Cognition seminars

It is generally agreed upon that qualities of conscious experience instantiate structural properties, usually called relations. They furnish a representation of qualities (or qualia, in fact) in terms of a mathematical space Q (rather than a set), which is crucial to both modelling and measuring of conscious experience." "What is usually disregarded is that “only such structural properties generalize across individuals” (Austen Clark), but that qualities themselves as differentiated by stimulus specifications, behavior or reports do not. We show that this implies that only the part of Q which is invariant with respect to the automorphism group has a well-defined referent, while individual elements do not. This poses a prima facie limitation of any theory or experiment that aims to address individual qualities. We show how mathematical theories of consciousness can overcome this limitation via symmetry groups and group actions, making accessible to science what is properly called private language.

Category theory is a branch of mathematics which have been used to organize various regions of mathematics and related sciences from a radical “relation-first” point of view. Why consciousness researchers should care about category theory? " "There are (at least) 3 reasons:" "1 Everything is relational" "2 Everything is relation" "3 Relation is everything" "In this talk we explain the reasons above more concretely and introduce the ideas to utilize basic concepts in category theory for consciousness studies.

The tight relationship between attention and conscious perception has been extensively researched in the past decades. However, whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particularly when it came to abstract and high-level processing. I will talk about a recent study where we utilized the Stroop paradigm to show that task load gates unconscious semantic processing. In a series of psychophysical experiments, the unconscious word semantics influenced conscious task performance only under the low task load condition, but not the high task load condition. Intriguingly, with enough practice in the high task load condition, the unconscious effect reemerged. These findings suggest a competition of attentional resources between unconscious and conscious processes, challenging the automaticity account of unconscious processing.

In this talk, I shall not argue for any single thesis or theory in the realm of the (un)consciousness and (in)attention. Instead I will discuss specific examples where philosophers and psychologists can have genuine collaborations in this area. Since issues concerning phenomenological overflow is already too familiar for this audience, I will briefly discuss it only, and focus on other issues that have not been overworked. The exact contents are to be determined, but I will perhaps focus on recent controversies over “sustained representation of perspectival shape” (Morales, Bax, and Firestone, 2020, 2021).

I will discuss the mechanisms that determine whether a weak visual stimulus will reach consciousness or not. If the stimulus is simple, early visual cortex acts as a relay station that sends the information to higher visual areas. If the stimulus arrives at a minimal strength, it will be stored in working memory and can be reported. However, during more complex visual perceptions, which for example depend on the segregation of a figure from the background, early visual cortex’ role goes beyond a simply relay. It now acts as a cognitive blackboard and conscious perception depends on it. Our results inspire new approaches to create a visual prosthesis for the blind, by creating a direct interface with the visual brain. I will discuss how high-channel-number interfaces with the visual cortex might be used to restore a rudimentary form of vision in blind individuals.

In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

Tom Froese is Assistant Professor at the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University (OIST), where he heads the Embodied Cognitive Science Unit. He is a cognitive scientist with a background in phenomenological philosophy, human-computer interaction, and complex systems theory. His interdisciplinary research centers on the role of agent-environment interaction in shaping cognition and consciousness, specifically when the interaction process involves sociality and technology. In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.

At the foundation of human conscious experience lie basic embodied experiences of selfhood – experiences of simply ‘being alive’. In this talk, I will make the case that this central feature of human existence is underpinned by predictive regulation of the interior of the body, using the framework of predictive processing, or active inference. I start by showing how conscious experiences of the world around us can be understood in terms of perceptual predictions, drawing on examples from psychophysics and virtual reality. Then, turning the lens inwards, we will see how the experience of being an ‘embodied self’ rests on control-oriented predictive (allostatic) regulation of the body’s physiological condition. This approach implies a deep connection between mind and life, and provides a new way to understand the subjective nature of consciousness as emerging from systems that care intrinsically about their own existence. Contrary to the old doctrine of Descartes, we are conscious because we are beast machines.

Integrated information theory (IIT) takes as its starting point phenomenology, rather than behavioral, functional, or neural correlates of consciousness. The theory characterizes the essential properties of phenomenal existence—which is immediate and indubitable. These are translated into physical properties, expressed operationally as cause-effect power, which must be satisfied by the neural substrate of consciousness. On this basis, the theory can account for clinical and experimental data about the presence and absence of consciousness. Current work aims at accounting for specific qualities of different experiences, such as spatial extendedness and the flow of time. Several implications of IIT have ethical relevance. One is that functional equivalence does not imply phenomenal equivalence—computers may one day be able to do everything we do, but they will not experience anything. Another is that we do have free will in the fundamental, metaphysical sense—we have true alternatives and we, not our neurons, are the true cause of our willed actions.

Over the last fifteen years, Simona Ginsburg and I developed an evolutionary approach for studying basic consciousness, suggesting that the evolution of learning drove the evolutionary transition to from non-conscious to conscious animals. I present the rationale underlying this thesis, which has led to the identification of a capacity that we call the evolutionary transition marker, which, when we find evidence of it, we have evidence that the major evolutionary transition in which we are interested has gone to completion. I then put forward our proposal that the evolutionary marker of basic consciousness is a complex form of associative learning that we call unlimited associative learning (UAL), and that the evolution of this capacity drove the transition to consciousness. I discuss the implications of this thesis for questions pertaining to the neural dynamics that constitute conscious, to its taxonomic distribution and to the ecological context in which it first emerged. I end by pointing to some of the ways in which the relationship between UAL and consciousness can be experimentally tested in humans and in non-human animals.

