Cognition seminars

Empathy plays a critical role in social interactions, and many species, including rodents, display evolutionarily conserved behavioral antecedents of empathy. In both humans and rodents, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) encodes information about the affective state of others. However, little is known about which downstream targets of the ACC contribute to empathy behaviors. We optimized a protocol for the social transfer of pain behavior in mice and compared the ACC-dependent neural circuitry responsible for this behavior with the neural circuitry required for the social transfer of two related states: analgesia and fear. We found that a 1-hour social interaction between a bystander mouse and a cagemate experiencing inflammatory pain led to congruent mechanical hyperalgesia in the bystander. This social transfer led to activation of neurons in the ACC and several downstream targets, including the nucleus accumbens (NAc), which was revealed by monosynaptic rabies virus tracing to be directly connected to the ACC. Bidirectional manipulation of activity in ACC-to-NAc inputs influenced the acquisition of socially transferred pain. Further, the social transfer of analgesia also depended upon ACC-NAc inputs. By contrast, the social transfer of fear instead required activity in ACC projections to the basolateral amygdala. This shows that mice rapidly adopt the sensory-affective state of a social partner, regardless of the valance of the information (pain, fear, or pain relief). We find that the ACC generates specific and appropriate empathic behavioral responses through distinct downstream targets. More sophisticated understanding of evolutionarily conserved brain mechanisms of empathy will also expedite the development of new therapies for the empathy-related deficits associated with a broad range of neuropsychiatric disorders.

Across species, humans are uniquely able to acquire deep relational systems of the kind needed for mathematics, science, and human language. Analogical comparison processes are a major contributor to this ability. Analogical comparison engages a structure-mapping process (Gentner, 1983) that fosters learning in at least three ways: first, it highlights common relational systems and thereby promotes abstraction; second, it promotes inferences from known situations to less familiar situations; and, third, it reveals potentially important differences between examples. In short, structure-mapping is a domain-general learning process by which abstract, portable knowledge can arise from experience. It is operative from early infancy on, and is critical to the rapid learning we see in human children. Although structure-mapping processes are present pre-linguistically, their scope is greatly amplified by language. Analogical processes are instrumental in learning relational language, and the reverse is also true: relational language acts to preserve relational abstractions and render them accessible for future learning and reasoning. Although structure-mapping processes are present pre-linguistically, their scope is greatly amplified by language. Analogical processes are instrumental in learning relational language, and the reverse is also true: relational language acts to preserve relational abstractions and render them accessible for future learning and reasoning.

Constraints on control-dependent processing have become a fundamental concept in general theories of cognition that explain human behavior in terms of rational adaptations to these constraints. However, theories miss a rationale for why such constraints would exist in the first place. Recent work suggests that constraints on the allocation of control facilitate flexible task switching at the expense of the stability needed to support goal-directed behavior in face of distraction. We formulate this problem in a dynamical system, in which control signals are represented as attractors and in which constraints on control allocation limit the depth of these attractors. We derive formal expressions of the stability-flexibility tradeoff, showing that constraints on control allocation improve cognitive flexibility but impair cognitive stability. We provide evidence that human participants adapt higher constraints on the allocation of control as the demand for flexibility increases but that participants deviate from optimal constraints. In continuing work, we are investigating how collaborative performance of a group of individuals can benefit from individual differences defined in terms of balance between cognitive stability and flexibility.

The cognitive neuroscience of conscious perception has seen considerable growth over the past few decades. Confirming an influential hypothesis driven by earlier studies of neuropsychological patients, we have found that the lateral and polar prefrontal cortices play important causal roles in the generation of subjective experiences. However, this basic empirical finding has been hotly contested by researchers with different theoretical commitments, and the differences are at times difficult to resolve. To address the controversies, I suggest one alternative venue may be to look for clinical applications derived from current theories. I outline an example in which we used closed-loop fMRI combined with machine learning to nonconsciously manipulate the physiological responses to threatening stimuli, such as spiders or snakes. A clinical trial involving patients with phobia is currently taking place. I also outline how this theoretical framework may be extended to other diseases. Ultimately, a truly meaningful understanding of the fundamental nature of our mental existence should lead to useful insights for our colleagues on the clinical frontlines. If we use this as a yardstick, whoever loses the esoteric theoretical debates, both science and the patients will always win.

