Cognitive Psychology seminars

Can we learn without conscious awareness? Numerous evidences in the research of implicit learning have indicated that people can learn the statistical structure of the stimuli but seemingly without any awareness of its underlying rules. However, it remains unclear what types of knowledge can be learned in implicit learning, what is the relationship between conscious and unconscious knowledge, and what are the neural substrates for the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge. In this talk, I will discuss with you about these ongoing questions.

Visual perceptual learning (VPL) is defined as improved performance on a visual task due to visual experience. It was once argued that attention to a visual feature is necessary for VPL of the feature to occur. Contrary to this view, a phenomenon called task-irrelevant VPL demonstrated that VPL can occur due to exposure to a feature which is sub-threshold and task-irrelevant, and therefore, unattended. A series of findings based on task-irrelevant VPL has indicated the following two mechanisms. First, attention to a feature facilitates VPL of the feature while inhibiting VPL of unattended and supra-threshold features. Second, reward paired with a feature enables VPL of the feature irrespective of whether the feature is attended or not. However, we recently found an additional twist; VPL of a task-irrelevant and supra-threshold feature embedded in a natural scene is not subject to the inhibition of attention. This new finding suggests a need to revise the current view or add a new mechanism as to how VPL occurs.

Social learning and analogical reasoning both provide exponential opportunities for learning. These skills have largely been studied independently, but my future research asks how combining skills across previously independent domains could add up to more than the sum of their parts. Analogical reasoning allows individuals to transfer learning between contexts and opens up infinite opportunities for innovation and knowledge creation. Its origins and development, so far, have largely been studied in purely cognitive domains. Constraining analogical development to non-social domains may mistakenly lead researchers to overlook its early roots and limit ideas about its potential scope. Building a bridge between social learning and analogy could facilitate identification of the origins of analogical reasoning and broaden its far-reaching potential. In this talk, I propose that the early emergence of social learning, its saliency, and its meaningful context for young children provides a springboard for learning. In addition to providing a strong foundation for early analogical reasoning, the social domain provides an avenue for scaling up analogies in order to learn to learn from others via increasingly complex and broad routes.

Vision provides us with a holistic interpretation of the world that is, with very few exceptions, coherent and consistent across multiple levels of abstraction, from scene to objects to features. In this talk I will present results from past and ongoing work in my laboratory that investigates the role top-down signals play in establishing such coherent perceptual experience. Based on the results of several psychophysical experiments I will introduce a theory of “self-consistent inference” and show how it can account for human perceptual behavior. The talk will close with a discussion of how the theory can help us understand more cognitive processes.

Common factors are omnipresent in everyday life, e.g., it is widely held that there is a common factor g for intelligence. In vision, however, there seems to be a multitude of specific factors rather than a strong and unique common factor. In my thesis, I first examined the multidimensionality of the structure underlying visual illusions. To this aim, the susceptibility to various visual illusions was measured. In addition, subjects were tested with variants of the same illusion, which differed in spatial features, luminance, orientation, or contextual conditions. Only weak correlations were observed between the susceptibility to different visual illusions. An individual showing a strong susceptibility to one visual illusion does not necessarily show a strong susceptibility to other visual illusions, suggesting that the structure underlying visual illusions is multifactorial. In contrast, there were strong correlations between the susceptibility to variants of the same illusion. Hence, factors seem to be illusion-specific but not feature-specific. Second, I investigated whether a strong visual factor emerges in healthy elderly and patients with schizophrenia, which may be expected from the general decline in perceptual abilities usually reported in these two populations compared to healthy young adults. Similarly, a strong visual factor may emerge in action video gamers, who often show enhanced perceptual performance compared to non-video gamers. Hence, healthy elderly, patients with schizophrenia, and action video gamers were tested with a battery of visual tasks, such as a contrast detection and orientation discrimination task. As in control groups, between-task correlations were weak in general, which argues against the emergence of a strong common factor for vision in these populations. While similar tasks are usually assumed to rely on similar neural mechanisms, the performances in different visual tasks were only weakly related to each other, i.e., performance does not generalize across visual tasks. These results highlight the relevance of an individual differences approach to unravel the multidimensionality of the visual structure.

Visual comparisons are ubiquitous, and they can also be an important source for learning (e.g., Gentner et al., 2016; Kok et al., 2013). In science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM), key information is often conveyed through figures, graphs, and diagrams (Mayer, 1993). Comparing within and across visuals is critical for gleaning insight into the underlying concepts, structures, and processes that they represent. This talk addresses how people make visual comparisons and how visual comparisons can be best supported to improve learning. In particular, the talk will present a series of studies exploring the Spatial Alignment Principle (Matlen et al., 2020), derived from Structure-Mapping Theory (Gentner, 1983). Structure-mapping theory proposes that comparisons involve a process of finding correspondences between elements based on structured relationships. The Spatial Alignment Principle suggests that spatially arranging compared figures directly – to support correct correspondences and minimize interference from incorrect correspondences – will facilitate visual comparisons. We find that direct placement can facilitate visual comparison in educationally relevant stimuli, and that it may be especially important when figures are less familiar. We also present complementary evidence illustrating the preponderance of visual comparisons in 7th grade science textbooks.

