Topic: metacognition

Metacognition has long been defined as “cognition about cognition”. One of its aspects is the error monitoring ability, which includes being aware of one’s own errors without external feedback. This ability is mostly investigated in two-alternative forced choice tasks, where the performance has all or none nature in terms of accuracy. The previous literature documents the effect of different influences on the error monitoring ability, such as working memory, feedback and sensorimotor involvement. However, these demonstrations fall short of generalizing to the real life scenarios where the erro

Theories of consciousness are commonly grouped into "first-order" and "higher-order" families. As conventional wisdom has it, many more animals are likely to be conscious if a first-order theory is correct. But two recent developments have put pressure on the first/higher-order distinction. One is the argument (from Shea and Frith) that an effective global workspace mechanism must involve a form of metacognition. The second is Lau's "perceptual reality monitoring" (PRM) theory, a member of the "higher-order" family in which conscious sensory content is not re-represented, only tagged with a te

In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity

As Socrates said that "I know that I know nothing," our mind's function to be aware of our ignorance is essential for abstract and conceptual reasoning. However, the biological mechanism to enable such a hierarchical thought, or meta-cognition, remained unknown. In the first part of the talk, I will demonstrate our studies on the neural mechanism for metacognition on memory in macaque monkeys. In reality, awareness of ignorance is essential not only for the retrospection of the past but also for the exploration of novel unfamiliar environments for the future. However, this proactive feature of

A central issue in reinforcement learning (RL) is the ‘curse-of-dimensionality’, arising when the degrees-of-freedom are much larger than the number of training samples. In such circumstances, the learning process becomes too slow to be plausible. In the brain, higher cognitive functions (such as abstraction or metacognition) may be part of the solution by generating low dimensional representations on which RL can operate. In this talk I will discuss a series of studies in which we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and computational modeling to investigate the neuro-computation

Metacognition encompasses the capability to monitor and control one’s cognitive processes. According to brain imaging, prospective and retrospective second-order judgments recruit widespread portions of prefrontal cortex (PFC), thus leaving the neuronal architecture underlying metacognitive knowledge poorly understood. This pilot experiment makes use of transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) targeting the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) to understand whether this brain region occupies a crucial role in sustaining metacognition. A randomized, double-blind, within-subjects research design was u