduce smoking among young adult LGB women.

Face matching tests have traditionally been developed to assess human face perception in the neurotypical range, but methods that underlie their development often make it difficult for these measures to be applied in atypical populations (developmental prosopagnosics, super recognizers) due to unadjusted difficulty. We have recently presented the development of the Oxford Face Matching Test, a measure that bases individual item-difficulty on algorithmically derived similarity of presented stimuli. The measure seems useful as it can be given online or in-laboratory, has good discriminability and high test-retest reliability in the neurotypical groups. In addition, it has good validity in separating atypical groups at either of the spectrum ends. In this talk, I examine the stability of the OFMT and other traditionally used measures in atypical groups. On top of the theoretical significance of determining whether reliability of tests is equivalent in atypical population, this is an important question because of the practical concerns of retesting the same participants across different lab groups. Theoretical and practical implications for further test development and data sharing are discussed.

According to the concreteness fading approach, instruction should start with concrete representations and progress stepwise to representations that are more idealized. Various researchers have suggested that concreteness fading is a broadly applicable instructional approach. In this talk, we conceptually analyze examples of concreteness fading in mathematics and various science domains. In this analysis, we draw on theories of analogical and relational reasoning and on the literature about learning with multiple representations. Furthermore, we report on an experimental study in which we employed concreteness fading in advanced physics education. The results of the conceptual analysis and the experimental study indicate that concreteness fading may not be as generalizable as has been suggested. The reasons for this limited generalizability are twofold. First, the types of representations and the relations between them differ across different domains. Second, the instructional goals between domains and the subsequent roles of the representations vary.

My research focuses, broadly speaking, on how emotions impact decision making. Specifically, I am interested in affective biases, a phenomenon known to be important in depression. Using a rodent decision-making task, combined with computational modelling I have investigated how different antidepressant and pro-depressant manipulations that are known to alter mood in humans alter judgement bias, and provided insight into the decision processes that underlie these behaviours. I will also highlight how the combination of behaviour and modelling can provide a truly translation approach, enabling comparison and interpretation of the same cognitive processes between animal and human research.

The behavioural and emotional profiles underlying adolescent self-harm, and its developmental risk factors, are relatively unknown. The authors of this paper aimed to identify sub-groups of young people who self-harm (YPSH) and longitudinal predictors leading to self-harm using the Millennium Cohort Study. (Pre-print: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.07.10.20150789v1)

In many societal problems, individuals exhibit a conflict between keeping resources (e.g., money, time or attention) to themselves or sharing them with another individual or group. The reasons motivating decisions in favor of others welfare can thereby vary from purely altruistic to completely strategic. Be it the stranger making an effort returning a lost valet to its rightful owner or a co-worker pitching in her fair share in a joint project. Actions like that create an environment that makes living together a pleasant experience. Hence, understanding how decisions determining the welfare of oneself and others are made is important for facilitating this behavior by building institutions that maximize the rate of cooperation in a society. To shed new light on such decision making processes I will present recent evidence from a set of process tracing experiments utilizing eye-tracking and economic games. Experiments will focus on the role of social preferences in the choice construction process and will identify mechanisms (i.e., search and processing depth, information weighting, and ignorance) through which they guide choice behavior. I will in particular focus on the differences and commonalitiesbetween strategic and altruistic decisions. Specifically, investigating to which extent people direct attention towards certain components of the decision situation in a context-dependent manner.

Mindsets are core assumptions about the nature and workings of things in the world that orient us to a particular set of attributions, expectations, and goals. Our study of mindsets is, in part, inspired by research on the placebo effect, a robust demonstration of the ability of mindsets, conscious or subconscious, to elicit physiological changes in the body. This talk will explore the role of mindsets in three stages of chronic disease progression: genetic predisposition, behavioral prevention, and clinical treatment. I will discuss the mechanisms through which mindsets influence health as well as the myriad ways that mindsets can be more effectively leveraged to motivate healthy behaviors and improve 21st century healthcare.