Cognitive Psychology seminars

Many models of attention assume that attentional selection takes place at a specific moment in time which demarcates the critical transition from pre-attentive to attentive processing of sensory input. We argue that this intuitively appealing account is not only inaccurate, but has led to substantial conceptual confusion (to the point where some attention researchers offer to abandon the term ‘attention’ altogether). As an alternative, we offer a “diachronic” framework that describes attentional selectivity as a process that unfolds over time. Key to this view is the concept of attentional episodes, brief periods of intense attentional amplification of sensory representations that regulate access to working memory and response-related processes. We describe how attentional episodes are linked to earlier attentional mechanisms and to recurrent processing at the neural level. We present data showing that multiple sequential events can be involuntarily encoded in working memory when they appear during the same attentional episode, whether they are relevant or not. We also discuss the costs associated with processing multiple events within a single episode. Finally, we argue that breaking down the dichotomy between pre-attentive and attentive (as well as early vs. late selection) offers new solutions to old problems in attention research that have never been resolved. It can provide a unified and conceptually coherent account of the network of cognitive and neural processes that produce the goal-directed selectivity in perceptual processing that is commonly referred to as “attention”.

Smooth pursuit eye movements are among our most intriguing motor behaviors. They are able to keep the line of sight on smoothly moving targets with little or no overt effort or deliberate planning, and they can respond quickly and accurately to changes in the trajectory of motion of targets. Nevertheless, despite these seeming automatic characteristics, pursuit is highly sensitive to high-level factors, such as the choices made about attention, or beliefs about the direction of upcoming motion. Investigators have struggled for decades with the problem of incorporating both high- and low-level processes into a single coherent model. This talk will present an overview of the current state of efforts to incorporate high- and low-level influences, as well as new observations that add to our understanding of both types of influences. These observations (in contrast to much of the literature) focus on the directional properties of pursuit. Studies will be presented that show: (1) the direction of smooth pursuit made to pursue fields of noisy random dots depends on the relative reliability of the sensory signal and the expected motion direction; (2) smooth pursuit shows predictive responses that depend on the interpretation of cues that signal an impending collision; and (3) smooth pursuit during a change in target direction displays kinematic properties consistent with the well-known two-thirds power law. Implications for incorporating high- and low-level factors into the same framework will be discussed.

Episodic memory performance decreases with advancing age. According to theoretical models, such memory decline might be a consequence of age-related reductions in the ability to form distinct neural representations of our past. In this talk, I want to present our new age-comparative fMRI study investigating age-related neural dedifferentiation across different representational levels. By combining univariate analyses and searchlight pattern similarity analyses, we found that older adults show reduced category selective processing in higher visual areas, less specific item representations in occipital regions and less stable item representations. Dedifferentiation on all these representational levels was related to memory performance, with item specificity being the strongest contributor. Overall, our results emphasize that age-related dedifferentiation can be observed across the entire cortical hierarchy which may selectively impair memory performance depending on the memory task.

Did we eat spaghetti for lunch because we saw our colleague eat spaghetti? What drives a risk decision? How can our breakfast impact our decisions throughout the day? Research from different disciplines such as economics, psychology and neuroscience have attempted to investigate the motives and modulators of human decision making. Human decisions can be flexibly modulated by the different experiences we have in our daily lives, at the same time, bodily processes, such as metabolism can also impact economic behavior. These modulations can occur through our social networks, through the impact of our own behavior on the social environment, but also simply by the food we have eaten. Here, I will present a series of recent studies from my lab in which we shed light on the psychological, neural and metabolic motives and modulators of human decision making.

In human and non-human animals, conceptual knowledge is partially organized according to low-dimensional geometries that rely on brain structures and computations involved in spatial representations. Recently, two separate lines of research have investigated cognitive maps, that are associated with the hippocampal formation and are similar to world-centered representations of the environment, and image spaces, that are associated with the parietal cortex and are similar to self-centered spatial relationships. I will suggest that cognitive maps and image spaces may be two manifestations of a more general propensity of the mind to create low-dimensional internal models, and may play a role in analogical reasoning and metaphorical thinking. Finally, I will show some data suggesting that the metaphorical relationship between colors and emotions can be accounted for by the structural alignment of low-dimensional conceptual spaces.

