Cognitive Psychology seminars

The seminar will first outline the architecture of the human mind, specifying general and domain-specific mental processes. The place of causal reasoning and its relations with the other processes will be specified. Experimental, psychometric, developmental, and brain-based evidence will be summarized. The main message of the talk is that causal thought involves domain-specific core processes rooted in perception and served by special brain networks which capture interactions between objects. With development, causal reasoning is increasingly associated with a general abstraction system which generates general principles underlying inductive, analogical, and deductive reasoning and also heuristics for specifying causal relations. These associations are discussed in some detail. Possible implications for artificial intelligence and educational implications are also discussed.

Selection is the hallmark of attention: processing improves for attended items but is relatively impaired for unattended items. It is well known that visual spatial attention changes sensory signals and perception in this selective fashion. In the work I will present, we asked whether and how attentional selection happens across time. First, our experiments revealed that voluntary temporal attention (attention to specific points in time) is selective, resulting in perceptual tradeoffs across time. Second, we measured small eye movements called microsaccades and found that directing voluntary temporal attention increases the stability of the eyes in anticipation of an attended stimulus. Third, we developed a computational model of dynamic attention, which proposes specific mechanisms underlying temporal attention and its selectivity. Lastly, I will mention how we are testing predictions of the model with MEG. Altogether, this research shows how precisely timed voluntary attention helps manage inherent limits in visual processing across short time intervals, advancing our understanding of attention as a dynamic process.

When we remember a stimulus we rarely maintain a full fidelity representation of the observed item. Our working memory instead maintains a mixture of the observed feature values and categorical/gist information. I will discuss evidence from computational models supporting a mix of categorical and fine-detail information in working memory. Having established the need for two memory formats in working memory, I will discuss whether categorical and fine-detailed information for a stimulus are represented separately or as a single unified representation. Computational models of these two potential cognitive structures make differing predictions about the pattern of responses in visual working memory recall tests. The present study required participants to remember the orientation of stimuli for later reproduction. The pattern of responses are used to test the competing representational structures and to quantify the relative amount of fine-detailed and categorical information maintained. The effects of set size, encoding time, serial order, and response order on memory precision, categorical information, and guessing rates are also explored. (This is a 60 min talk).

Self-control is a central aspect of free will. Because self-control is often described in terms of resisting temptations, research on the cognitive neuroscience of free will often focuses on mechanisms of top-down regulation. We argue that this obscures a crucial temporal dimension of free will: now-then regulation. We distinguish now-then regulation from top-down regulation, and situate now-then regulation within a broader account of temporally extended agency. In highlighting this temporal dimension of control, we aim to provide a more nuanced account of how motivation informs action over time, different kinds of regulatory processes underlying the planning and execution of action, and the temporal components of reasons-responsiveness.

In decision-making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: (1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, (2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and (3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as eleven alternative models each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants’ data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants’ choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.

The talk will give a tour of Guided Search 6.0 (GS6), the latest evolution of the Guided Search model of visual search. Part 1 describes The Mechanics of Search. Because we cannot recognize more than a few items at a time, selective attention is used to prioritize items for processing. Selective attention to an item allows its features to be bound together into a representation that can be matched to a target template in memory or rejected as a distractor. The binding and recognition of an attended object is modeled as a diffusion process taking > 150 msec/item. Since selection occurs more frequently than that, it follows that multiple items are undergoing recognition at the same time, though asynchronously, making GS6 a hybrid serial and parallel model. If a target is not found, search terminates when an accumulating quitting signal reaches a threshold. Part 2 elaborates on the five sources of Guidance that are combined into a spatial “priority map” to guide the deployment of attention (hence “guided search”). These are (1) top-down and (2) bottom-up feature guidance, (3) prior history (e.g. priming), (4) reward, and (5) scene syntax and semantics. Finally, in Part 3, we will consider the internal representation of what we are searching for; what is often called “the search template”. That search template is really two templates: a guiding template (probably in working memory) and a target template (in long term memory). Put these pieces together and you have GS6.

Many models of attention assume that attentional selection takes place at a specific moment in time which demarcates the critical transition from pre-attentive to attentive processing of sensory input. We argue that this intuitively appealing account is not only inaccurate, but has led to substantial conceptual confusion (to the point where some attention researchers offer to abandon the term ‘attention’ altogether). As an alternative, we offer a “diachronic” framework that describes attentional selectivity as a process that unfolds over time. Key to this view is the concept of attentional episodes, brief periods of intense attentional amplification of sensory representations that regulate access to working memory and response-related processes. We describe how attentional episodes are linked to earlier attentional mechanisms and to recurrent processing at the neural level. We present data showing that multiple sequential events can be involuntarily encoded in working memory when they appear during the same attentional episode, whether they are relevant or not. We also discuss the costs associated with processing multiple events within a single episode. Finally, we argue that breaking down the dichotomy between pre-attentive and attentive (as well as early vs. late selection) offers new solutions to old problems in attention research that have never been resolved. It can provide a unified and conceptually coherent account of the network of cognitive and neural processes that produce the goal-directed selectivity in perceptual processing that is commonly referred to as “attention”.

