BI 246 Andrea Gambarotto: Cognition Requires Agency
Andrea Gambarotto discusses how Hegel's account of the intrinsic purposiveness of organisms contrasts with mechanistic explanation and connects to enactive approaches in cognitive science. The conversation considers autonomy, constraint closure, dialectics, the relations among life, mind, cognition, intelligence and consciousness, and why natural intelligence may differ from engineered artificial intelligence. It also examines whether large language models should be described as minded or cognitive and whether octopuses may be highly intelligent without being conscious.
BI 242 Kathryn Nave: How Life Gets its Meaning and Intelligence
Kathryn Nave discusses how living systems acquire meaning and intelligence through organization, constraints, and active inference. The conversation connects the free-energy principle and organizational closure to questions about brains, cognition, agency, and the boundaries of intelligent life.
BI 241 Johannes Jaeger: Agency and the Cyborg Myth
Paul Middlebrooks and Johannes Jaeger discuss agency in living systems, relevance realization, consciousness, energy efficiency and why biological organisms differ from artificial agents.
On biological and cognitive autonomy
In this talk I will introduce the central notions of the theory of autonomy, as it is being currently developed in biology and cognitive science. The theory of autonomy puts forward the capacity of self-determination of organisms as whole systems, and constitutes thereby an alternative to more reductionist and mechanistic approaches. I will discuss how the theory of autonomy provides a justification for the scientific use of notions as function, norm, agency and teleology, whose epistemological legitimacy is highly debated. I will conclude by describing the difficult challenges that poses the transition from biological to cognitive autonomy.
Free will beyond spontaneous volition: Conscious control processes of inhibition and attention in self-control and free will
Polaris Koi (Philosophy) and Jake Gavenas (Neuroscience) begin the seminar by arguing that agentive control is the key requirement for free will, drawing on folk-philosophy findings to support this claim (Gavenas et al., in prep). They explore how two executive control processes that functionally involve consciousness—inhibition and top-down control of attention—connect self-control and free will.
Free will over time: Distinguishing top-down and now-then control
Self-control is a central aspect of free will. Because self-control is often described in terms of resisting temptations, research on the cognitive neuroscience of free will often focuses on mechanisms of top-down regulation. We argue that this obscures a crucial temporal dimension of free will: now-then regulation. We distinguish now-then regulation from top-down regulation, and situate now-then regulation within a broader account of temporally extended agency. In highlighting this temporal dimension of control, we aim to provide a more nuanced account of how motivation informs action over time, different kinds of regulatory processes underlying the planning and execution of action, and the temporal components of reasons-responsiveness.
Toward Naturalistic Paradigms of Agency
Voluntary control of behavior requires the ability to dynamically integrate internal states and external evidence to achieve one’s goals. However, neuroscientific studies of intentional action and critical philosophical commentary of that research have taken a rather narrow turn in recent years, focussing on the neural precursors of spontaneous simple actions as potential realizers of intentions. In this session, we show how the debate can benefit from incorporating other types of experimental approaches, focussing on agency in dynamic contexts.
Agency through Physical Lenses
I will offer a broad-brush account of what explains the emergence of agents from a physics perspective, what sorts of conditions have to be in place for them to arise, and the essential features of agents when they are viewed through the lenses of physics. One implication will be a tight link to informational asymmetries associated with the thermodynamic gradient. Another will be a reversal of the direction of explanation from the one that is usually assumed in physical discussions. In in an evolved system, while it is true in some sense that the macroscopic behavior is the way it is because of the low-level dynamics, there is another sense in which the low-level dynamics is the way that it is because of the high-level behavior it supports. (More precisely and accurately, the constraints on the configuration of its components that define system as the kind of system it is are the way they are to exploit the low-level dynamics to produce the emergent behavior.) Another will be some insight into what might make human agency special.
Agency in the Stream of Consciousness: Perspectives from Cognitive Science and Buddhist Psychology
The stream of consciousness refers to ideas, images, and memories that meander across the mind when we are otherwise unoccupied. The standard view is that these thoughts are associationistic in character and they arise from subpersonal processes—we are for the most part passive observers of them. Drawing on a series of laboratory studies we have conducted as well as Buddhist models of mind, I argue that these views are importantly incorrect. On the alternative view I put forward, these thoughts arise from minimal decision processes, which lie in a grey zone: They are both manifestations of agency as well as obstacles to it.