Neural correlates of visual working memory have been found in early visual, parietal, and prefrontal regions. These findings have spurred fruitful debate over how and where in the brain memories might be represented. Here, I will present data from multiple experiments to demonstrate how a focus on behavioral requirements can unveil a more comprehensive understanding of the visual working memory system. Specifically, items in working memory must be maintained in a highly robust manner, resilient to interference. At the same time, storage mechanisms must preserve a high degree of flexibility in case of changing behavioral goals. Several examples will be explored in which visual memory representations are shown to undergo transformations, and even shift their cortical locus alongside their coding format based on specifics of the task.

Our research investigates how processes of attention, visual working memory (VWM), and decision-making combine to translate perception into action. Within this framework, the role of VWM is to form stable representations of transient stimulus events that allow them to be identified by a decision process, which we model as a diffusion process. In psychophysical tasks, we find the capacity of VWM is well defined by a sample-size model, which attributes changes in VWM precision with set-size to differences in the number evidence samples recruited to represent stimuli. In the first part of the talk, I review evidence for the sample-size model and highlight the model's strengths: It provides a parameter-free characterization of the set-size effect; it has plausible neural and cognitive interpretations; an attention-weighted version of the model accounts for the power-law of VWM, and it accounts for the selective updating of VWM in multiple-look experiments. In the second part of the talk, I provide a characterization of the theoretical relationship between two-choice and continuous-outcome decision tasks using the circular diffusion model, highlighting their common features. I describe recent work characterizing the joint distributions of decision outcomes and response times in continuous-outcome tasks using the circular diffusion model and show that the model can clearly distinguish variable-precision and simple mixture models of the evidence entering the decision process. The ability to distinguish these kinds of processes is central to current VWM studies.

Several studies have showed that face stimuli elicit extremely fast and involuntary saccadic responses toward them, relative to other categories of visual stimuli. In the talk, I will mainly focus on a quite recent research done in our team that investigated to what extent face stimuli influence the programming and execution of saccades. In this research, two experiments were performed using a saccadic choice task: two images (one with a face, one with a vehicle) were simultaneously displayed in the left and right visual fields of participants who had to execute a saccade toward the image (Experiment 1) or toward a cross added in the center of the image (Experiment 2) containing a target stimulus (a face or a vehicle). As expected participants were faster to execute a saccade toward a face than toward a vehicle and did less errors. We also observed shorter saccades toward vehicle than face targets, even if participants were explicitly asked to perform their saccades toward a specific location (Experiment 2). Further analyses, that I will detailed in the talk, showed that error saccades might be interrupted in mid-fight to initiate a concurrently programmed corrective saccade.

I will begin by describing recent research taking a new, model-based approach to perceptual development. This approach uncovers fundamental changes in information processing underlying the protracted development of perception, action, and decision-making in childhood. For example, integration of multiple sensory estimates via reliability-weighted averaging – widely used by adults to improve perception – is often not seen until surprisingly late into childhood, as assessed by both behaviour and neural representations. This approach forms the basis for a newer question: the scope for the nervous system to deploy useful computations (e.g. reliability-weighted averaging) to optimise perception and action using newly-learned sensory signals provided by technology. Our initial model system is augmenting visual depth perception with devices translating distance into auditory or vibro-tactile signals. This problem has immediate applications to people with partial vision loss, but the broader question concerns our scope to use technology to tune in to any signal not available to our native biological receptors. I will describe initial progress on this problem, and our approach to operationalising what it might mean to adopt a new signal comparably to a native sense. This will include testing for its integration (weighted averaging) alongside the native senses, assessing the level at which this integration happens in the brain, and measuring the degree of ‘automaticity’ with which new signals are used, compared with native perception.

Nicole Rust is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research investigates how the brain gives rise to the mind and to behavior, with an emphasis on memory. Much of her work lies at the nexus of real and artificial intelligence, as well as experiment and theory.

Humans have a remarkable ability to figure out what happened and why. In this talk, I will shed light on this ability from multiple angles. I will present a computational framework for modeling causal explanations in terms of counterfactual simulations, and several lines of experiments testing this framework in the domain of intuitive physics. The model predicts people's causal judgments about a variety of physical scenes, including dynamic collision events, complex situations that involve multiple causes, omissions as causes, and causal responsibility for a system's stability. It also captures the cognitive processes underlying these judgments as revealed by spontaneous eye-movements. More recently, we have applied our computational framework to explain multisensory integration. I will show how people's inferences about what happened are well-accounted for by a model that integrates visual and auditory evidence through approximate physical simulations.