Smooth pursuit eye movements are among our most intriguing motor behaviors. They are able to keep the line of sight on smoothly moving targets with little or no overt effort or deliberate planning, and they can respond quickly and accurately to changes in the trajectory of motion of targets. Nevertheless, despite these seeming automatic characteristics, pursuit is highly sensitive to high-level factors, such as the choices made about attention, or beliefs about the direction of upcoming motion. Investigators have struggled for decades with the problem of incorporating both high- and low-level processes into a single coherent model. This talk will present an overview of the current state of efforts to incorporate high- and low-level influences, as well as new observations that add to our understanding of both types of influences. These observations (in contrast to much of the literature) focus on the directional properties of pursuit. Studies will be presented that show: (1) the direction of smooth pursuit made to pursue fields of noisy random dots depends on the relative reliability of the sensory signal and the expected motion direction; (2) smooth pursuit shows predictive responses that depend on the interpretation of cues that signal an impending collision; and (3) smooth pursuit during a change in target direction displays kinematic properties consistent with the well-known two-thirds power law. Implications for incorporating high- and low-level factors into the same framework will be discussed.

Episodic memory performance decreases with advancing age. According to theoretical models, such memory decline might be a consequence of age-related reductions in the ability to form distinct neural representations of our past. In this talk, I want to present our new age-comparative fMRI study investigating age-related neural dedifferentiation across different representational levels. By combining univariate analyses and searchlight pattern similarity analyses, we found that older adults show reduced category selective processing in higher visual areas, less specific item representations in occipital regions and less stable item representations. Dedifferentiation on all these representational levels was related to memory performance, with item specificity being the strongest contributor. Overall, our results emphasize that age-related dedifferentiation can be observed across the entire cortical hierarchy which may selectively impair memory performance depending on the memory task.

Did we eat spaghetti for lunch because we saw our colleague eat spaghetti? What drives a risk decision? How can our breakfast impact our decisions throughout the day? Research from different disciplines such as economics, psychology and neuroscience have attempted to investigate the motives and modulators of human decision making. Human decisions can be flexibly modulated by the different experiences we have in our daily lives, at the same time, bodily processes, such as metabolism can also impact economic behavior. These modulations can occur through our social networks, through the impact of our own behavior on the social environment, but also simply by the food we have eaten. Here, I will present a series of recent studies from my lab in which we shed light on the psychological, neural and metabolic motives and modulators of human decision making.

Not all individuals are equally competent at recognizing the faces they interact with. Revealing how the brains of different individuals support variations in this ability is a crucial step to develop an understanding of real-world human visual behaviour. In this talk, I will present findings from a large high-density EEG dataset (>100k trials of participants processing various stimulus categories) and computational approaches which aimed to characterise the brain representations behind real-world proficiency of “super-recognizers”—individuals at the top of face recognition ability spectrum. Using decoding analysis of time-resolved EEG patterns, we predicted with high precision the trial-by-trial activity of super-recognizers participants, and showed that evidence for face recognition ability variations is disseminated along early, intermediate and late brain processing steps. Computational modeling of the underlying brain activity uncovered two representational signatures supporting higher face recognition ability—i) mid-level visual & ii) semantic computations. Both components were dissociable in brain processing-time (the first around the N170, the last around the P600) and levels of computations (the first emerging from mid-level layers of visual Convolutional Neural Networks, the last from a semantic model characterising sentence descriptions of images). I will conclude by presenting ongoing analyses from a well-known case of acquired prosopagnosia (PS) using similar computational modeling of high-density EEG activity.

The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.

In human and non-human animals, conceptual knowledge is partially organized according to low-dimensional geometries that rely on brain structures and computations involved in spatial representations. Recently, two separate lines of research have investigated cognitive maps, that are associated with the hippocampal formation and are similar to world-centered representations of the environment, and image spaces, that are associated with the parietal cortex and are similar to self-centered spatial relationships. I will suggest that cognitive maps and image spaces may be two manifestations of a more general propensity of the mind to create low-dimensional internal models, and may play a role in analogical reasoning and metaphorical thinking. Finally, I will show some data suggesting that the metaphorical relationship between colors and emotions can be accounted for by the structural alignment of low-dimensional conceptual spaces.

