Topic: agency

Psychologist Martin Seligman continues his discussion of learned helplessness by examining how people interpret discouraging thoughts and develop a sense of agency. The conversation explores ways of recognizing possibilities and building confidence in the capacity to influence future events. This is the second part of the interview, following the episode published on 21 September 2026.

Psychologist Martin Seligman joins Hidden Brain to discuss learned helplessness and why some people act on opportunities while others believe their actions cannot change outcomes. The conversation examines how interpretations of setbacks influence later behaviour and how optimism can help people recover a sense of agency. Seligman is a professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. Hosted by Shankar Vedantam and published by Hidden Brain Media on 21 September 2026, this is the first part of How to Make a Difference. The official episode page provides a public audio player.

Andrea Gambarotto examines agency and intrinsic purpose in biological cognition, drawing on Hegel and contemporary theoretical biology. The conversation connects these ideas to enactivism and asks how living intelligence differs from artificial systems, including language models.

Kathryn Nave discusses how living systems acquire meaning and intelligence through organization, constraints, and active inference. The conversation connects the free-energy principle and organizational closure to questions about brains, cognition, agency, and the boundaries of intelligent life.

Paul Middlebrooks and Johannes Jaeger discuss agency in living systems, relevance realization, consciousness, energy efficiency and why biological organisms differ from artificial agents.

In this talk I will introduce the central notions of the theory of autonomy, as it is being currently developed in biology and cognitive science. The theory of autonomy puts forward the capacity of self-determination of organisms as whole systems, and constitutes thereby an alternative to more reductionist and mechanistic approaches. I will discuss how the theory of autonomy provides a justification for the scientific use of notions as function, norm, agency and teleology, whose epistemological legitimacy is highly debated. I will conclude by describing the difficult challenges that poses the

Self-control is a central aspect of free will. Because self-control is often described in terms of resisting temptations, research on the cognitive neuroscience of free will often focuses on mechanisms of top-down regulation. We argue that this obscures a crucial temporal dimension of free will: now-then regulation. We distinguish now-then regulation from top-down regulation, and situate now-then regulation within a broader account of temporally extended agency. In highlighting this temporal dimension of control, we aim to provide a more nuanced account of how motivation informs action over ti

Voluntary control of behavior requires the ability to dynamically integrate internal states and external evidence to achieve one’s goals. However, neuroscientific studies of intentional action and critical philosophical commentary of that research have taken a rather narrow turn in recent years, focussing on the neural precursors of spontaneous simple actions as potential realizers of intentions. In this session, we show how the debate can benefit from incorporating other types of experimental approaches, focussing on agency in dynamic contexts.

I will offer a broad-brush account of what explains the emergence of agents from a physics perspective, what sorts of conditions have to be in place for them to arise, and the essential features of agents when they are viewed through the lenses of physics. One implication will be a tight link to informational asymmetries associated with the thermodynamic gradient. Another will be a reversal of the direction of explanation from the one that is usually assumed in physical discussions. In in an evolved system, while it is true in some sense that the macroscopic behavior is the way it is because

The stream of consciousness refers to ideas, images, and memories that meander across the mind when we are otherwise unoccupied. The standard view is that these thoughts are associationistic in character and they arise from subpersonal processes—we are for the most part passive observers of them. Drawing on a series of laboratory studies we have conducted as well as Buddhist models of mind, I argue that these views are importantly incorrect. On the alternative view I put forward, these thoughts arise from minimal decision processes, which lie in a grey zone: They are both manifestations of age