Drawing on recent findings from evolutionary anthropology and neuroscience, professor Barton will lead us through the amazing story of the evolution of human cognition. Usingstatistical, phylogenetic analyses that tease apart the variation associated with different neural systems and due to different selection pressures, he will be addressing intriguing questions like ‘Why are there so many neurons in the cerebellum?’, ‘Is the neocortex the ‘intelligent’ bit of the brain?’, and ‘What explains that the recognition by humans of emotional expressions is disrupted by trancranial magnetic stimulation of the somatosensory cortex?’ Could, as professor Barton suggests, the cerebellum -modestly concealed beneath the volumetrically dominating neocortex and largely ignored- turn out to be the Cinderella of the study of brain evolution?

Understanding speech in noisy backgrounds requires selective attention to a particular speaker. Humans excel at this challenging task, while current speech recognition technology still struggles when background noise is loud. The neural mechanisms by which we process speech remain, however, poorly understood, not least due to the complexity of natural speech. Here we describe recent progress obtained through applying machine-learning to neuroimaging data of humans listening to speech in different types of background noise. In particular, we develop statistical models to relate characteristic features of speech such as pitch, amplitude fluctuations and linguistic surprisal to neural measurements. We find neural correlates of speech processing both at the subcortical level, related to the pitch, as well as at the cortical level, related to amplitude fluctuations and linguistic structures. We also show that some of these measures allow to diagnose disorders of consciousness. Our findings may be applied in smart hearing aids that automatically adjust speech processing to assist a user, as well as in the diagnosis of brain disorders.

Over 60 years of research has established that medial temporal lobe structures, including the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, are necessary for the formation of episodic memories (i.e. memories of specific personal events that occur in spatial and temporal context). While prior work to establish the neural mechanisms underlying episodic memory has largely focused on questions related spatial context, recently we have begun to investigate how these brain structures could be involved in encoding aspects of temporal context. In particular, we have focused on how medial entorhinal cortex, a structure well known for its role in spatial memory, may also be involved in encoding interval time. To answer this question we have developed an instrumental paradigm for head-fixed mice that requires both immobile interval timing and locomotion-dependent navigation behavior. By combining this behavioral paradigm with large-scale cellular resolution functional imaging and optogenetic-mediated inactivation, our results suggest that MEC is required for learning of interval timing behavior and that interval timing could be mediated through regular, sequential neural activity of a distinct subpopulation of neurons in MEC that encode elapsed time during periods of immobility (Heys and Dombeck, 2018; Heys et al, 2020; Issa et al., 2020). In this talk, I will discuss these findings and discuss our on-going work to investigate the principles underlying the role of medial temporal lobe structures in timing behavior and episodic memory.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

Team work makes sensory streams work: our senses work together, learn from each other, and stand in for one another, the result of which is perception and understanding. Learned associations between stimuli in different sensory modalities can shape the way we perceive these stimuli (Mcgurk and Macdonald, 1976). During audio-visual associative learning, auditory cortex is thought to underlie multi-modal plasticity in visual cortex (McIntosh et al., 1998; Mishra et al., 2007; Zangenehpour and Zatorre, 2010). However, it is not well understood how processing in visual cortex is altered by an auditory stimulus that is predictive of a visual stimulus and what the mechanisms are that mediate such experience-dependent, audio-visual associations in sensory cortex. Here we describe a neural mechanism by which an auditory input can shape visual representations of behaviorally relevant stimuli through direct interactions between auditory and visual cortices. We show that the association of an auditory stimulus with a visual stimulus in a behaviorally relevant context leads to an experience-dependent suppression of visual responses in primary visual cortex (V1). Auditory cortex axons carry a mixture of auditory and retinotopically-matched visual input to V1, and optogenetic stimulation of these axons selectively suppresses V1 neurons responsive to the associated visual stimulus after, but not before, learning. Our results suggest that cross-modal associations can be stored in long-range cortical connections and that with learning these cross-modal connections function to suppress the responses to predictable input.