Neural correlates of visual working memory have been found in early visual, parietal, and prefrontal regions. These findings have spurred fruitful debate over how and where in the brain memories might be represented. Here, I will present data from multiple experiments to demonstrate how a focus on behavioral requirements can unveil a more comprehensive understanding of the visual working memory system. Specifically, items in working memory must be maintained in a highly robust manner, resilient to interference. At the same time, storage mechanisms must preserve a high degree of flexibility in case of changing behavioral goals. Several examples will be explored in which visual memory representations are shown to undergo transformations, and even shift their cortical locus alongside their coding format based on specifics of the task.

Our research investigates how processes of attention, visual working memory (VWM), and decision-making combine to translate perception into action. Within this framework, the role of VWM is to form stable representations of transient stimulus events that allow them to be identified by a decision process, which we model as a diffusion process. In psychophysical tasks, we find the capacity of VWM is well defined by a sample-size model, which attributes changes in VWM precision with set-size to differences in the number evidence samples recruited to represent stimuli. In the first part of the talk, I review evidence for the sample-size model and highlight the model's strengths: It provides a parameter-free characterization of the set-size effect; it has plausible neural and cognitive interpretations; an attention-weighted version of the model accounts for the power-law of VWM, and it accounts for the selective updating of VWM in multiple-look experiments. In the second part of the talk, I provide a characterization of the theoretical relationship between two-choice and continuous-outcome decision tasks using the circular diffusion model, highlighting their common features. I describe recent work characterizing the joint distributions of decision outcomes and response times in continuous-outcome tasks using the circular diffusion model and show that the model can clearly distinguish variable-precision and simple mixture models of the evidence entering the decision process. The ability to distinguish these kinds of processes is central to current VWM studies.

Several studies have showed that face stimuli elicit extremely fast and involuntary saccadic responses toward them, relative to other categories of visual stimuli. In the talk, I will mainly focus on a quite recent research done in our team that investigated to what extent face stimuli influence the programming and execution of saccades. In this research, two experiments were performed using a saccadic choice task: two images (one with a face, one with a vehicle) were simultaneously displayed in the left and right visual fields of participants who had to execute a saccade toward the image (Experiment 1) or toward a cross added in the center of the image (Experiment 2) containing a target stimulus (a face or a vehicle). As expected participants were faster to execute a saccade toward a face than toward a vehicle and did less errors. We also observed shorter saccades toward vehicle than face targets, even if participants were explicitly asked to perform their saccades toward a specific location (Experiment 2). Further analyses, that I will detailed in the talk, showed that error saccades might be interrupted in mid-fight to initiate a concurrently programmed corrective saccade.

Abstract relations are considered the pinnacle of human cognition, allowing analogical and logical reasoning, and possibly setting humans apart from other animal species. Such relations cannot be represented in a perceptual code but can easily be represented in a propositional language of thought, where relations between objects are represented by abstract discrete symbols. Focusing on the abstract relations same and different, I will show that (1) there is a discontinuity along ontogeny with respect to the representations of abstract relations, but (2) young infants already possess representations of same and different. Finally, (3) I will investigate the format of representation of abstract relations in young infants, arguing that those representations are not discrete, but rather built by juxtaposing abstract representations of entities.

To date, neuroimaging research has had a limited focus on non-social features of autism. As a result, neurobiological explanations for atypical sensory perception in autism are lacking. To address this, we quantitively condensed findings from the non-social autism fMRI literature in line with the current best practices for neuroimaging meta-analyses. Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), we conducted a series of robust meta-analyses across 83 experiments from 52 fMRI studies investigating differences between autistic (n = 891) and typical (n = 967) participants. We found that typical controls, compared to autistic people, show greater activity in the prefrontal cortex (BA9, BA10) during perception tasks. More refined analyses revealed that, when compared to typical controls, autistic people show greater recruitment of the extrastriate V2 cortex (BA18) during visual processing. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of current theories of autistic perception, and highlight some of the challenges of cognitive neuroscience research in autism.

I will begin by describing recent research taking a new, model-based approach to perceptual development. This approach uncovers fundamental changes in information processing underlying the protracted development of perception, action, and decision-making in childhood. For example, integration of multiple sensory estimates via reliability-weighted averaging – widely used by adults to improve perception – is often not seen until surprisingly late into childhood, as assessed by both behaviour and neural representations. This approach forms the basis for a newer question: the scope for the nervous system to deploy useful computations (e.g. reliability-weighted averaging) to optimise perception and action using newly-learned sensory signals provided by technology. Our initial model system is augmenting visual depth perception with devices translating distance into auditory or vibro-tactile signals. This problem has immediate applications to people with partial vision loss, but the broader question concerns our scope to use technology to tune in to any signal not available to our native biological receptors. I will describe initial progress on this problem, and our approach to operationalising what it might mean to adopt a new signal comparably to a native sense. This will include testing for its integration (weighted averaging) alongside the native senses, assessing the level at which this integration happens in the brain, and measuring the degree of ‘automaticity’ with which new signals are used, compared with native perception.