The study of altered states of consciousness has long had the potential to provide important insight into the nature of consciousness. In recent years there has been a resurgence of research and public interest in atypical or altered states of consciousness. These have focused both on conditions in which consciousness is considered to be impaired due to brain trauma or enhanced in some way through mediation practices or ingestion of psychedelics. The talk will begin with a brief overview of recent scientific approaches to understanding these different types of altered consciousness. The remainder of the talk will focus on lab-based experiments conducted by myself and others looking at the effects of serotoninergic hallucinogens (i.e. psilocybin and LSD) on perceptual and cognitive function. Together this body of research provides important new insights for the scientific study of consciousness and an initial understanding of the neuropharmacological mechanisms underlying conscious experience.

The cognitive neuroscience of conscious perception has seen considerable growth over the past few decades. Confirming an influential hypothesis driven by earlier studies of neuropsychological patients, we have found that the lateral and polar prefrontal cortices play important causal roles in the generation of subjective experiences. However, this basic empirical finding has been hotly contested by researchers with different theoretical commitments, and the differences are at times difficult to resolve. To address the controversies, I suggest one alternative venue may be to look for clinical applications derived from current theories. I outline an example in which we used closed-loop fMRI combined with machine learning to nonconsciously manipulate the physiological responses to threatening stimuli, such as spiders or snakes. A clinical trial involving patients with phobia is currently taking place. I also outline how this theoretical framework may be extended to other diseases. Ultimately, a truly meaningful understanding of the fundamental nature of our mental existence should lead to useful insights for our colleagues on the clinical frontlines. If we use this as a yardstick, whoever loses the esoteric theoretical debates, both science and the patients will always win.

My research uses a range of methods to better understand how the brain’s natural chemicals control complex behaviours, thoughts and perceptions. I also have a particular fascination about the factors that determine the contents of an individual’s conscious experience. In this talk I will present work that sits at the intersection of these two research areas looking at the role of different neurotransmitter systems in driving changes in conscious state. Specifically, I will discuss a series of studies using ambiguous stimuli to explore the neuropharmacological processes that underly alternations in perceptual awareness. By comparing different methods and neurotransmitter systems including: serotonin (psychedelics), noradrenaline (pupillometry) and Glutamate/GABA (Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy MRS) we can start to tease apart the distinct role that different neurotransmitter systems play in coordinating conscious experience across time.

I will discuss the mechanisms that determine whether a weak visual stimulus will reach consciousness or not. If the stimulus is simple, early visual cortex acts as a relay station that sends the information to higher visual areas. If the stimulus arrives at a minimal strength, it will be stored in working memory. However, during more complex visual perceptions, which for example depend on the segregation of a figure from the background, early visual cortex’ role goes beyond a simply relay. It now acts as a cognitive blackboard and conscious perception depends on it. Our results also inspire new approaches to create a visual prosthesis for the blind, by creating a direct interface with the visual cortex. I will discuss how high-channel-number interfaces with the visual cortex might be used to restore a rudimentary form of vision in blind individuals.

The COINTOB (conditional intention and integration to bound) model provides a heuristic framework of processes in Libet-style experiments. The model is based on three assumptions. First, brain activation preceding conscious intentions in Libet-style experiments does not reflect an unconscious decision but rather the unfolding of a decision process. Second, the time of conscious decision (W) reflects the moment in time when the decision boundary is crossed. This interpretation of W is consistent with our apparent intuition that we decide in the moment we experience the conscious intention to act. Third, the decision process is configured by conscious intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment based on the experimental instruction. Brass and Mele discuss the model, conceptual background for it, and the model’s bearing on free will.

Having conscious experience is arguably the most important reason why it matters to us whether we are alive or dead. A powerful paradigm to identify neural correlates of consciousness is binocular rivalry, wherein a constant visual stimulus evokes a varying conscious percept. It has recently been suggested that activity modulations observed during rivalry may represent the act of report rather than the conscious percept itself. Here, we performed single-unit recordings from face patches in macaque inferotemporal (IT) cortex using a novel no-report paradigm in which the animal’s conscious percept was inferred from eye movements. These experiments reveal two new results concerning the neural correlates of consciousness. First, we found that high proportions of IT neurons represented the conscious percept even without active report. Using high-channel recordings, including a new 128-channel Neuropixels-like probe, we were able to decode the conscious percept on single trials. Second, we found that even on single trials, modulation to rivalrous stimuli was weaker than that to unambiguous stimuli, suggesting that cells may encode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus. To test this hypothesis, we varied the identity of the suppressed stimulus during binocular rivalry; we found that indeed, we could decode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus from neural activity. Moreover, the same cells that were strongly modulated by the conscious percept also tended to be strongly modulated by the suppressed stimulus. Together, our findings indicate that (1) IT cortex possesses a true neural correlate of consciousness even in the absence of report, and (2) this correlate consists of a population code wherein single cells multiplex representation of the conscious percept and veridical physical stimulus, rather than a subset of cells perfectly reflecting consciousness.