In this talk I’ll discuss translation of findings of multisensory facilitation of learning to cognitive training. I’ll first review some early findings of multisensory facilitation of learning and then discuss how we have been translating these basic science approaches into gamified training interventions to improve cognitive functions. I’ll touch on approaches to training vision, hearing and working memory that we are developing at the UCR Brain Game Center for Mental Fitness and Well-being. I look forward to discussing both the basic science but also the complexities of how to translate approaches from basic science into the more complex frameworks often used in interventions.

The idea that behavior results from a dynamic interplay between automatic and controlled processing underlies much of decision science, but has also generated considerable controversy. In this talk, I will highlight behavioral and neural data showing how recently-developed computational models of decision making can be used to shed new light on whether, when, and how decisions result from distinct processes operating at different timescales. Across diverse domains ranging from altruism to risky choice biases and self-regulation, our work suggests that a model of prioritized attentional sampling and evidence accumulation may provide an alternative explanation for many phenomena previously interpreted as supporting dual process models of choice. However, I also show how some features of the model might be taken as support for specific aspects of dual-process models, providing a way to reconcile conflicting accounts and generating new predictions and insights along the way.

Constraints on control-dependent processing have become a fundamental concept in general theories of cognition that explain human behavior in terms of rational adaptations to these constraints. However, theories miss a rationale for why such constraints would exist in the first place. Recent work suggests that constraints on the allocation of control facilitate flexible task switching at the expense of the stability needed to support goal-directed behavior in face of distraction. We formulate this problem in a dynamical system, in which control signals are represented as attractors and in which constraints on control allocation limit the depth of these attractors. We derive formal expressions of the stability-flexibility tradeoff, showing that constraints on control allocation improve cognitive flexibility but impair cognitive stability. We provide evidence that human participants adapt higher constraints on the allocation of control as the demand for flexibility increases but that participants deviate from optimal constraints. In continuing work, we are investigating how collaborative performance of a group of individuals can benefit from individual differences defined in terms of balance between cognitive stability and flexibility.

Concerns about the impact of social media use on adolescent well-being and mental health are common. While the amount of research in this area has increased rapidly over the last 5 years, most outputs are still marred by a multitude of limitations. These shortcomings have left our understanding of social media effects severely limited, holding back both scientific discovery and policy interventions. This talk discusses how developmental, cognitive and neuroscientific approaches might provide a new and improved way of studying social media effects. It will detail new studies in support of this idea, and raise potential avenues for collaborative work across the Cambridge Neuroscience community. As the digital world now (re)shapes what it means for us to live, communicate and develop, only an interdisciplinary approach will allow us to truly understand its impacts.

In a few months, human infants develop complex capacities in numerous cognitive domains. They learn their native language, recognize their parents, refine their numerical capacities and their perception of the world around them but are they conscious and how can we study consciousness when no verbal report is possible? One way to approach this question is to rely on the neural responses correlated with conscious perception in adults (i.e. a global increase of activity in notably frontal regions with top-down amplification of the sensory levels). We can thus study at what age the developing anatomical architecture might be mature enough to allow this type of responses, but moreover we can use similar experimental paradigms than in adults in which we expect to observe a similar pattern of functional responses.

Many psychological theories assume that qualitatively different cognitive processes can result in identical responses. Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models allow researchers to disentangle latent cognitive processes based on observed response frequencies. Recently, MPT models have been extended to explicitly account for participant and item heterogeneity. These hierarchical Bayesian MPT models provide the opportunity to connect two traditionally isolated disciplines. Whereas cognitive psychology has often focused on the experimental validation of MPT model parameters on the group level, psychometrics provides the necessary concepts and tools for measuring differences in MPT parameters on the item or person level. Moreover, MPT parameters can be regressed on covariates to model latent processes as a function of personality traits or other person characteristics.

Interval timing is a fundamental component action, and is susceptible to motor-related temporal distortions. Previous studies have shown that movement biases temporal estimates, but have primarily considered self-modulated movement only. However, real-world encounters often include situations in which movement is restricted or perturbed by environmental factors. In the following experiments, we introduced viscous movement environments to externally modulate movement and investigated the resulting effects on temporal perception. In two separate tasks, participants timed auditory intervals while moving a robotic arm that randomly applied four levels of viscosity. Results demonstrated that higher viscosity led to shorter perceived durations. Using a drift-diffusion model and a Bayesian observer model, we confirmed these biasing effects arose from perceptual mechanisms, instead of biases in decision making. These findings suggest that environmental perturbations are an important factor in movement-related temporal distortions, and enhance the current understanding of the interactions of motor activity and cognitive processes. https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.10.26.355396v1