Several lines of research have demonstrated that internally generated sensory experience - such as during memory, dreaming and mental imagery - activates similar neural representations as externally triggered perception. This overlap raises a fundamental challenge: how is the brain able to keep apart signals reflecting imagination and reality? In a series of online psychophysics experiments combined with computational modelling, we investigated to what extent imagination and perception are confused when the same content is simultaneously imagined and perceived. We found that simultaneous congruent mental imagery consistently led to an increase in perceptual presence responses, and that congruent perceptual presence responses were in turn associated with a more vivid imagery experience. Our findings can be best explained by a simple signal detection model in which imagined and perceived signals are added together. Perceptual reality monitoring can then easily be implemented by evaluating whether this intermixed signal is strong or vivid enough to pass a ‘reality threshold’. Our model suggests that, in contrast to self-generated sensory changes during movement, our brain does not discount self-generated sensory signals during mental imagery. This has profound implications for our understanding of reality monitoring and perception in general.

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies and variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to the frequently suboptimal inference strategies used by humans. We examined inference problems involving rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that were suboptimal relative to the Bayesian ideal observer. These suboptimal strategies reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but high bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but displayed weaker, near-normative bias. Our results yield new insights into the principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference, and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that are sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality of the inference process.

Error monitoring refers to the ability to monitor one's own task performance without explicit feedback. This ability is studied typically in two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigms. Recent research showed that humans can also keep track of the magnitude and direction of errors in different magnitude domains (e.g., numerosity, duration, length). Based on the evidence that suggests a shared mechanism for magnitude representations, we aimed to investigate whether metric error monitoring ability is commonly governed across different magnitude domains. Participants reproduced/estimated temporal, numerical, and spatial magnitudes after which they rated their confidence regarding first order task performance and judged the direction of their reproduction/estimation errors. Participants were also tested in a 2AFC perceptual decision task and provided confidence ratings regarding their decisions. Results showed that variability in reproductions/estimations and metric error monitoring ability, as measured by combining confidence and error direction judgements, were positively related across temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Metacognitive sensitivity in these metric domains was also positively associated with each other but not with metacognitive sensitivity in the 2AFC perceptual decision task. In conclusion, the current findings point at a general metric error monitoring ability that is shared across different metric domains with limited generalizability to perceptual decision-making.

Recent economics literature has seen a revival of interest to psychologically-grounded theories of decision under risk. We review the recent proposals in this direction, compare it to classical estimations based on utility functions, and discuss their appropriateness using some original experimental data.

The seminar will first outline the architecture of the human mind, specifying general and domain-specific mental processes. The place of causal reasoning and its relations with the other processes will be specified. Experimental, psychometric, developmental, and brain-based evidence will be summarized. The main message of the talk is that causal thought involves domain-specific core processes rooted in perception and served by special brain networks which capture interactions between objects. With development, causal reasoning is increasingly associated with a general abstraction system which generates general principles underlying inductive, analogical, and deductive reasoning and also heuristics for specifying causal relations. These associations are discussed in some detail. Possible implications for artificial intelligence and educational implications are also discussed.

Selection is the hallmark of attention: processing improves for attended items but is relatively impaired for unattended items. It is well known that visual spatial attention changes sensory signals and perception in this selective fashion. In the work I will present, we asked whether and how attentional selection happens across time. First, our experiments revealed that voluntary temporal attention (attention to specific points in time) is selective, resulting in perceptual tradeoffs across time. Second, we measured small eye movements called microsaccades and found that directing voluntary temporal attention increases the stability of the eyes in anticipation of an attended stimulus. Third, we developed a computational model of dynamic attention, which proposes specific mechanisms underlying temporal attention and its selectivity. Lastly, I will mention how we are testing predictions of the model with MEG. Altogether, this research shows how precisely timed voluntary attention helps manage inherent limits in visual processing across short time intervals, advancing our understanding of attention as a dynamic process.

It is well established that the opportunity to compare learning stimuli in a novel word learning/extension task elicits a larger number of conceptually relevant generalizations than standard no-comparison conditions. I will present results suggesting that the effectiveness of comparison depends on factors such as semantic distance, number of training items, dimension distinctiveness and interactions with age. I will address these issues in the case of familiar and unfamiliar object nouns and relational nouns. The alignment strategies followed by children during learning and at test (i.e., when learning items are compared and how children reach a solution) will be described with eye-tracking data. We will also assess the extent to which children’s performance in these tasks are associated with executive functions (inhibition and flexibility) and world knowledge. Finally, we will consider these issues in children with cognitive deficits (Intellectual deficiency, DLD)

When we remember a stimulus we rarely maintain a full fidelity representation of the observed item. Our working memory instead maintains a mixture of the observed feature values and categorical/gist information. I will discuss evidence from computational models supporting a mix of categorical and fine-detail information in working memory. Having established the need for two memory formats in working memory, I will discuss whether categorical and fine-detailed information for a stimulus are represented separately or as a single unified representation. Computational models of these two potential cognitive structures make differing predictions about the pattern of responses in visual working memory recall tests. The present study required participants to remember the orientation of stimuli for later reproduction. The pattern of responses are used to test the competing representational structures and to quantify the relative amount of fine-detailed and categorical information maintained. The effects of set size, encoding time, serial order, and response order on memory precision, categorical information, and guessing rates are also explored. (This is a 60 min talk).