I will discuss the mechanisms that determine whether a weak visual stimulus will reach consciousness or not. If the stimulus is simple, early visual cortex acts as a relay station that sends the information to higher visual areas. If the stimulus arrives at a minimal strength, it will be stored in working memory. However, during more complex visual perceptions, which for example depend on the segregation of a figure from the background, early visual cortex’ role goes beyond a simply relay. It now acts as a cognitive blackboard and conscious perception depends on it. Our results also inspire new approaches to create a visual prosthesis for the blind, by creating a direct interface with the visual cortex. I will discuss how high-channel-number interfaces with the visual cortex might be used to restore a rudimentary form of vision in blind individuals.

The COINTOB (conditional intention and integration to bound) model provides a heuristic framework of processes in Libet-style experiments. The model is based on three assumptions. First, brain activation preceding conscious intentions in Libet-style experiments does not reflect an unconscious decision but rather the unfolding of a decision process. Second, the time of conscious decision (W) reflects the moment in time when the decision boundary is crossed. This interpretation of W is consistent with our apparent intuition that we decide in the moment we experience the conscious intention to act. Third, the decision process is configured by conscious intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment based on the experimental instruction. Brass and Mele discuss the model, conceptual background for it, and the model’s bearing on free will.

In many learning and decision scenarios, especially sequential settings like mazes or games, it is easy to state an objective function but difficult to compute it, for instance because this can require enumerating many possible future trajectories. This, in turn, motivates a variety of more tractable approximations which then raise resource-rationality questions about whether and when an efficient agent should invest time or resources in computing decision variables more accurately. Previous work has used a simple all-or-nothing version of this reasoning as a framework to explain many phenomena of automaticity, habits, and compulsion in humans and animals. Here, I present a more finegrained theoretical analysis of deliberation, which attempts to address not just whether to deliberate vs. act, but which of many possible actions and trajectories to consider. Empirically, I first motivate and compare this account to nonlocal representations of spatial trajectories in the rodent place cell system, which are thought to be involved in planning. I also consider its implications, in humans, for variation over time and situations in subjective feelings of mental effort, boredom, and cognitive fatigue. Finally, I present results from a new study using magnetoencephalography in humans to measure subjective consideration of possible trajectories during a sequential learning task, and study its relationship to rational prioritization and to choice behavior.

Regulation of information flow in the brain is critical for many forms of behavior. In the process of sensory based decision-making, decisions about future actions are held in memory until enacted, making them potentially vulnerable to distracting sensory input. Therefore, gating of information flow from sensory to motor areas could protect memory from interference during decision-making, but the underlying network mechanisms are not understood. I will present our recent experimental and modeling work describing how information flow from the sensory cortex can be gated by state-dependent frontal cortex dynamics during decision-making in mice. Our results show that communication between brain regions can be regulated via attractor dynamics, which control the degree of commitment to an action, and reveal a novel mechanism of gating of neural information.

Concerns about the impact of social media use on adolescent well-being and mental health are common. While the amount of research in this area has increased rapidly over the last 5 years, most outputs are still marred by a multitude of limitations. These shortcomings have left our understanding of social media effects severely limited, holding back both scientific discovery and policy interventions. This talk discusses how developmental, cognitive and neuroscientific approaches might provide a new and improved way of studying social media effects. It will detail new studies in support of this idea, and raise potential avenues for collaborative work across the Cambridge Neuroscience community. As the digital world now (re)shapes what it means for us to live, communicate and develop, only an interdisciplinary approach will allow us to truly understand its impacts.