In the past few years, there has been growing evidence that the basic ability for relational generalization starts in early infancy, with 3-month-olds seeming to learn relational abstractions with little training. Further, work with toddlers seem to suggest that relational generalizations are no more difficult than those based on objects, and they can readily consider both simultaneously. Likewise, causal learning research with adults suggests that people infer causal relationships at multiple levels of abstraction simultaneously as they learn about novel causal systems. These findings all appear counter to theories of concept learning that posit when concepts are first learned they tend to be concrete (tied to specific contexts and features) and abstraction proceeds incrementally as learners encounter more examples. The current talk will not question the veracity of any of these findings but will present several others from my and others’ research on relational learning that suggests that when the perceptual or conceptual content becomes more complex, patterns of incremental abstraction re-emerge. Further, the specific contexts and task parameters that support or hinder abstraction reveal the underlying cognitive processes. I will then consider whether the models that posit simultaneous, immediate learning at multiple levels of abstraction can accommodate these more complex patterns.

Previous work looking at individual differences in face identity processing (FIP) has found that most commonly used lab-based performance assessments are unfortunately not sufficiently sensitive on their own for measuring performance in both the upper and lower tails of the general population simultaneously. So more recently, researchers have begun incorporating multiple testing procedures into their assessments. Still, though, the growing consensus seems to be that at the individual level, there is quite a bit of variability between test scores. The overall consequence of this is that extreme scores will still occur simply by chance in large enough samples. To mitigate this issue, our recent work has developed measures of intra-individual FIP consistency to refine selection of those with superior abilities (i.e. from the upper tail). For starters, we assessed consistency of face matching and recognition in neurotypical controls, and compared them to a sample of SRs. In terms of face matching, we demonstrated psychophysically that SRs show significantly greater consistency than controls in exploiting spatial frequency information than controls. Meanwhile, we showed that SRs’ recognition of faces is highly related to memorability for identities, yet effectively unrelated among controls. So overall, at the high end of the FIP spectrum, consistency can be a useful tool for revealing both qualitative and quantitative individual differences. Finally, in conjunction with collaborators from the Rheinland-Pfalz Police, we developed a pair of bespoke work samples to get bias-free measures of intraindividual consistency in current law enforcement personnel. Officers with higher composite scores on a set of 3 challenging FIP tests tended to show higher consistency, and vice versa. Overall, this suggests that not only is consistency a reasonably good marker of superior FIP abilities, but could present important practical benefits for personnel selection in many other domains of expertise.

Self-control is a central aspect of free will. Because self-control is often described in terms of resisting temptations, research on the cognitive neuroscience of free will often focuses on mechanisms of top-down regulation. We argue that this obscures a crucial temporal dimension of free will: now-then regulation. We distinguish now-then regulation from top-down regulation, and situate now-then regulation within a broader account of temporally extended agency. In highlighting this temporal dimension of control, we aim to provide a more nuanced account of how motivation informs action over time, different kinds of regulatory processes underlying the planning and execution of action, and the temporal components of reasons-responsiveness.

In decision-making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: (1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, (2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and (3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as eleven alternative models each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants’ data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants’ choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.

Natural behavior reveals the way that gaze serves the needs of the current task, and the complex cognitive control mechanisms that are involved. It has become increasingly clear that even the simplest actions involve complex decision processes that depend on an interaction of visual information, knowledge of the current environment, and the intrinsic costs and benefits of actions choices. I will explore these ideas in the context of walking in natural terrain, where we are able to recover the 3D structure of the visual environment. We show that subjects choose flexible paths that depend on the flatness of the terrain over the next few steps. Subjects trade off flatness with straightness of their paths towards the goal, indicating a nuanced trade-off between stability and energetic costs on both the time scale of the next step and longer-range constraints.

The tight relationship between attention and conscious perception has been extensively researched in the past decades. However, whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particularly when it came to abstract and high-level processing. I will talk about a recent study where we utilized the Stroop paradigm to show that task load gates unconscious semantic processing. In a series of psychophysical experiments, the unconscious word semantics influenced conscious task performance only under the low task load condition, but not the high task load condition. Intriguingly, with enough practice in the high task load condition, the unconscious effect reemerged. These findings suggest a competition of attentional resources between unconscious and conscious processes, challenging the automaticity account of unconscious processing.